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ABSTRACT
CONCEPTUALIZING GOVERNANCE DECISION MAKING: A THEORETICAL MODEL
OF MENTAL PROCESSES DERIVED THROUGH ABDUCTION
Matt Loesch
Old Dominion University, 2019
Director: Dr. Berhanu Mengistu
The field of Public Policy and Administration is heavily influenced by the decisions
individuals make regarding matters of governance. These types of decisions can affect a broad
scope of government-related activities ranging from esoteric debates about political ideology to
policy development to specific ways in which people directly interact with public services.
Unfortunately, in the view of this research, there is no sufficient model for conceptualizing
governance decision making. This creates the focus of inquiry for this work, which is to examine
how governance decisions are conceived of and formulated. The purpose of this research is then
to analyze the governance decision making processes. This is achieved by examining the
available research on decision making processes and then contrasting the widely applied rational
approaches with the more applicable nonrational approaches for decision making. This review
will indicate that a nonrational conceptualization based on schemas, heuristics, and a societallevel shared mental model may be more instrumental in analyzing governance decisions than
rational conceptualizations. The unique but necessary methodological approach of abductive
logic is used to develop a theoretical foundation for this new perspective. An application of
abductive principles is used to create a framework that anchors governance decisions. The result
of these efforts is a model that can serve as a tool for analysis of these important and influential
decisions in governance.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Government actions, known as governance, can affect many aspects of society. The
actions of government can bring with them great risks and costs (Kettl, 2018). One can evaluate
several different parts of these actions, such as how their courses of action developed, how they
were implemented, or what type of impact they had. One could also evaluate these actions at a
more foundational level. Their origin could be investigated by exploring the choices that were
made, choices that resulted in those government actions coming into existence. To do this would
be to study governance decision making. That is the focus of this work.
This area of inquiry is worthy of attention for two fundamentally important reasons. First,
it is believed that to understand governance decision making is to understand the source of any
government action. To know the origin of a government action may mean being able to more
positively influence its formation, implementation, and application. It is reasoned that
progressing such understandings could lead to the development of government actions that are
more preferred and satisfying to the people receiving them. Changes of this nature could
reasonably be viewed by the average person as improving government. Second, exploring
decision making is important as it is considered the foundation of public administration. In fact,
disagreements over how decision making does and should work are at the foundation of public
administration (Kettl, 2018). This research will look to help move these public administration
disagreements in a positive direction. As Frederikson, Smith, Larimer, and Licari stated (2016, p.
1), “All great human events in history were probably achieved by what we today would call
public administration.” It is determined here that to advance the field of public administration’s
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understanding of governance decision making is to better enable the possibility for more of such
“great human events.”
Any chance to improve governance and enable meaningful societal achievements through
those improvements rests on the decisions that are made in the governing process. The collective
decision by a governing body to act in some way can be linked back to the decisions of
individuals and their conceptualizations of the governance process. Although interpersonal
communication of perceptions likely requires some form of shared understanding regarding what
different preferences mean, the process of decision making happens in the mind of each decision
maker. Researchers cannot though directly observe these cognitive processes and rely on
inferential explanations for describing people’s decision making processes (Hindmoor, 2006).
Yet, given the potential impact of these decisions, understanding how they happen is valuable.
That understanding may be best represented in the form of a model. Regrettably, no model exists
that is believed to sufficiently conceptualize the decision making process associated with
governance.
Justifiably, the influence of politics in government can cause this void of understanding
governance decision making to be filled by some spectrum-type political model. However, it is
argued in this work that such models are too simple for capturing the complexity of the
governance decisions that public administrators make. To more suitably address this complexity,
researchers have the option of turning to other types of analytical tools, such as those that are
based on the concept of rationality. These can be tools such as decision-tree, regression-based, or
cost-benefit-type models. These approaches are frequently considered to be acceptable because it
is often believed that, to some degree, individual decision makers act in a rational, logical
manner.
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This belief is cultivated through the application of rational choice theory. This theory
emphasizes that the individual decision maker chooses the path that can deliver the highest return
in utility. This theory then brings along with it methodologies and approaches that match that
view of the decision maker’s cognitive processes. Although there is undeniable value in
comparative utility analyses and in rational choice theory in general, this research takes the
position that they inadequately represent the governance decision making process. This is
because, in reality, decision makers seldom engage in all-encompassing utility calculations
(Rogerson, Gottleib, Handelsman, Knapp, & Younggren, 2011) and instead take a judicious
approach in the expenditure of their cognitive resources (Downs, 1957). These findings call into
question the extent that rationality is even used at all for governance decision making.
To address these challenges to rational choice theory’s applicability, this research
explores a decision process that avoids the principles of rational choice theory. This research
states that decision makers instead rely on a nonrational form of logic in their cognitive
processes. Nonrational approaches, which are different from mere irrational ones, emphasize
maximizing the use of cognitive resources instead of the rational approach of maximizing utility.
In general, this view on decision making maintains that individuals use certain keys for sorting
and processing information. They then do those acts in a manner that helps them adeptly
navigate the complexities of matters like governance decisions while still helping them arrive at
choices that match their core preferences. Moreover, to the extent that a decision maker’s
interpersonal environment shapes these nonrational approaches, decision paths can be imparted
between people. This phenomenon creates what is called a shared mental model, and such a
model may be prevalent for governance decisions.
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The view of governance decisions as part of a societal-level shared mental model may be
more accurate and instrumental of a view to take than that of any rationality-based
conceptualization. It is the goal of this research to explore the potential formation of such a
shared mental model. A theoretical development of this sort could then serve as a tool for
analyzing the important and influential actions of governments. It could potentially do this by
providing a useful conceptualization for assessing how the governance decisions preceding those
corresponding government actions occurred.

Overview of the Problem and Research Focus
This work explores the theoretical underpinnings of government actions, actions which
can affect virtually every aspect of interpersonal, geopolitical, and sociopolitical life.
Governments of varying sizes and forms can exert great influence on how people live their lives.
The activities of governments make history and change the world. Understanding how those
significant activities come to be and, more importantly, how people put those actions in motion
is the inspiration for this research.
The actions of a government, known as governance, can be examined by looking at the
choices that were made leading up to those particular actions and outcomes. Any choice that is
made is the end result of some decision-making process. It is assumed in this work that decisionmaking can be thought of as a universal process occurring in the minds of all people, that the
process helps a person make a choice of some nature, and there is great potential for research to
learn more about this process. These assumptions have important implications on exploring the
activities of a government. Specifically, in order to gain a better understanding of what a
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government does and why, one must gain a better understanding of the decision-making
processes underneath those governance actions.
This work’s perceptions of governance and governance decisions are framed, in part, by
the contributions of Bevir (2013) and Hufty (2011). Governance decisions, because of their
subject matter, are believed here to be a unique domain of decision making, even if the
functional processes for making those decisions are like other similar types of decisions.
Governance decisions are defined here as the choices and policies that are made by some
governing body in order to structure, regulate, and maintain the rules, initiatives, and culture of
the entities associated with that governing body. These governing bodies could be of various
forms, sizes, and degrees of formality. They could be in the form of a small family unit, a tribe,
an organization, an established government, or any other sociopolitical group charged with the
task of governance decisions. It is asserted in this work that although the many types of
governing bodies make many different types of decisions through different formal and informal
procedures, the governance decision making processes they go through all share common
foundational elements. It is assumed here that there are enduring features related to the political
interplay of preferences and motivations that cross structural and functional boundaries.
These governance decisions are studied from the context of the thought processes of
individual decision makers, be that how they might be structured and what might influence an
individual’s direction within that structure. This context of individual decision making is
believed to culminate at aggregate levels as the decision making of organizations and entities that
govern societal functions. In order to know how any organization or entity engages in
governance, it is then dependent on knowing the individual decisions maker and how he or she
may approach a decision of governance.
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There are a number of challenges with this exploring the cognitive processes associated
with governance decision making. Examining decision making means exploring the “black box”
of human cognition, where although brain activity can be monitored, the exact mechanisms of
thoughts are unknown. As Hindmoor (2006, pg. 182) wrote, “We cannot directly observe mental
phenomena and that reference to them in explanations of individual behavior must therefore be
entirely inferential, non-fashionable, and unscientific.” Governance decisions by any given
person might occur through some combination of that person’s inherent abilities and learned
skills, but people might fall into patterns or categories for their decisions. Since there are some
aspects about how a person’s mind operates that are unknown, this study is about exploring what
the structure of those decisions might look like.
Even though the decision making process can be messy and circular (Mintzberg,
Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976), a general classification system has been developed for
governance decision making. According to Kettl (2018), decision making in bureaucracy has
four main approaches: rational, public choice, participative, and bargaining. A public
administration decision maker using the rational approach would comprehensively assess all
pertinent information and attempts to maximize efficiency, where the greatest return on
investment (ratio of inputs to outputs) can be achieved. The public choice approach has a public
administration decision maker that is more self-interested and goes for the option that offers the
most perceived utility. A public administrator using the participative approach would look to
those most affected by a decision for input on the best path to take. Finally, the bargaining
approach would have a public administrator confronted with a decision that tries to maximize
political support for any choice that may be selected. Kettl notes that each of these four
approaches to decision making come with various advantages and disadvantages, and none of the
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four adequately or comprehensively solves the challenges associated with stating how public
administration decisions are or should be formed.
Of these four approaches, much of the research on decision making has focused on the
concept of rationality. Specifically, many of the analyses conducted in this area of research hold
the assumption that some form of rational maximization of utility is conducted by the decision
makers in question (Jones, 2003). Utility, a concept introduced by Bentham in 1789, is an
evaluation of the extent to which an action brings happiness to a person, such as the marginal
difference of pleasure over pain. In a generalized sense, this means that the decision maker
attempts to optimize their outcome by choosing one path of choices over some other set of
choices. The resulting ranking of alternative choices in a decision creates what is known as a
utility function (Halpern, 1998), and that utility function becomes a guide for directing the
decision maker to a particular decision path. Predicting an individual’s utility functions predicts
their behavior (Kettl, 2018).
The notion of a rational utility analysis guiding the actions of a decision maker is the
basis for a core concept in the area of public policy and public administration research known as
rational choice theory. This theory based on the assumption that people are rational utility
maximizers of self-interest is also sometimes called public choice, or principle-agent theory
(Kettl, 2018). Rational choice theorists equate rationality not just with reason but also with
optimality. These theorists also assume that people not only have reasons to act the way they do
but that the beliefs that people have for why they act in certain ways are the best possible beliefs
to have given the available information. Rational choice theory has five main assumptions
including the assumption of rationality, self-interested actors, methodological individualism, the
ability to use models to convey behavior, and political individualism for creating the preferences
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that act as criteria for judging outcomes (opposed to a universal and singular view of what is
best) (Hindmoor, 2006).
In rational choice theory, theorists look not just to describe what happened but also why it
happened (Hindmoor, 2006). In doing so, preferences and choices are considered one in the same
for both their definition and measurement (Heath, 1976). Riker (1990) believed rational choice to
be the only model with the ability to help political science research meet the requirements of
being scientific, given its ability to help create generalizations for describing phenomena.
Rational choice has helped form the backbone of several theories such as explanations for party
competition, coalition building, and collective action (Hindmoor, 2006).
The theorists that have used rational choice have claimed it has a universal ability to
explain any and every aspect of political life (Hindmoor, 2006). Government decision making
“occurs in a tangled context of economic optimums and political warfare” (Downs, 1957, pg.
52). Rational choice theorists believe that there are predictable explanations for untangling those
situations and use utility comparisons to describe those relationships. Through these practices,
rational choice theory helps connect the study of politics and economics. More specifically,
rational choice theory is viewed as the intersection between the two areas of thought (Hindmoor,
2006). Economics is defined by Krugman and Wells (2012) as the study of the production,
distribution, and consumption of goods and services, and politics is defined by Lasswell (1936)
as who gets what, when, and how. Rational utility analysis is a tool of economics that, when
applied in the form of rational choice theory, is believed to describe the choices people make
politically about the production, distribution, and consumption of government-related goods and
services. This perceived association creates the connection for political scientists to use rational
choice theory to evaluate choices and decisions.
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The decision making process takes time and cognitive resources, so a person must
carefully choose what resources to use and how to use them when making a decision (Downs,
1957). This need for resources brings about the main criticism against rational choice theory. It
alleges that the computational operations that a person is required to do in their mind in order to
select the choice that maximizes utility are simply too difficult to reliably and repeatedly conduct
(Simon, 1955). Hindmoor (2006) summarized other criticisms of rationality, such as the
accusations that people merely use bounded rationality, do not act in instrumentally rational
ways, are not only self-interested, and can be bound in the selection possibilities by societal and
cultural factors. Despite these criticisms, “…rational choice still retains a large number of
adherents and continues to shape much of the political science research agenda. A large number
of articles published in journals American Political Science Review, the British Journal of
Political Science, and the American Journal of Political Science continue to use rational choice
theory” (Hindmoor, 2006, pg 18), despite a strong push for the use of other methodologies
(Hindmoor, 2006).
This push for other methodologies often comes from the view that there are actually few
times in which a person has the ability to be fully rational (Rogerson, Gottleib, Handelsman,
Knapp, & Younggren, 2011). This does also not imply that just because a decision is not fully
rational does not make it fully irrational. Decisions can be assessed not just for their level of
striving for utility maximization but also for their structure. The category label for these types of
cognitive processes is nonrational decision making. Nonrational decisions differ from rationalityfocused decision process assessments in that they focus less on utility maximization but rather
maximizing the use of cognitive resources. Through the application of procedural shortcuts and
resource-saving strategies, a person’s search for workable solutions to otherwise complex
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decisions can become much easier. Nonrational approaches attempt to scan and simplify any
large and complex sets of information into meaningful chunks of information in order to make it
more manageable and more easily dealt with. The chunking of information can help a person get
the gist of the content with an expenditure of less resources than a rational approach would
require (Fukukura, Gerguson, & Fujita, 2013; Henderson, 2006; Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, &
Alony, 2006).
This nonrational approach may also be important beyond being able to avoid some of the
main criticisms of rational choice theory. This may be because the heart of rational choice
theory, rationality, may be insufficient for both accurately modeling governance decision maker
behaviors as well as insufficient in its ability to address the complexity of governance decisions.
According to Heath (1976, pg. 79), “Rationality has nothing to do with the goal which men
pursue but only with the means they use to achieve them.” It is assumed in this work that, should
that characterization of rationality be accurate, this distinction highlights how rational choice
theory may fall short of properly conceptualizing governance decisions. More precisely, rational
choice theory runs into two challenges for governance decision making research: the resource
allocation process and the outcome focus.
The first of these two challenges, the resource allocation process, has already been
addressed. In the complex world of governance decision making, it is doubtful that public
administrators engage in complicated mathematical calculations of utility for their decisions. It is
assumed that they are more likely to use a decision making process that uses shortcuts and saves
them time and cognitive resources. As an example, even a cost-benefit analysis, which seems
purely rational, involves using shortcuts such as various metrics, whether they are a required rate
of return, a form of measurement, or a benchmark.
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The second of the two challenges, the outcome focus, addresses the view that rationality,
and thus rational choice theory, has nothing to do with the goal of a decision making process. It
is asserted in this work that public administrators do indeed focus on the goal and outcomes of
governance decisions. They may be concerned with other people affected by their decisions, with
the adherence to certain values or ideologies they hold, or with the need to operate within certain
predefined situational parameters. There is some logical support to this second challenge that
comes from the first challenge.
If it can be assumed that the cognitive process that is happening for a governance
decision is not a matter of rational choice and utility maximization, then there are a number of
potential outcome options for any decision that are essentially disregarded as unworkable
choices. This means that only certain choices are assessed in the decision making process. This
set of possible choices would only be those with anticipated outcomes that are preferable to the
decision maker. If true, this means that before a decision is even made, a person engaging a
decision regarding some governance matter has eliminated certain choices from being possibly
selected in the decision. Evaluating all choices would be too demanding.
With the elimination of the decision making paths that lead to the less preferred choices,
any other remaining choices are considered, by default, as more preferred choices. These
preferred choices are likely favored because the decision maker believes they have a high
likelihood of leading to an outcome close to some predetermined goal. It is assumed here that
with a goal already in mind, a decision maker will use as few cognitive resources as possible for
selecting a choice that achieves that goal. A decision process that emphasizes the minimization
of expensed cognitive resources instead of attempting to maximize utility would be best
characterized as a nonrational process. This logic leads one to believe that a governance decision
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making process not only leans towards a nonrational approach but expressly avoids the
complexities that would come with the rational choice means-focused and goal-disregarded
principles.
The use of rational choice theories would be an otherwise acceptable approach to
assessing governance decision making, but the assumptions of this work preclude that method.
Without the guidance of rational choice theory assessing the governance decision making
process, researchers are left to look for a nonrational approach to assessing these activities. No
satisfactory nonrational approach is believed to exist. The drive to confront this perceived
unknown is the motivation for this research.

Intellectual Merit
There are several ways that this research will explore original ideas, advance knowledge,
and provide important and valuable conclusions. The current research addresses this perceived
lack of a strong conceptualization of how governance decisions are formulated. This work takes
the stance that the application of nonrational approaches may help create an accurate
representation of the mental model used by governance decision makers. The study opens an
important line of research about the influence of one’s values and the mechanisms for creating
and using mental shortcuts in order to make a governance decision.
This study is grounded in the body of social science literature that addresses the way
people are believed to make decisions and choose between governance alternatives. The current
research creates a theoretical model of governance decision making and the factors that affect
that process. This model explores how those views and preferences culminate into dominant

13
ideological outlooks for each individual decision maker. It is considered a novel contribution to
articulate the manner in which these inclinations coalesce into a particular stance on governance.
With an accurate nonrational conceptualization of governance decision making, certain
scientific applications of Public Policy and Administration may be able to be explored in the
manner they are in other social sciences. For instance, the push to create refined scales for
assessing personality variables in Psychology lead to a great variety of connected, applicable,
and comprehensive research (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1985). It is proposed in this work that the
structure of these governance decisions likely start at the basic impulses of some core values and
culminate in widely applicable and enduring ideologies. Unique metrics may be able to be
developed for these aspects of the model that this research will present.
The ability to develop an accurate conceptualization of governance can affect what
outcomes for governance actions are sought or how outcomes of governance actions are
evaluated. These outcomes though can have significant, real world impact on people’s lives.
They may affect who gets what, when, and how, and, as Harold Lasswell (1936) indicated, that
means politics. This influence of politics on governance makes fully understanding and
deconstructing governance situations more difficult. This is because politics brings with it certain
terminology, and it is unclear how much of that terminology is universally defined and
accurately applied. It is unclear how often people merely adapt political terminology to fit their
preexisting views on governance actions, and it is unknown exactly how the perceptions of
ideographs affect decision making. People seem to tackle the terminology challenges of the
political arena by using some version of classification models (e.g., political parties, ideological
spectrums, or matrices built from preference axes).
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It is believed here that these types of political models insufficiently explain why a person
might prefer one particular governance approach over another. They may work well for purely
political analyses, but they seem to fall short of being able to specifically address governance
related matters. This means that people may feel they have some level of comfort with their
political affiliations but have some level of uncertainty about how these political views translate
to governance matters. This may cause people to struggle with selecting the governmental
leaders that they believe are right for them or struggle with easily identifying ideological friend
from foe when arguing over a particular governance action. The model presented in this work
will remedy some of those uncertainties. It will do this by focusing specifically on governance
related matters instead of politics per say. Having a model that takes such a view is an original
contribution to public administration and public policy studies.
If this area of governance decision making is left unexplored, several opportunities could
be missed. Public administrators could have a greater chance for experiencing unknowingly
undesirable governance outcomes. People may be more easily manipulated into policies and
practices that they are uncomfortable with but lack the analytical tools for expressing why.
Moreover, without a comprehensive model for governance decision making, a trend might
develop where the focus of decision making research in the field of Public Policy and
Administration becomes merely case studies for specific purposes as opposed to more widely
generalizable scientific concepts.

Broad Impact
It is believed that this research will be able to benefit other research as well as benefit
society as a whole. The most immediate impact may be on research conducted in the field of
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Public Policy and Public Administration. It is the goal of this study to provide a new framework
from which Public Policy and Administration research can work from. Future research may
benefit from acquiring a better conceptual grasp of a decision process at the heart of the actions it
studies. A framework that presents a better understanding of what was going on in people’s
minds than what is currently available could open up a world of predictive models for
researchers. With such prediction models, many opportunities to test and improve the proposed
theory could occur. Additionally, it is the goal of this research to integrate streams of research
from other social science fields (e.g., psychology, organizational behavior, and economics), in
order to expand on how Public Policy and Administration thinks about certain key concepts.
In situations where government leaders must make governance decisions, they may at
some point engage in making the choice of what is best and determine which path is best. For
those times, it may be important for those decision makers to have a better understanding of what
tradeoffs might exist for the choices they can make. Decision makers may not realize what types
of governance actions should deliver in the future the highest level of satisfaction as a function of
preference fit. If one knew what was going on in the heart of governance decisions, there is a
chance that those decisions could be improved in order to better fit a desired outcome. One
would presume that such developments would result in “better” governance and more satisfied
citizens. Also, having a better understanding of governance could help government officials
design better programs and initiatives.
Public administrators may also benefit. At times, public administrators may struggle with
their ability to connect their values and preferences to the development of particular policy or
government initiatives. Conclusions from this research may help understandings of how to
develop public policies that are more able to inherently balance the preferences and views that
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might otherwise have been believed to be competing, even to the extent of being mutually
exclusive.
Public administrators also may not sufficiently identify where competing interests might
be incompatible with other interests or when they could be combined into a new vision instead of
being believed to be at odds. This research will aid public administrators in sorting out those
types of situations. This research may help to reconcile competing entities during conflict
resolution efforts. For example, if people are able to more accurately and instrumentally
communicate their positions and interests, it may sow the seeds for constructive resolutions to
disagreement. By being able to more explicitly understand the different avenues of approaching
governance decisions, more unambiguous considerations can be given to otherwise disparate
political factions in order to help foster buy-in.
There are several potential associations this work is implicitly proposing as assumptions
when exploring conceptualizations of governance. Conceptualizations may be connected to
perceptions, and perceptions may be related to perceived preferences. Preferences may be linked
to personal evaluations, and positive evaluations are likely indicative of satisfaction. One’s
satisfaction with a thing is related to one’s support and acceptance of that thing. Taken together,
these connections could mean that a person’s belief that they support some small action could in
fact be connected to how they think that action fits into a larger conceptualization of governance.
If those associations are true, they would indicate that managing a people’s
conceptualizations and perceptions are linked to gaining their support. One can quickly see how
such concepts could be of great interest to a government or a leader. Garnering support could
bring followers and power. This could mean that governments, through various types of
leadership, could be very interested in influencing people’s perceptions of their governance. It is
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assumed here that such efforts have happened for all sorts of reasons, from the most altruistic to
the most malicious of reasons. Because of this motivation uncertainty, the more developed and
accurate a people’s conceptualization of governance decisions, the more likely they may be to
have their government act in a manner that they support and desire. Conversely, the more
inaccurate or misunderstood their conceptualization of governance decisions, the more potential
there might be for undesirable governance outcomes to occur.
Citizens may struggle with understanding whether or not proposed acts of governance
will or will not align with their preferences. As a result of that uncertainty, they may have to
unduly rely on their affiliated political leaders to help them understand what to think and why. It
is proposed here that those same individuals may have the potential to become more independent
and empowered if equipped with the conceptual tools necessary for analyzing how governance
actions fit their preferences on their own. Furthermore, this research may help people understand
the perspectives, or at least the governance-related perspectives, of others and other cultures that
are not inherently or readily comprehendible. It is the goal of this work to help make those
potential outcomes a reality.

Problem Statement
For public policy and administration research, a lack of a nonrational model for
governance decision making may cause studies to drift away from decision making research.
This is unfortunate as continued research in this area could be essential to the development of
scientific scales and metrics related to governance decision making. Lacking certain metrics or
theoretical models for governance decisions for which metrics could be derived from, efforts to
develop a more functional, impactful, and well-run governance system could be more difficult.

18
For instance, metrics for evaluating how a particular community makes decisions and selects
certain governance choices could lead to the development of governance policies and programs
that approach the underlying problem from a completely different perspective. This disconnect
of perspective could lead to unnecessarily negative perceptions of the governance efforts. This
concern relates to the research problem that this study addresses, which is how are governance
decisions structured and processed in the mind.
The two forms of nonrational decision making of interest in this research are schemas and
heuristics. They serve as shortcuts to fully rational processing. The first step of the nonrational
process is the formation of a lens for the decision maker to view the world through. This
contextually bound lens is called a schema. Schemas help people understand things by creating a
framework and categories for information (Lord and Maher, 1991; Poole et al., 1990). Culture
and context can determine the application of schemas and the social interactions between people
using those cognitive lenses (Bartlett, 1932, 1995; McVee, Dunsmore, & Gavelek, 2005;
Middleton & Crook, 1996; Saito, 1996, 2000).
Schemas though are not mechanisms for making decisions. For nonrational decision
making, that is the role of heuristics, which are used for evaluating alternatives. Heuristics are
methods for solving problems that allow a person to avoid dealing with complicated calculations
and probability estimation. They do this by substituting rules of thumb and approximate
representations (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010; McKenzie, 2005; Rogerson, et al., 2011). Working
together, schemas screen and sort information based on preexisting perceptions and preferences.
Heuristics then take over by using estimation techniques to approximate the decision path that is
believed to be the most beneficial within the limited scope of options offered by the schemas set
in place.
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This type of nonrational use of schemas and heuristics has a very important role on not
just individual but also group decisions. Many types of decisions must be made not just by the
individual but by a group of people deciding together. This causes the need for a common
decision making language in order to communicate, thus bringing about the concept of the
shared mental model. This group level phenomenon of a shared mental model is where a group
of people use a collective, nonrational game plan for achieving a decision (Klimoski &
Mohammed, 1994, p. 403). Shared mental models help people understand systems, both
currently and into the future (Halpern, 1998; Jonker, Riemsdijk, & Vermeulen, 2011).
Societally and culturally dominant schematic lenses and heuristic rules of thumb become
then crucial to the way that a group of people can collectively work towards a decision. If the
decision in question concerns how a people governs itself, then the type and quality of life that
people live may be fundamentally tied to the shared mental model that is used for matters of
governance. There may then be great value in examining what sort of shared mental model
people use for governance since the decisions that result from it may affect many aspects of
people’s lives. Searching for this type of model is the focus of this research.

Research Question
This research explores governance, an important aspect of political science and public
administration research which consists of government actions that can affect the interpersonal,
geopolitical, and sociopolitical aspects of life. Given the wide variety of forms and functions that
governance can take on, analyzing it can be difficult for researchers. One particular area of
interest for analysis though is governance decision making processes. These processes are
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important because they are the precursors to the vast range of possible governance actions that
can occur and impact people’s lives.
People are commonly thought of as acting in a rational manner when making decisions.
This common assumption typically ties any inquiry into decision making processes to the
perspective of rationality. Specifically, it ties researchers to the application of rational choice
theory and the methods and assumptions that come with that approach. The rational choice
theory relies on comparative utility analyses to assess choices. This may be a useful approach for
assessing many types of situations, but this research takes the position that rational choice theory
leaves much unanswered about the type of decisions people actually make when it comes to
matters of governance. This position comes from the belief held by this research that the rational
choice theory assumptions of people doing extensive calculations and being indifferent to
decision outcomes are assumptions that do not match the governance decision making process.
Turning away from rational choice theory approaches may imply needing to abandon the
variety of highly analytical assessment tools that appear to frequently require a much greater
level of accuracy, certainty, and clarity than the information available from a person’s
governance decision making process can provide. Dispensing with these methods does not
however require one to rely on the political side of governance and use political spectrum-type
models for assessing governance decisions. This work views the place of those models as being
most useful for analyzing partisan voting hypotheses as opposed to governance decisions per se.
This research asserts that a better answer may be to revisit the decision making process
and explore a different perspective, the nonrational perspective. This perspective casts off the
focus of maximizing utility in exchange for maximizing cognitive resources. This take on the
decision making process is believed to be more useful for conceptualizing the governance
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decision making process. Nonrationality is built upon components like schemas and heuristics
for creating mental shortcuts for processing information. These resource saving approaches are
common and have the ability to be much more widely employed than complex utility
calculations. This wide potential applicability is also believed to be instrumental to interpersonal
efforts to collectively agree on some governance approach. If true, this would imply that some
type of shared mental model that incorporates outcome focused drivers for decisions could be the
correct conceptualization for governance decision making processes. As a result of this line of
reasoning, it is the goal of this research to create a model that accurately represents this process.
It is believed here that any such model could bring a variety of benefits to researchers,
government leaders, public administrators, and even the average citizen.
As a result of these beliefs, the central research question to this work can be formed. An
assumption of this work is that understanding and deconstructing how governance decision
making occurs would allow governance actions to be better analyzed and to be conducted in a
more desired fashion in the future. From this line of reasoning, the main question of this research
can be derived: How are governance decisions formulated?

Overview of the Methodology and Hypothesis
It is believed that a model of these decision making processes will be developed that can
function as a tool or mechanism for explanation. This will be achieved by attempting to assess
and structure the various aspects of governance believed to be a part of a nonrational decision
making process. These aspects included potential elements such as frames of reference,
ideological identities, political philosophies, societal positions, motivating interests, and other
concepts potentially related to governance. It is believed that a model could be created with the
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flexibility needed to account for a wide variety of types of governance decisions. Developing a
model for understanding the governance decision making processes likely requires that the
concept of governance be considered a unique context for thought and the acceptance of the
assumption that there is a universal structure to the mechanisms of thought within that context.
Although developing a new model such as this would be an exploratory approach, it could still
offer useful suggestions.
Any proposed model of governance decision making should address a variety of
perspectives, such as values, societal anchors, motivations, and outcome goals. In doing so, it
should speak to how those views interact with one another, how certain lenses of perception can
limit the ability for people to conceptualize other views, and how people may chunk information
as a technique for dealing with otherwise overwhelmingly complex information and choices.
Since it can be difficult to obtain quality information about the inner thoughts of public
administrators’ minds that they themselves might be unaware of, a methodology that can
function without such information is needed.
The three types of logical argument that help form different broad categories of
methodology used for research are deduction, induction, and abduction. The style of research
conducted here cannot be done through typical inductive or deductive approaches. Induction
would be applicable if there were a set of governance decision making cases that could have their
implied results analyzed to infer if some universal rule is the cause of the found results
(Timmons & Tavory, 2012). At this time, no suitable universal rule with theoretically-rooted
origins for explaining how the wide range governance decisions occur is available to examine for
its predictive power. Deduction would be applicable if the available observations of governance
decision making could be used to lend support to or against the conclusions of some hypothesis,
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with that hypothesis being entirely supported a priori by some theoretically-based assumptions
(Copi, 1961; Copi & Burgess-Jackson, 1995). Again, with no currently available and suitable
comprehensive explanatory theory for the wide range of governance decisions, no deductively
obtained hypotheses could be constructed. To deal with the type of information associated with
the governance decision making process, the methodological approach used in this research will
be based on the principals of abduction (Douven, 2017; Haig, 2005). Abduction is needed for
this type of assessment because of its ability to construct the theory for which research-guiding
hypotheses of inductive and deductive approaches are built upon but do not inherently possess
the ability to formulate independently (Timmons & Tavory, 2012).
The goal of abduction is explanation, accomplished through practical reasoning and
scientific inquiry (Hoffman, 2010; Svenevig, 1997). Abduction starts not from nothing but rather
from previous knowledge, then manipulates and reforms that knowledge (Paavola, 2014).
Abduction creates hypotheses by making inferences from puzzling evidence (Haig, 2005). The
process of abductive reasoning selects the most plausible hypothesis out of available alternatives
(Svenevig, 1997). Abduction looks for an order for information that best characterizes and
addresses the available observations (Reichertz, 2004). In abduction the value of explanatory
considerations outweighs the need to require grounding in vast statistical information (Douven,
2017).
Abduction is the process of using otherwise confusing or surprising information to
creatively infer new theories and hypotheses (Timmons & Tavory, 2012). With abductive logic,
inferential leaps can be made in order to link concepts into a coherent framework. An
abductively-derived search for explanation uses observation to develop categories and
frameworks, and the resulting conceptualization then looks to provide usability and helpfulness
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for some task (Paavola, 2014; Reichertz, 2004). Abduction can be referred to as the inference to
the best explanation. New theoretical insights can take the place of old understandings (Timmons
& Tavory, 2012). This method is used here because it is the primary process for producing new
and innovative concepts, such as Darwin’s (1859) explanation for evolution as being the process
of natural selection. The use of abduction has been explored across many different areas of
inquiry, such as artificial intelligence (Pople, 1973; Yamamoto, 2000), computer science
(Magnani, 2001), law (Abimbola, 2002; Anderson, Schum, & Twining, 2005), linguistics
(McMahon, 1994), medicine (Barro & Marin, 2013; Rejón Altable, 2012), and the philosophy of
science (Lipton, 2004).
It is asserted here that the conditions for exploration that preceded some of those
applications of abduction were structurally and characteristically similar to those faced by the
search for a comprehensive understanding of governance decision making today. What is meant
by this is that not only are inductive and deductive approaches inadequate for logically deriving
an answer to some inquiry, but the information available for constructing a proposed explanation
comes in the form of unorganized facts, clues, and relationships related to the phenomenon that
could be sorted and arranged in a more instrumental, useful, or explanatory manner through
abductive logic. Since the focus of this research is to bring structure to a currently unstructured
conceptualization, the best choice for a method would be one that was tailor made for the process
of discovery. Abduction offers this, although new views created through abductive logic can
only be labeled as exploratory hypotheses (Douven, 2017). This means that the findings from
this process can only be exploratory, and not yet provide supporting evidence, as it looks to
create a new understanding.
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In order to accomplish the desired analysis, the puzzling evidence surrounding the current
state of affairs for governance decision making will be explored. Then the procedure of
abductively analyzing the information will occur through the collection of various governance
concepts, the grouping of these concepts, the comparison of different features of evidence, the
structuring of associations, the mapping of a flow for decision making processes, the prediction
of expected outcomes, and then, finally, the presentation of proposed schemas and heuristics
modeling the governance decision making process. Throughout the process, explanatory
coherence will guide identification of the inference to the best explanation. The resulting product
of the abductive method will be a model that can provide a theoretical framework for how
governance decisions occur.

Chapter Summary and Looking Ahead
This chapter explored the importance of governance decisions and some ways that those
decisions could be analyzed. It was proposed that the nonrational approach should be used to
assess decision processes rather than the standard rational approach. It was believed that this path
could deliver a more accurate conceptualization of a decision making process focused on
governance. This conceptualization was believed to be able to be formed into a model that could
be used for an analytical tool. In order to explore the formation of such a model, a
methodological approach based on abductive logic was suggested.
The next chapter will review literature relevant to governance and decision making. The
information will specifically aim to convey the interactions between the nonrational practices of
schemas, heuristics, and shared mental models. The goal of the next chapter will be to help
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combine the two spheres of knowledge into one cohesive set of information that can be used to
build a decision making model.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW OF GOVERNANCE DECISION MAKING
Exploring Governance
Many different topics and issues are encompassed within the term public administration
(Smith, 2007). It is important to distinguish between “government” and “governance.”
Government refers to “the formal institutions of the state and their monopoly over legitimate
coercive power” (Stoker, 1998, p. 17), and it emphasizes the role of the state to rule (Ansell,
2007). Governance is a much broader concept with varied connotations that makes it difficult to
define (Ansell, 2007; Keefer, 2004). There is no single indicator that can capture the concept of
governance for empirical evaluations (Bjornskov, 2010), and even the overall paradigm of
governance varies greatly in the ways it is constructed (Nyhlen & Liden, 2011). That said, it is
asserted here that one way to conceptualize governance is as the processes that both affect and
come from government. Governance addresses the governing processes and systems. It also
extends past various formal processes to include the actions of both non-state institutions and
society in general (Ansell, 2007). How public entities are organized and how members of society
interact with those entities is also a function of governance (Smith, 2007). Governance even
takes into account how governments are selected, the responsiveness of government to citizens,
the policy-making networks actors operate within, and how policies are formulated and
implemented (Kaufmann, 2003; Keefer, 2004; Rhodes, 1996). To analyze the mechanisms of
governance, one must evaluate various aspects of structured knowledge, such as sociology,
organizational theory, economics, and political science (Ansell, 2007).
The choices made in governance have been shown to have significant social, political,
and economic effects (Bjornskov, 2010). These significant impacts raise the question of what
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creates positive effects in these domains and, more simply, what represents “good” governance?
Good governance is typically defined by “normative assumptions about how decisions should be
made within organizations and the functioning of formal and informal structures for
implementing such decisions” (Mehta, 2007, section p. 1). Good governance may also be
associated with social trust (Putnam, 1993) or democratic values (Mehta, 20007). The United
Nation’s, through the Commission on Human Rights, finds transparency, responsibility,
accountability, participation, and responsiveness to be important aspects to good governance.
Also, the United Nations 1997 Development Program identified eight principles of good
governance. These organizational principles were a sense of responsiveness to stakeholders
within a reasonable timeframe, mediating differences in order to reach consensus, being
accountable to stakeholders, striving for transparency, working within legal frameworks, taking
on long-term visions, guaranteeing the rights of all individuals, and having equality of
participation in decision making (Mehta, 2007).
Good governance is also “increasingly seen as essential for ensuring national prosperity
by increasing the accountability, reliability, and predictability of decision making in
governments” (Mehta, 2007, section p. 1). This outlook means that governance decisions are
likely to be ever more focused on achieving some vision of good governance. The direction
taken for governance is based on some type of decision. Any analysis of political systems or
government policies requires some understanding of how decisions are made. Unfortunately,
how exactly governance decisions are formed is still in question. It is for this reason that
theories concerning decision making are and should continue to be fundamental components to
political science and public administration research (Nyhlen & Liden, 2011). What exactly
though is a decision?
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Decision making
A decision is “a specific commitment to action (usually a commitment of resources) and
a decision process as a set of actions and dynamic factors that begins with the identification of a
stimulus for action and ends with the specific commitment to action (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, &
Theoret, 1976). The term “decision making” refers to the cognitive processes related to
judgment, preference, classification, and inference (Gigerenzer, 2001). A great deal of research
has been done to try to analyze these processes and gain a better understanding of how people
make decisions (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). There are a number of academic journals that
specifically focus on decision making, such as the Journal of Behavioral Decision Making and
Judgment and Decision Making (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010).
The ability for a person to make a decision is related to how demanding the processing
task is (Payne, 1982), but this process does not necessarily occur in a linear form with balanced
tradeoffs (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007). Often the process of decision making is circular and
tumultuous (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976). What is especially fascinating about the
decision making process is a person’s ability to rather easily solve seemingly intractable
problems (McKenzie, 2005). This may suggest that the profoundly complex types of decisions
one may be presented with regarding matters of governance may be uniquely and somewhat
inherently able to be handled by our cognitive systems. Any interest in these types of decisions
then brings about a need to explore the causal mechanisms within this process (Nyhlen & Liden,
2011).
The process of making a decision can be extremely simple or expand all the way into
something with an incredibly multifaceted configuration. Decision making research has
persistent challenges and points of disagreement (Kettl, 2018). The challenges, as well as the
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potential payoffs, associated with decisions have been the subject of much research, but more is
needed. Of the research that has been completed thus far, a great deal of it deals with the concept
of “rationality.”

Rationality
One of the most prominent models in judgment and decision making research is
rationality, where a person is logical, analytical, and calculating in pursuit of explicit goals. In
rationality, a decision maker is believed to be able to integrate all relevant information and
produce some type of linear model for prediction of outcomes, weighting important factors as
necessary (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007). The information that produces the most desirable possible
outcome is then used for directing the decision that is to be made. Although the criteria for a
rational decision does not require the decision to necessarily be a “good” decision (Callahan,
2015), this approach is viewed as both an “elegant and powerful” model for decision making
(Nitta, 2007).
Rationality is not a unified theory, and it can encompass a number of different theoretical
arguments (Callahan, 2015). It is the dominant approach to decision making in Western societies,
often being viewed as purposeful, fulfilling to one’s self-interests, and efficient. Efficiency
occurs in rational decision making when, using the least amount of resources necessary, the
decision maker is able to achieve the maximum outcome available (Nitta, 2007). First developed
in the mid-seventeenth century (Gigerenzer, 2001), this concept of rational maximization is now
the foundation of many different types of analyses (Jones, 2003).
For the process of maximal rationality, a decision maker is presented with a number of
alternatives and selects the alternative with the highest expected value (Gigerenzer, 2001). If
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there are multiple steps in a decision, the total expected value for all steps are added together in
order for an alternative to be selected (Brownstein, 2003). An optimum choice is the alternative
that has at least as many good expected consequences as any other alternative (Tyson, 2007). In
making such choices, people have a tendency to overestimate positive outcomes for themselves
(Hogarth, 1987; Yates, 1990).
Mathematical and statistical models define the conditions of optimality (Mendoza &
Gutierrez-Pena, 2010). To better deal with conducting research with optimization, the notion of
expected value was eventually replaced with the more useful concept “expected utility” by the
mathematician Daniel Bernoulli (Gigerenzer, 2001). Just like with maximizing value, a rational
actor attempts to maximize utility; this is also often referred to as “positive theory” (Campitelli
& Gobet, 2010). In order to define a utility function, a choice merely has to be made between
alternatives, causing a rank order to the options in the decision (Halpern, 1998).
In economics-based models, this approach is considered Rational Choice Theory (RCT).
RCT establishes the assumption that people make logical decisions which lead them to the
outcome that offers the most utility. RCT logic includes principles such as transitivity,
coherence, internal consistency, and additivity of probabilities (Gigerenzer, 2001). People
generally operate in this logical and self-interested manner (Halpern, 1998), and although having
more information helps a person make a better decision, there is a point at which having more
information stops being beneficial (Fukukura, Gerguson, & Fujita, 2013).
The process of rationality is not just about which decision alternative offers the most
positive utility but rather which option delivers the highest marginal positive utility. This
important distinction means taking into account not just the positive factors but also the negative
aspects as well. This approach is known as cost-benefit analysis (CBA). Although maybe not
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typically included as one of the standard tangible or intangible components of such analyses, part
of the cost that can be included in a CBA is the amount of cognitive effort and time it takes to
reach a decision (Brownstein, 2003 & Payne, 1982). A CBA also has the ability to account for
the influence of environmental factors (Payne, 1982).
In addition to the challenge of trying to accurately include the right factors in a CBA, a
rational decision making process can also have to account for elements of uncertainty. The level
of uncertainty moderates expectations (McKenzie, 2005). This means that the determination of
how much of a cost or benefit a particular factor is can be higher or lower depending on the
amount of uncertainty present in the situation. A decision that does not include uncertainty is
conceptually simple, but real-world decisions often include uncertainty. Statistics helps a
decision maker deal with uncertainty, with the most useful models often including Bayesian
inferences (Mendoza & Gutierrez-Pena, 2010). These models allow researchers to incorporate
new evidence they come across in order to make what are assumed to be more accurate
calculations. Techniques like this help a rational decision maker come to a more accurate degree
of belief in an expectation by accounting for uncertainty, accounting for assumptions, and
updating conclusions as new information is presented. Altogether, the rigor and
comprehensiveness of a rational analytical process can, given the acceptability of certain
assumptions, provide a decision-maker a high level precision.

Irrationality & Sub-rationality
Despite these various approaches for making a rational decision, decisions often fall short
of achieving rationality. In many of these situations, a decision can be referred to as simply being
“irrational.” According to common understandings of the word, a decision that is irrational
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would be one that goes against logic, inadequately fits the goals of the decision, or is not
thoroughly thought out. However, there may be many types of decisions that, although not on par
with the standards of pure rationality, are also not entirely irrational in nature. A possibly useful
representation of the concept is to consider a spectrum of decision making with rationality on
one end and irrationality on the other. There may be a gradient between the two, and there may
be elements of both rationality and irrationality within complex decisions. To the extent that a
decision does not achieve full rationality but has aspects of rationality, it may be considered
merely sub-rational. This less-than-rational status may accurately represent many aspects of
governance, such as the creation of policy.
How policy decisions come about is an ever constant question researchers (Nyhlen &
Liden, 2011), and what has been found out about policy makers is that they often break from the
principles of rationality when making decisions (Hayes, 2007). Despite these dilemmas, many
researchers in fields related to governance do not pay much attention to aspects of decision
making (Jones, 2003). One of the few exceptions would be Graham Allison’s book Essence of
Decision that explored crisis decision making (Callahan, 2015). Despite examples like this, it is
unfortunate that decision making does not receive more attention specifically in the realm of
governance and policy arenas since the decisions of individuals form the “microfoundations for
organizational behavior and national policy” (Nitta, 2007).
Much of the research that has been conducted in regards to governance decision making
is most often anchored in the work of Herbert Simon (1947). Simon was a key figure in
behavioral studies regarding decision making and was a strong critic of the idea of decision
makers using perfect rationality (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010). Simon disagreed with the formal
models used in economic theory, identifying them as “substantive” models, and preferred the
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methods of experimental psychology and its ability to develop “procedural” models that he
believed were more accurate to real life decision making (Tyson, 2007). Substantively rational
behavior is that which fits the goal it aligned towards, and procedurally rational behavior is that
which would be the outcome of sufficient deliberation (Simon, 1976). These challenges started
the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950’s. Simon’s work on decision making used three main
assumptions: (1) cognitive process, and not just performance, needed to be analyzed in order for
accurate understandings to be developed, (2) the level of expertise that a decision maker
possesses affects the quality and development of the decision, and (3) in place of assumptions of
perfect rationality, decision makers were believed to use “bounded rationality” (Campitelli &
Gobet, 2010).
Bounded rationality occurs when a person works towards a particular goal in a decision
making process but falls short of some standard associated with perfect rationality in those
efforts (Tyson, 2007). In bounded rationality, a decision maker is constrained by availability and
completeness of information. They are also constrained by the time they have to come to a
decision and even the overall cognitive limitations of the human mind (e.g., the inability to
perform endlessly complex calculations and logic). Although a “good” decision can still be
reached, it is frequently impossible for all alternatives to be analyzed and compared to ensure the
“best” decision was made (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010).
This acceptance of something less than perfect led Simon to view decision makers
instead as “satisficers.” Through the framework of bounded rationality, a person does not look to
use the classic economic approach of maximizing but rather searches for a solution that is merely
adequate for the parameters they have set for the decision (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret,
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1976; Nitta, 2007). Although a purely rational approach should lead to a single, ideal choice to
make, satisficing can lead to many possible and desirable decisions to choose from (Nitta, 2007).
Another significant development for exploring governance aspects that challenged the
ideas of pure rationality was presented by Charles Lindblom (1959) called “Incrementalism.”
This concept developed shortly after the initial work by Simon on bounded rationality and
satisficing, and is very close in nature. In incrementalism, change is believed to be reactive and
made of just minor moves (Nitta, 2007), with those fringe steps as sometimes being somewhat
irrational when looking at the larger picture of the full governance situation.
Lindblom (1959) established incrementalism because he disagreed with the then
prevailing view that policy was the value-maximized decision that developed from deliberate
rational analysis. He believed that a purely rational process like that was unattainable as there is
often not absolute agreement on policy goals or sufficient information available to accurately
predict the consequences of different potential policy paths. Rather, he believed policies came
from the interaction of numerous actors building incrementally on previously established
policies. Realistic limitations on time and information require policymakers to only examine a
small range of options. It is this confined, sub-rational process of incrementalism that is
necessary for any large scale policy to be developed (Hayes, 2007), but any given incremental
step may be considered irrational when compared later against the overall policy goals.
A third significant development for exploring aspects of governance that fell short of the
ideals of pure rationality is the Garbage Can Process of policy development. Michael Cohen,
James March, and Johan Olsen (1972) proposed this theory to address the shortcomings of the
rational model that requires that decision makers accurately define a problem, provide alternative
solutions, and then select the best option. Not seeing the process happen through these rational
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steps, the researchers believed that a view of “organized anarchy” would fit the process better.
They believed that each decision looked not like the rational process but rather an “irrational
garbage can made up of a random draw from each of the four elements (or “streams”) of decision
making” (Shaw, 2007, section p. 1). These four streams swirling around were problems,
solutions, opportunities, and decision makers, only coming together when timing and attention
connected them (Nitta, 2007).

Transitioning from the Rationality-Irrationality Spectrum
Concepts such as bounded rationality and incrementalism appear to strive to maintain as
many elements of rationality as they can while attempting to also provide minor adjustments in
order to more accurately represent the realities of cognitive processes. They attempt to adhere to
the notion that a person will choose the outcome with the highest utility but make allowances for
the limiting influences of uncertainty, full information, or issues that require one’s attention and
force choices to be made when decision inputs seem sufficient although yet not complete. To the
extent that these conceptualizations attempt to exist along and within the spectrum of rationality
though, they are still burdened, to some degree, with the paradigmatic shortcomings of
irrationality and rationality.
It would be easy to anticipate the problems that would come with decision making
models built entirely on irrational principles. They would be nonsensical, unhelpful for making
predictions, and limit the potential for understanding. Given these faults, there is clear motivation
to have as few aspects of irrationality in any conceptualization of decision making. This is not to
say though that an attempt to present models with as many aspects of rationality as possible in
them is necessarily desirable.
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This undesirability arises because the limited ability for rational decision making to
actually occur (Rogerson, Gottleib, Handelsman, Knapp, & Younggren, 2011). Starting in the
1940’s, researchers started to challenge the rationality assumptions of perfect information and
that individuals evaluate all alternatives (Nitta, 2007). Since then, economists and psychologists
have found numerous violations of rationality and systematic deviations from its central concepts
in research studies, suggesting that the processes are frequently not occurring or not possible
(Campitelli & Gobet, 2010, Brownstein, 2003). Because of biases and social influences, decision
makers will not be purely rational, even when presented with perfect information (Frederickson,
et al., 2016). Research has also shown that decision makers do not maximize utility nor follow
Baye’s rules of updating expectations given new information (Halpern, 1998). In general, it has
been concluded that rationality “fails to accurately describe almost all actual decision making”
(Nitta, 2007, section p. 5).
Despite the consideration and perceived importance of rationality and irrationality in
decision making, both possess substantial flaws. Given these flaws, research on decision making
is not limited to a view that only sees a continuum of rationality to irrationality. A more
comprehensive and likely more accurate view on decision making takes model formulation in
another direction. Understandings bubbled out from this spectrum until research went in an
almost entirely new direction. This view started the concept of “nonrationality.”

Nonrationality
Nonrational theories are not irrational theories. They are an assorted mix of decision
making theories specifically created to account for the inadequacies of pure rationality. There is
no yet universally accepted definition of nonrational theories, but there are some commonly
agreed upon characteristics of them (Gigerenzer, 2001). Nonrationality is often believed to be
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composed of a mix of information sources for making a decision, such as formal knowledge,
techniques, patterns, and beliefs. Nonrationality typically refers to decision making elements
such as intuition, judgment, quick decisions, preferences, unconscious analysis, and
environmentally influenced decision making.
Theories of rationality are usually considered normative in that they are focused on
finding the best strategy for an all-knowing decision maker with unlimited resources.
Nonrational theories are often considered descriptive, capturing the underlying cognitive
processes of a decision. There are exceptions in both directions, but nonrational theories are
often focused less on the outcome than they are the process of a decision maker that has to deal
with emotions, resource limitations, and temporal pressures (Gigerenzer, 2001).
Frequently, nonrational thought processes are not considered to be their own independent
domain of decision making mechanisms but rather as mere blunders or inefficiencies within an
otherwise purely rational analysis (Rogerson, et al., 2011). Examples of changes in such
perceptions though can be seen in models such as bounded rationality and satisficing now being
considered more as nonrational models than modifications of rational models (Gigerenzer,
2001). Theories like these that account for decision making contexts, perceptions, and resource
limitations are better thought of as nonrational (Rogerson, et al., 2011). Nonrationality
significantly separates itself from rationality in that its theories do not strive for optimization of
utility nor endless search. They aim to more closely match real cognitive processes by
accommodating contextual influences and limitations and by acknowledging that an optimal
strategy might not even be known for the decision at hand (Gigerenzer, 2001).
One substantial real world challenge to decision making is when a decision must be
addressed by more than one decision maker. Within such a challenge is the need for multiple
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decision makers to see a decision, in the same way to some degree, be able to communicate
various sub-elements of the overall decision, and then eventually come to some type of
agreement about what strategy or approach will be taken for the decision at hand. This sort of
challenge is both common and also representative of the types of decision making that occurs in
governance strategies.
In theory, every individual associated with a multi-person decision making process could
employ principles of rationality and then everyone could come to the same optimized conclusion.
As this review of literature of explores, this is not how decision making typically occurs. At an
aggregate level, humans are not going around as a mob of computers calculating the best rational
options and then all collectively moving towards those options like a hive mind. Instead, what
nonrationality proposes is that people in a group (of any size) typically use a collective “game
plan.” Cognitive and organizational psychological research refers to this “group level
phenomenon” (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994, p. 403) as a shared mental model (SMM).
Individual applications of nonrationality culminate in larger societal models of decision
making through interpersonal relations. It is likely true that mental models used by society are
learned by the individual so that they can participate in the larger social world of interpersonal
decision making. This process likely happens through various forms of enculturation. It is
assumed here that through these means, the direction of a societal thinking process is pushed
down from the aggregate level to the individual. Once an individual understands through
communication how others are conceptualizing the decision making process (explicitly or
implicitly), the individual is able to contribute meaningfully in the decision discourse. It is for
this reason that the larger structures of shared mental models will be examined first and then the
review will transition down to more individualized cognitive processes.
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Shared Mental Models
Mental models are necessary for a person to have in order to make most of life’s
decisions (World Bank, 2014). They are may be applied to understandings of several different
concepts (Halpern, 1998). Mental models are commonly known as “categories, concepts,
identities, prototypes, stereotypes, causal narratives, and worldviews” (World Bank, 2014).
Mental models are used to form and structure all types of understandings and beliefs
(Halpern, 1998) and create descriptions of those conceptualizations (Jonker, Riemsdijk, &
Vermeulen, 2011). They influence the lenses a person views the world through, what gets their
attention, what is considered relevant from their past, and what assumptions they default to for
people or situations (World Bank, 2014). People use mental models to make sense of their world
(World Bank, 2014) and then create internal representations of the external environment around
themselves (Jonker, Riemsdijk, & Vermeulen, 2011).
A person’s perceptual world may be able to be thought of as just a collection of various
systems of information coming together in different ways that they need to process. Shared
mental models help people grasp the purpose, form, workings, and behavior of these systems
(Halpern, 1998). They not only help understand the current conditions but also predict future
states of that system (Jonker, Riemsdijk, & Vermeulen, 2011). In addition to understanding of
how systems work, mental models also help a person understand their place within that system
(World Bank, 2014).
Part of understanding one’s place within a system regards knowing how to react to
stimuli and behave appropriately; SMM help provide this guidance (Halpern, 1998). People can
have innate mental models, but most come from social influences. Mental models can even be
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embedded in culture (Halpern, 1998) and handed down and transferred across different
generations (World Bank, 2014). These understandings can be developed into deeply held
cultural assumptions regarding “behavior, attitudes, and perception” (Halpern, 1998, p. 100).
Mental models can be either broadly shared or context-dependent, and institutions can be
so closely associated with their mental models that in order to change that mental model the
entire institution must be changed. Mental models make it possible for people to develop
institutions, solve collective action problems, feel a sense of belonging and solidarity, or even
understand one another (World Bank, 2014).
Oftentimes applied to research on teams, Cannon-Bowers & Salas (2001) describe
SMM’s in part as “knowledge structures…that enable them to form accurate explanations and
expectations…” (p. 228). Work groups share mental models across themselves, and those models
help them to coordinate efforts, make predictions of how one another will react, and adapt their
behavior as necessary. The more one understands a SMM, the more interactions and
interpersonal efforts can be predicted (Jonker, Riemsdijk, & Vermeulen, 2011).
Accurate mental models can be quite helpful to a person (World Bank, 2014), but
sometimes mental models can oversimply a view of a system and overlook the necessary
complexities or depth of a system (Halpern, 1998). In these situations, the mental model can
negatively influence a decision maker’s ability to incorporate new information and create
incorrect assumptions where otherwise meaningful information is missing (World Bank, 2014).
A person’s ability to correctly form a mental model can be challenged by cultural background,
social context, illusions, incorrect estimations, and limited cognitive abilities to process all
available information. Minor misunderstandings aggregated across groups that gain momentum
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can develop into SMMs that are really just “shared ways of misperceiving the world” (Halpern,
1998, p. 225).

Robustness Through Simplicity
A person’s limited abilities of observation and cognitive processing can easily be
overwhelmed by all of the potentially relevant inputs that a situation could present (World Bank,
2014). With all the possible avenues of information that could be determined as useful by an
individual or by a group with a shared mental model, one can quickly see how information
overload could occur. Decisions using large amounts of information or potential choices are
challenging (Fukukura, Gerguson, & Fujita, 2013), and information overload occurs at the point
where a decision becomes less able to be made with each additional aspect of information
included. Information overload can lead to many negative outcomes. “When people are
confronted with too much information that they must use to make a decision, they can experience
information overload, which increases confusion (Lee & Lee, 2004; Malhotra, 1982; Schick,
Gordon, & Haka, 1990), creates paralysis and delay of decision making (Bawden, 2001; Schick
et al. 1990), decreases motivation (Baldacchino, Armistead, & Parker, 2002), and ultimately
decreases satisfaction (Jacoby, 1984; Lee & Lee, 2004)” (Fukukura, Gerguson, & Fujita, 2013, p.
658).
Abstract thinking can allow people to focus on core aspects of a decision instead of being
distracted by secondary aspects. It can be helpful to become more abstract and/or gain
psychological distance (perceived involvement), temporal distance (time from situation), or
spatial distance (physical distance between events), in order to deal with information overload
(Fukukura, Gerguson, & Fujita, 2013). Only information that can be used is helpful. Simpler,
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less complicated information is more able to be used for making decisions. Trying to create more
useful information by creating psychological distance causes information to be organized by its
“gist,” and gist is similar to the concept of chunking (Fukukura, Gerguson, & Fujita, 2013;
Henderson, 2006; Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006). “Chunking” is a common
technique for making information simpler in an instrumental manner. Chunking is the process of
combining pieces of information into groups so that there are less overall discrete elements of
information to have to manage and more overall information can be remembered and worked
with (Miller, 1956). Chunks of information can even be grouped into templates that can be stored
in long term memory and contain a broader range of information (Gobet & Simon, 1996).
Breaking larger and more complex information down into smaller, more manageable
components can help people more easily deal with the challenges associated with making certain
decisions. The simpler large sets of information can be made, the more readily and widely they
can be applied. This implies that the simplified form a mental model takes on compared to a fully
rational model helps make it more useful in more potential applications. Armed with the ability
to broadly apply chunks of information, it becomes easier to form any strategies necessary for
solving otherwise complex decisions, such as the types of decisions necessary for certain aspects
of governance. The process of chunking information in order to apply it strategically in decision
making is, in effect, the use of a “heuristic.”
Heuristics & Biases
Simon’s (1947) challenges to purely rational models of decision making inspired the
work of others. The most significant of these developments was the creation of “biased
rationality” by Tversky and Kahneman in the 1970’s (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010; McKenzie,
2005). Tversky and Kahneman have worked together to produce a great deal of research
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assessing decision making (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, -73, -79, -82a, -82b, & -84;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, -73, -74, -80, -81, -82, -83, & -91). Their research showed
empirically that people systematically deviate from predictions of rationality that anticipate
maximization strategies. They showed that the judgment of real people was not a modified
version of rationality (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010). As a substitute, Tversky and Kahneman
(1974) proposed an emphasis on heuristics.
Heuristics are methods for solving problems that allow a person to avoid dealing with
complicated calculations and probability estimation. They do this by substituting rules of thumb
and approximate representations (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010; McKenzie, 2005; Rogerson, et al.,
2011). Decisions that would be very difficult to solve using purely rational means become much
easier when a person uses cognitive shortcuts in order to get to a workable conclusion. In
challenging decisions, a person will sort for characteristics that offer simpler information to work
with than more difficult information. This implies that they try to find and employ the simplest
heuristic necessary in order to use the least amount of cognitive resources required for a decision
(Rogerson, et al., 2011). A form of this type of decision making might be in the way that singleissue voters select a politician based on just one criterion opposed to the full range of criteria
they might otherwise prefer to evaluate elected officials by.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) proposed three heuristics that help people simplify the
decision making aspects of estimating probabilities and frequencies (McKenzie, 2005). The first,
“representativeness heuristic,” is where people make assumptions that the outcome of the present
situation will match situations with similar characteristics, features, and processes. The second,
“availability heuristic,” is where people make estimations of outcomes based on examples that
more immediately and prominently come to mind. The third heuristic proposed, “anchoring and
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adjustment heuristic,” is where people use estimations they are familiar with and then move
estimations of the current situation relative to that originally referenced starting point.
The selection of heuristic is applied in regards to its fit with the characteristics of the
situation and the information available to the decision maker (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010). The
expectations for the use of heuristics can be learned from societal influences and shared mental
models in that people can have expectations for others to think in a similar manner. People can
communicate or act while assuming that others are using the same heuristics as they are and
cause mistakes and misunderstandings (Halpern, 1998). For instance, if the constituents of a
policy maker have a different heuristic for evaluating fairness, a taxation strategy perceived as
fair by the policy maker could be implemented and then viewed as unfair by the constituents.
The tradeoff to being able to compress large amounts of information and create mental
shortcuts is a loss of the ability to sufficiently prescreen for what information may be valid to
include in the analysis. Having too much information affects ability of a decision maker to find
the most important information, and condensing information causes it to be filtered, (Kettl,
2018). With heuristics, there can be a loss of the ability to avoid prejudging what information is
evaluated. The result of this compression and categorical structuring is known as a bias.
Therefore, heuristics can lead to systematic bias (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010; McKenzie, 2005).
Rogerson, et al. (2011) discuss an example of such bias in that “the availability heuristic permits
people to approximate frequency on the basis of how easily the target comes to mind, but more
memorable events are not necessarily more frequent” (p. 617). The various efforts of Tversky
and Kahneman identified a dozen such biases (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010).This bias can occur
during decision making or even occur as “biased predecision processing” where only certain
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information is being searched for while other applicable information is ignored or where one
alternative is favored from the outset (Brownstein, 2003).
It is widely accepted that decision makers frequently use heuristics, but there are
criticisms of heuristics as we know them (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007). Heuristics can often be too
vague in explaining a process (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010), and they can also lack the specificity
needed for selecting or using a particular heuristic (Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987; McKenzie,
2005). Moreover, there are criticisms regarding the characterization of cognitive performance
that comes with the heuristics paradigm (Cohen, 1981; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Hogarth, 1981;
Jungermann, 1983; Lopes, 1982; Phillips, 1983) (McKenzie, 2005).
Finally, the heuristics-and-biases paradigm can fail to properly account for environmental
influences (McKenzie, 2005). This is important to get right as properly capitalizing on the
structure of environments is what allows heuristics to be accurate, cognitively cost-effective, and
simple. When a heuristic matches well with the structure of the environment, it is referred to as
being “ecologically rational.” A heuristic that has ecological rationality is thus domain specific
(Gigerenzer, 2001), meaning that it is adapted for the environment for which it is applied.
Therefore, an accurate depiction of a shared mental model and the heuristics used within it
should appropriately account for environmental influences.

Environmental Influences
Typical normative research, usually focusing on utility, isolates decision making from
social context (Halpern, 1998). Simon (1947) disagreed with this approach and believed that
characteristics of the environment needed to be included alongside evaluations of the cognitive
system, but Tversky and Kahneman overlooked the importance of environmental influences in
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their early work on heuristics (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007). Heuristics can be studied in a
controlled research setting like rational models, but ignoring environmental influences can lead
to misleading conclusions. Numerous psychological studies have analyzed the influence of
conditions on decision making (Mendoza & Gutierrez-Pena, 2010), and it has been found that
heuristics interact with the environment and are condition dependent (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007;
McKenzie, 2005).
Research using a paradigm of rationality has often viewed people’s actions as irrational
when what was really happening was that people were altering their behavior to match their
environment (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010). Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) identified the
characteristic of heuristics as being “fast and frugal,” which is where resource limitations and
changing environmental conditions cause people to develop approaches that are not irrational but
instead rather fitting for situational pressures. Two categories of behavior have been developed
from these understandings: adaptable and adaptive behavior (Klayman & Brown, 1993;
McKenzie & Mikkelsen, 2000). Adaptive behavior is where views thought to be irrational are
actually decision processes tailored made for the environment. Adaptable decision making is
exhibited when a person, who identified some type of assumption that was fitting for heuristics
of a prior environment, determines that this assumption is now inappropriate for the changed
conditions and makes adjustments as needed (McKenzie, 2005).
Identifying the appropriate processes is an important component to decision making.
“According to the logic of appropriateness, individuals consider their situation, evaluate their
role in that situation, weigh actions according to which is most appropriate, and finally do what
is appropriate. Rational decision making assumes that individuals will act to maximize their
preferences and engage in self-interested behavior, but the logic of appropriateness assumes that
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individuals will conform to external rules—norms, routines, procedures, and roles—often
without consciously realizing they are making a decision” (Nitta, 2007, p. 4). This concept of
appropriateness can have important influences on the decision making processes related to
governance.
A shared mental model concerning governance would be expected to use heuristics that
get their form and structure from what is deemed appropriate for that environment. It is assumed
here that what is appropriate for the governance decision making environment is determined
primarily by the actors participating in that environment. Although people typically let their
social and cultural context influence alternatives they select (Halpern, 1998) – a top down
approach supporting the notion that people conform to an overall shared mental model, it is also
known that “Individual-level decision making provides the microfoundations for organizational
behavior and national policy” (Nitta, 2007, section p. 1). Therefore, it is assumed that the actors
participating in this decision making structure would be important environmental influencers.
How a governance decision is implemented can be influenced by various actors (Nyhlen
& Liden, 2011). The policy model proposed by Kingdon (1995) supports this view by
emphasizing the role of policy entrepreneurs taken on by individual actors (Shaw, 2007).
Individual actors may be politicians or civil servants, but they may also be governing structures
or different interest groups. The processes of governance has “blurred the distinction between
different actors” (p. 5), and their “spatial meaningful origins” (p. 8) may be their only
meaningful distinction (Nyhlen & Liden, 2011). Anderson (2012) developed a matrix model with
these types of spatial origins for describing choice related to governance. One of the dimensions
within this typology specified a continuum of state institutions and the government on one end to
society and the general population on the other.
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One noteworthy way in which actors within a governance decision making model differ
may be in the manner in which they perceive and structure problems. Problem structure is “a
theoretical construct used to explain how one or more individuals understand an issue; it is
composed of a starting state and a finishing state […] a well-structured problem is one where
actors seeking a solution are in agreement on the constraints, the starting point, finishing point,
and the steps necessary to progress from one to the other” (Zwald, 2007, section p. 1). For
complex problem structures, people generally attempt to break the problem down into more
manageable subdecisions with more comprehendible pieces (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret,
1976). As a problem moves farther away from being well-structured and is not merely complex,
it becomes “ill-structured” or a “fuzzy problem” (Zwald, 2007). In these situations, “one or more
constraints are vaguely defined or unknown by the actors seeking a solution […] The process
transforming an ill-structured or fuzzy problem into a well-structured problem is a combination
of cognitive functions and social interaction [...] ultimately, a well-structured problem is the
result of social contestation among multiple cognitively limited perceptions of the problem
constraints” (Zwald, 2007, section p. 1).
“Social contestation among multiple cognitively limited perceptions” appears to indicate
that how decision makers structure a problem is related to the perspective with which they
approach the decision. It also appears to indicate that a problem can be structured more
accurately and meaningfully if it includes competing perspectives. In a SMM for governance,
there could be as many perspectives as there are people in the society. How these actors
structure and view decisions within a SMM is likely to coalesce on an aggregate level into a
limited number of perspectives. This may be necessary if for no other reason than for
communication, but it may also occur for some principle-anchored reason. Accessing such
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common perspectives is likely to help produce interpersonal understanding and agreement. In the
world of governance, perspectives are expected to be a product of the frame of view used and the
information judged to be relevant. These perspectives are also expected to be indicative of
people’s perceptions and preferences for the role and purpose of government.

Perspectives, Schemata, & Preferences
Decision makers may be very selective in determining what information to include in
their cognitive processes. Selective information search has frequently been found to be related to
the biased processes of heuristics (Brownstein, 2003). People may selectively seek certain
information because they are motivated towards finding supporting evidence for a particular
belief (Kunda, 1990), and at any time during a decision they may engage in information editing
(Brownstein, 2003). Information editing here may refer to the process of viewing only certain
input information as relevant or modifying the understanding of information so as to make it fit a
preconceived perception.
When decision makers settle on the information that they want to give their attention to,
they often attempt to help themselves be more confident in their selection of information and
thus the alternative the information leads them towards. People want to have a sense of certainty
in their choices (Mills, 1968). To do this, they often try to select choices that are justified and
supported (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998), and this may mean selecting the alternatives that are
the easiest to find reasons for justifying (Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993). Decision makers
frequently try to find an option that ranks the highest in their primary goal dimensions, a
“dominant alternative” (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976). Montgomery & Willen
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(1999) believed that a search for such dominance in alternatives, otherwise known as
“dominance structuring,” is at the foundation of decision making processes.
An important part of dominance structuring is “bolstering.” In bolstering, one alternative
has its positive aspects amplified and its negative aspects deemphasized, and the other
alternatives receive the opposite treatment. This creates perceived separation between the
evaluation of the choices and helps create a sense of certainty (Brownstein, 2003). Perspectives
that form from selective information editing and bolstering of a choice are related to (and build
up to) a specific lens for viewing decisions. Together this process develops a cognitive
framework for a decision maker’s world. This unique lens for viewing available information is
called a schema. A schema is a perspective that is used to structure the information specific to an
environment.
Starting with the works of Plato and Aristotle (Marshall, 1995), the concept of schemata
first became common in research through Kant (1929) and Bartlett (1932) (Johnson, 1987). Kant
(1929) described schemata as the lenses through which one interprets the world around them.
Piaget (1952) also used the concept of schemata in his work on the cognitive development of
children. Work on schemata developed most in the 1970’s to become the concept it is now
known (Beals, 1998) – a way of filtering the information in the world around us.
Schemata are "data structures for representing the generic concepts stored in memory.
They exist for generalized concepts underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events,
actions, and sequences of actions" (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977, p. 101). Schemata help people
put information together into categories and form some type of organized framework so that they
can understand what they perceive (Lord and Maher, 1991; Poole et al., 1990). They provide a
decision maker with a particular pathway for interpreting information and determining how to
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proceed. Schemata operate as patterns for organizing information nearly effortlessly, help
integrate new perceptions into a cognitive structure that can be understood, and generally enable
people grasp the world around themselves (Anderson, 1990; Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; McVee,
Dunsmore, & Gavelek, 2005). Schemata are cognitive structures for combining attributes and
interpreting some aspect of the world, such as archetypes, stereotypes, or worldviews (Anderson,
1990). Given their broad nature, their structures must be loosely classified (Kintsch, 1998).
To quickly and easily organize information with little expenditure of cognitive resources,
perception may be forced into one path of understanding. Again, this becomes a schematic lens
through which people see the world. Schemata are similar to heuristics in this sense in that they
avert a full rational analysis of information in order to expedite decision making. They are
biased in that they show partiality by sorting the relevant from the irrelevant information. On the
other hand, schemata are not mechanisms for making decisions like heuristics, and they are not
used for evaluating alternatives. Schemata do not result in decisions being made. In schemata,
information deemed useful is merely screened for and processed. Once processed, the
information can be used for making a decision, but the inputs to that decision making process are
limited to what is offered from the employed schemata.
Schemata have a number of features and functions. They use variables, can be embedded
within one another, operate at all levels of abstraction, and “represent knowledge rather than
definitions” (Rumelhart, 1984, p. 169). At times, multiple schemata can be applied
simultaneously to a situation, and they can conflict with one another (Anderson, 1990). Use of
schemata may be affected by environmental influences. Culture, as an aspect of environmental
and contextual influence, can determine the application of schemata (McVee, Dunsmore, &
Gavelek, 2005). Therefore, schemata can even be viewed as cultural constructs that establish
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societal patterns and can help people interact with one another (Bartlett, 1932, 1995; Middleton
& Crook, 1996; Saito, 1996, 2000).

The Nonrational SMM of Governance
The ability for people to be able to interact with one another is important in decision
making that affects multiple people. In order to do this, there may be a need for a limited number
of options for everyone involved to communicate about. This assumption is supported by the
work of Gigerenzer (1996a, b) that proposed that people use the minimum number of attributes
possible when considering a choice. It is believed in this work that this type of simplification
also occurs in governance decision making. If true, this means that the schemata relating to
governance would be confined to a limited number of basic notions within a societal SMM.
Given the nature of choice of societal direction that comes as a result of a governance
decision, the schemata associated with personal preference for governance outcomes are likely
connected to subjective reasoning. This assumption would be supported in part by the work of
Rogerson, Gottleib, Handelsman, Knapp, and Younggren, (2011) that showed that people often
use subjective reasons for justifying the decisions they make.
Since the choices made for governance can be quite complex, any subjective reasoning
for a particular decision must be able to account for such necessary complexity. If governance
decisions are not believed to be constructed in a truly rational sense, then these decisions are
probably formed from some other, nonrational root. Being nonrational in a unique way is
misunderstood socially (Halpern, 1998), so in order to communicate well, a person must likely
use a standardized process of nonrational decision making. To find the likely nonrational
foundation of such decisions is to find a concept that can communicate the requirements of a
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decision preference for governance. Such requirements would likely be the ability to address the
topic areas for governance activities, provide simplicity for dealing with multifaceted decisions,
and have universally comprehendible features.
Values can encompass a broad range of governance concepts in simple terms and provide
conceptual flexibility across several domains of discussion. Values would allow otherwise
difficult attempts at rational analysis to be exchanged for people’s principles or judgments about
what is important. For any given individual, value preferences may be an important subjective
determinant to governance decisions. The use of preferred values for making governance
decision may also support the notion that information editing is commonly used and can be a
necessary prerequisite for communication within a SMM consisting of numerous participants.
It is for these reasons that this work makes the proposition that any SMM for governance
decision making likely has the use of values at its base. It is, however, an entirely different level
of conceptual development to propose which values are used, how they are employed, how those
values play into the schematic and heuristic structures of nonrational thinking, and the
implications of those values in the formation of governance decision making. This level of
conceptual advancement would require the creation of a theoretical model for governance
decision making. Proposing what this theoretical model may look like is thus the objective of this
work. In the development of the model, questions over which governance values should be used,
and in which way, will be explored and addressed.
As stated before, this type of focus represents a type of continuation of the work of
Simon (1947). Simon believed that the world of public administration is one of decisions, and he
believed that any science of administration should focus on analyzing decisions and particularly
the nonrational aspects of those decisions. For the field of Public Policy and Administration to be
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more scientific, it must develop various principles of science. This is to say that it should develop
structured knowledge, operationalized terms, verifiable explanations, and understandings from
which predictions can be made. Allowing governance decision making to be left unexplored and
disregarded as the unknowable process hidden within the realm of cognition prevents the field
from developing a more scientific understanding of governance. The push for a focus on decision
making and the use of scientific approaches for Public Policy and Administration could be traced
to the views of Simon. This work looks to heed his requests.
Although Simon may have eschewed the influencing power of personal values in
administrative work, he was well aware of the nonrational forms of thought and what influences
those processes can have. Even though governance values will be explored and assumed to play
an important role in the development of a governance SMM, it is hoped that Simon would
support such an inclusion of values. This would be because this inclusion of values in intended to
lead to a more scientific understanding of the Public Administration-related decision making
processes that occur and would not inherently undermine the potential for professionalism in
public administrators. Simon believed in the influence of the environment on cognitive
processes, that more developed decisions can come from those with expertise, that decision
makers operate with methods far different from those of a fully rational figure, and that templates
of thought can be used as shortcuts to get around otherwise incredibly complex decision
problems. This work builds off of those beliefs by Simon by using them as guiding principles for
how to construct a decision making model for the realm of governance.
Again, there is no model for governance decision making, despite the immense
importance and place of the concept of governance to numerous aspects of civilization and the
virtually immeasurable impact governance decisions can make. It is proposed here that this lack
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of a model of decision making in governance is because it is anchored in and based off of a
concept (values) that may be difficult to impossible for common decision making models to
work with. This difficulty may be because of their reliance on pure rationality and the ability to
apply weights to alternatives within a decision. For the complex process of governance, society
may need a SMM with some simple rules of DM, and with preferences (of values) that come
from nature and nurture. The goal of a theory that models decision making in governance would
be to develop heuristics that fit the structure of the information relevant to the environment as
well as include schemata for how that relevant information is sorted.

Chapter Summary and Looking Ahead
This chapter explored the literature relevant to governance and decision making. The
information covered the connections between the nonrational practices of schemas, heuristics,
and shared mental models. The goal of the next chapter will be to explicate the methodology that
is used to derive and then develop the theoretical insights presented in this work.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Research Approach
Kettl (2018) presented four different possible approaches to decision making. Yet, Kettl
also stated that persistent challenges exist when it comes to a comprehensive, accurate, and
agreed upon understanding of decision making. This deficiency for decision making appears to
be particularly true when specifically evaluating the status of structured knowledge regarding the
context of governance. None of those four approaches presented by Kettl sufficiently and
independently explain governance decision making, and there is little advice for how to integrate
the approaches or reconcile discrepancies. This leaves one to reexamine other decision making
research for clues on how to best resolve this inadequacy. Doing just that and using what is
known regarding the cognitive processes associated with a person making a choice, the previous
literature review indicates the need to develop a nonrational, shared mental model in order to
more accurately explain the governance decision making process. To move towards that goal, the
central question of this research becomes: How are governance decisions formulated?
This research question is motived by the search for a shared conceptualization,
framework, and form of communication by people on matters of governance. As a result of this
focus, the unit of analysis is the individual decision maker. Since this investigation looks to
break into a new area of understanding, it is believed that such a research question can only be
exploratory and offer suggestions, not confirmatory. It cannot yet argue for proof or support on
any level. This interpretation of the current stage of understanding for that concept motivates the
research design. The research design will look to emphasize a theory development methodology
and, in doing so, create a model to represent individual decision making specifically for the
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domain of governance choices. Ideally, a mental model will be created with the flexibility to
account for a wide variety of types of governance decisions, albeit likely at a foundational level
of processing.

Methodology
To answer the main research question is to develop a mental model for governance. So
what would a model like this look like? It should be able to account for a variety of perspectives
and encompass a variety of families of thought. It should be able to account for how people
predisposed to one outlook on things may have difficulty conceptualizing other approaches to
governance, yet the model should also be flexible enough to account for decision-making
processes that are more blended or hybrid in nature. The model should identify the particular
cognitive anchor points unique to this context of decision-making, yet it should also be
structured similarly to other models of decision-making in that complex groupings of
information are chunked together in order to expedite outcomes and preserve resources.
It is the goal of this research to produce such a model. The creation of a theoretical model
requires a methodology tailored towards that process. Any discussion of methodology should
cover the practices and procedures necessary for a particular inquiry. A research question such as
the one that is the focus of this work does not lend itself to the typical inductive or deductive
methods for reasoning but rather relies on abductive logic, where inferential leaps can be made in
order to link concepts in the most parsimonious manner.
Given the needs of this inquiry, the process of abductive logic will be used here to
deconstruct governance thought processes down into their primary drivers in order to identify the
schematic and heuristic elements of a nonrational model. This will be done, as Paavola (2014)
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described, by modifying and combining different aspects of previous knowledge. Specifically, a
model will be derived by examining the values, societal anchors, motivations, and outcome goals
associated with governance decisions. From these sources, an explanatory theory for governance
decisions with the most plausible account of the processes involved that can be developed will be
presented. The construction of this explanation will look to economically address relevant facts,
be able to be scientifically challenged, outperform the existing rival conceptualizations, and
relate well to other realms of understanding.
The result of these efforts will be to create a piece of theoretical research through a postpositivist approach. If sufficiently created, the model might yield a meaningful theoretical
contribution to the fields of Public Administration and Public Policy. Such a model could also
form the foundations that many other types of analyses could be created from. If this model helps
provide a better understanding of the decision making processes within matters of governance,
this knowledge could potentially help create government environments more conducive to the
desires and needs of people.

The Development of Theoretical Models
Generally, research is oriented towards either a deductive or an inductive approach. In
deductive approaches, the processes are often considered top-down. An idea comes from the
creation of a hypothesis, and observations confirm (or fail to disprove) the hypothesis.
Conclusions follow logically from facts with deductive methodologies (Douven, 2017). This
means that the hypothesis must be explained by the theoretical assumptions presented a priori in
the premises. The hypothesis cannot contain any new information (Copi, 1961; Copi & BurgessJackson, 1995).
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Conversely, inductive approaches are often thought of as bottom-up processes. In this
sense, specific observations are built up to be representative of more overarching generalizations.
Induction tries to use past experience to make future predictions. Patterns in observations form
the foundations for hypotheses, and these hypotheses develop into theories that are believed to
possess the capacity to be more widely applied than to merely the few observations originally
analyzed. Aspects of samples of a population are used to make educated guesses about the whole
population. This means that the inductive process brings with it a bit of uncertainty given the
reliance on the generalizability of characteristics and sequence of events obtained from the
limited set of observations. To manage this uncertainty, probability estimates are used to gauge
the confidence that one can expect to witness a phenomena being repeated throughout the
population (Copi, 1961; Douven, 2017).
Deduction and induction differ mainly in the types of inferences drawn from each
method. Deductive inferences are considered to be “necessary.” This means that an inference
must be true if the premises that the conclusion is built upon are true. The other class of
inferences is those that are “non-necessary,” where the truth of premises may not guarantee the
accuracy of the conclusion. The fascinating aspect of these types of inferences is that they can
not only include the inductive approach, but also a seldom acknowledged approach known as
“abduction” (Douven, 2011). Abduction is a form of reasoning used for theory development,
where the use of non-necessary inferences opens the door for the creation of new ideas.
Induction and abduction are more similar to one another than either is to deduction. They
are so similar that people may believe they are making inductive inferences when they are, in
fact, actually engaging in an abductive approach. This may be because, unlike deduction, both
induction and abduction are “ampliative” in that they extend or add to what is already known.
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Ampliative implies that the inferences drawn can exceed what is logically contained in the
premises. However, there is a distinct difference between induction and abduction. Induction is
based on observed frequencies, particular features within a population, or some statistical data.
On the other hand, in abduction the value of explanatory considerations outweighs the need to
require grounding inferences in known statistical information. Despite these lax logical rules,
abduction can still be a reliable method for identifying true conclusions, especially if the
premises are valid (Douven, 2017). It is for all of these reasons that the process of abduction is
ideal for use when trying to develop a theoretical model of some concept.

Exploring Abduction
An example of abduction may be shown through the inference drawn from a simple
scenario. Imagine that you have a house with a porch, and on that porch is a lightweight, plastic
lawn chair. As you are going to bed one night, you notice that it is extremely windy outside. The
next morning, you notice that the plastic lawn chair is knocked over on its side. It might be
possible that a neighbor’s pet went up onto your porch and pushed the chair over as it went by, it
might be that the chair was used by a neighbor and put back incorrectly, it might be that the
whole porch tilted all on its own, tipping the chair over. Most likely though, the chair was blown
over by the high winds during the night, and most people would come to that same conclusion.
The inclination for a person to choose this explanation is not an inference drawn from the
inductive or deductive methods but rather the abductive approach. Deduction would require far
greater certainty in the premises to come to a conclusion about the wind knocking down the
chair. Induction would require knowing past examples of the wind knocking down the chair and
then draw conclusions about how likely it will be that the chair will be knocked down again in
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the future when those conditions exist again. Abduction allows a strong theory for why the chair
was knocked down without the benefits of premise certainty or ample past examples to predict
from. Situations like this example would be connected to the development of any (best)
explanation for why or how something happens.
It may be helpful to think of a theory as a form of an explanation. Regrettably, theory
development is really only given superficial attention with inductive and deductive approaches.
As Haig (2005) stated, “The standard inductive and hypothetico-deductive views of scientific
method give little attention to the process of theory development. The use of traditional inductive
method leads to theories that are organized summaries of their constituent empirical
generalizations, and the orthodox hypothetico-deductive method assumes that hypotheses and
theories emerge fully formed, ready for immediate testing” (p. 379). Induction’s ability to
develop theory relies on existing trends that, in a sense, help point the theory’s construction in
the correct direction, and deduction’s ability to do so depends on an existing path that merely
needs to find support indicating that it is right theoretical road to be on. When relying on just
induction and deduction, a void exists in being able to create theory without preexisting support
or guarantees. Abduction, by connecting the dots between pieces of evidence, fills the void for
theory development as it reveals a path when no theoretical roadmap otherwise existed.
Abduction’s place in research has though not been as prominent as deductive and inductive
methods. This is somewhat surprising given the amount of time that abduction has been a known
form of reasoning.
The abductive process was first significantly described by Julius Pacius in 1597, but it
was not until Charles Peirce described it as a way to infer that extended knowledge that
abduction was able to be widely identified as a distinct from of logical reasoning (Reichertz,
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2004). In his work on the logic of science, Peirce (1931) presented abduction as a method for
inferences that offer special explanatory considerations, sometimes being called the “Inference to
the Best Explanation.” Peirce viewed the hypotheses developed from abductive methods as the
only analytical operation that produces novel concepts. He believed that the place of abductive
inferences would be in the process of discovery, where theories are developed and evaluated in a
later stage of inquiry by either deductive or inductive assessments (Douven, 2017). The term
abduction is now often used in research to draw attention to new discoveries (Reichertz, 2010).
Some modern views on abduction see it as a tool for assessing theories, but Peirce saw it
as the earlier stage of discovery that was for generating theories (Douven, 2017). It is a logical
inference that produces new knowledge by extending into the “realm of profound insight”
(Reichertz, 2010, p. 300 ). In doing so, abduction addresses both practical reasoning and
scientific inquiry (Svenevig, 1997). The goal of abduction is explanation (Hoffman, 2010). It
focuses more on explaining the state of events than from using evidence from established
premises. Abduction is a search strategy for the explanation that can be tested later (Douven,
2017).
Abduction creates hypotheses by making inferences from puzzling facts (Haig, 2005). It
is a mental leap that brings together concepts which might have never been connected before. It
“‘proceeds,’ therefore, from a known quantity (= result) to two unknowns (= rule and case)”
(Reichertz, 2004, p. 304). When there is no appropriate explanation or rule for some combination
of features of a thing, there is surprise. This surprise leads to a need for a new explanation. This
explanation must be discovered or invented. That intellectual effort is abduction, and it can
happen in an instant. It allows for the conventional view of things to be discarded for some
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creative new type of view (Reichertz, 2010). These new views can be labeled as explanatory
hypotheses (Douven, 2017).
Observations, in the form of facts, lead to a hypothesis which leads to a rule that will
account for the observations (Svenevig, 1997). When a particular situation is paired with a
general rule for how something happens, a result can be inferred (Svennevig, 1997). “An order,
or a rule, in this procedure must therefore first be discovered or invented – and this has to happen
with the aid of intellectual effort. Something unintelligible is discovered in the data, and on the
basis of the mental design of a new rule the rule is discovered or invented and, at the same time,
it also becomes clear what the case is. The logical form of this operation is that of abduction.
Here one has decided (with whatever degree of awareness and for whatever reasons) no longer to
adhere to the conventional view of things” (Reichertz, 2004, p. 304). We create rules to regain
the control that was lost by surprising facts (Reichertz, 2010).
The real process of abduction is not usually as simple as the typical explanation where
one anomalous fact leads to a hypothesis. Abduction typically includes sorting out numerous
possibly relevant clues in order to develop patterns that might lead to a viable hypothesis for
explanation (Paavola, 2014). Abduction seeks not just any new order but one for best
characterizing and addressing the observations at hand (Reichertz, 2004). An abductively
discovered order does not have to exactly mirror reality. Its goal is to be a mental construct that
sufficiently helps to manage reality in an orderly fashion (Reichertz, 2010). In doing this, the
focus is not necessarily in creating what is preferred or explicitly known already to be valid.
Instead, the focus of an abductively-derived conceptualization is its usability and helpfulness in
completing some task (Reichertz, 2004). This search for explanation causes conceptual
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frameworks to evolve and uses observations to develop categories (Paavola, 2014). These
categories often form for our beliefs and our degrees of belief about a thing (Douven, 2017).
Patterns of data and presented information are critical for abductive reasoning. It is,
however, more accurate to state that abduction is not looking to structure data and draw
predictions as it is trying to describe a phenomenon. Phenomena are usually unobservable
abstractions supported by facts (Haig, 2005). Phenomena can take a variety of forms including
“objects, states, process, events, and other features that are hard to classify” (Haig, 2005, p. 374).
Phenomena are different from data. Data are the end result of many factors interacting within
specific contexts. Phenomona are more stable as they come from only a few causal factors. The
function of data is to indicate that phenomena occur. The goal of theories is not to explain data as
much as it is to grasp an understanding of phenomena. Said another way, theories describe
phenomena and data represent evidence to support the description of the phenomena in question
(Haig, 2005). Although the main focus of abduction is to understand the meaning of a
phenomenon (Olsen, 2004), the main purpose of phenomena is not to test of the predictability of
theories as much as to be a reason why something happens the way it does (Haig, 2005). This
means that in abductive logic’s pursuit to understand a phenomenon, it inherently produces the
theory that gives form to the phenomenon. To understand phenomena is to investigate and
explain the world and that, arguably, is the purpose of scientific discovery.

Scientific Discovery
Inductive and deductive research constructs and uses theories that are tools for
describing, ordering, and predicting empirical relationships. These types of theories explain the
relationships of data, but they do not explain the causal mechanisms of the phenomena they are
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studying (Haig, 2005). The understanding of a phenomenon comes through an abductive insight.
An abductive insight is where an explanatory hypothesis fits into or creates a belief system
because it satisfies the conditions that (1) what was come up with was acceptable, (2) the system
adequately addresses some phenomenon, & (3) the system is connected to the phenomenon
because it sufficiently describes it (Hoffman, 2010). As stated before, the process of abduction is
for theory generation. Some view the construction of theories in inductive and deductive research
as having been created without the use of any particular methodology, but abduction can be a
specific methodology used for theory creation. With the use of abduction, theory construction
can go through the phases of theory generation, then theory development, and then theory
appraisal (Haig, 2005).
These three phases are related to the three forms of logical argument discussed here abduction, deduction, and induction. Peirce created a three-stage process of scientific discovery
that progressed from abduction to deduction to induction. In the first stage, a hypothesis is
created through abduction. In the second stage, deduction is used derive predictions. In the third
stage, induction is used to verify the assumptions by searching for facts. Peirce believed that
whenever the process did not yield sufficiently fitting facts, the cycle was to be repeated until it
did (Reichertz, 2004).
Abduction does not start from nothing but “modifies and combines several elements of
previous knowledge” (Paavola, 2014, pg 8). The abductive process asks the theorist to analyze
what they see and not merely what they hope or expect to see (James, 1989). The abductive
phase temporarily accepts a hypothesis, the deductive phase identifies the likely and necessary
experimental outcomes, and the inductive phase evaluates the plausibility of the abductively
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derived hypothesis (Svenevig, 1997). The deductive and inductive processes are used to clarify
and test the hypotheses that the abductive process provided (Paavola, 2014).
Many important discoveries in science were made through the abductive approach, where
the inferences required to move ideas forward could not come from inductive or deductive
methods. With abduction, understanding the causal mechanisms of theories is done through
using the known nature of things to explain the unknown the nature of things. Some prominent
examples are the discoveries of the planet Neptune, the electron, the molecular formation of
gases, the functions of genes, the different types of personalities, and the process of natural
selection. Inductive and deductive methods were later used to assess these discoveries, but the
initial conceptual leap was created through abductive reasoning. Most psychologists and
philosophers concur that abduction is the cornerstone of scientific reasoning and methodology
but also quite common in everyday reasoning (Douven, 2017; Haig, 2005). Abduction is
considered to be the most common form of reasoning for medical diagnoses by physicians when
evaluating the symptoms of a patient (Josephson & Josephson, 1994). One statistical test that is
sometimes considered to be a form of abduction and is frequently used in the behavioral sciences
is that of exploratory factor analysis (Haig, 2005).

Evaluating Abduction
Backing for abduction can actually come from inductive logic. This is because each
successive positive application of abductive methodology presents support for proponents’ views
on the inferential logic (Douven, 2017). The more times there are success stories for abduction,
the more reliable the approach is viewed as being. This use of the past to predict the future would
be inductive reasoning, and supporters of abduction can point to past accomplishments as to why
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the approach is a worthy path. Despite the many positive examples of the use of abductive logic
available, the process has three significant criticisms.
The first criticism is that if the abductively derived logic leads one to accept a falsehood,
there is no clear limit on how long that error can exist until it is caught and fixed (Douven,
2017). Misperceptions can endure until substantial deductive and inductive insights rectify the
incorrect view. A second criticism of abduction is that the near instantaneous nature of the
thought process of an inferential leap can lack the rigor helpful in preventing the theories from
quickly creating a very incorrect perception and becoming cemented in that way of thinking
(Paavola, 2014). A wrong step through abduction can quickly throw a thought process very far
off course, and other logical processes may be more deliberate and safer.
The third major criticism of abduction is related to the perceived potential for the process
to lead to circular logic. As Douven (2017) said, “critics have accused this argument of being
circular [...However, there is a] distinction between premise-circularity and rule-circularity. An
argument is premise-circular if its conclusion is amongst its premises. A rule-circular argument,
by contrast, is an argument of which the conclusion asserts something about an inferential rule
that is used in the very same argument….rule-circular arguments, Psillos [Stathis Psillos (1999,
Ch. 4)] contends, need not be viciously circular (even though a premise-circular argument is
always viciously circular). To be more precise, in his view, an argument for the reliability of a
given rule R that essentially relies on R as an inferential principle is not vicious, provided that
the use of R does not guarantee a positive conclusion about R's reliability…granting the use of
abduction does nothing to ensure that the best explanation of the success of scientific
methodology is the approximate truth of the relevant background theories” (section 3.2).
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Given these legitimate criticisms, the credibility of the abductive process relies on the
proper vetting of an idea. Unfortunately, it may take an idea being scrutinized through later
deductive and inductive approaches to truly ever know how credible that abductively derived
idea happened to be. Until those stages though, there are some guiding principles that can be
used for selecting the best theories and hypotheses.
In abductive reasoning, the most plausible hypothesis should be selected over any other
less plausible option (Svenevig, 1997). Being able to compare all options would be helpful, but it
is usually impossible for a person to be able to consider all possible explanations. A good rule of
thumb might be that the more hypotheses that can be thought up, the more likely that the correct
answer will be found. Though likely true in principle, simply having more hypotheses to choose
from does not necessarily help a person understand which one is best (Douven, 2017). Producing
a near endless number of hypotheses would mean that the process of abduction would be reduced
to being little more than daydreaming, and anything that a person could think of would be
included and put on equal footing with all other hypotheses (Hoffman, 2010). The reasoning at
the foundation of scientific discovery deserves a higher standard.
In light of that, there is a necessary distinction between the creation of ideas and the
instrumental abductive logic that forms an explanatory hypothesis (Hoffman, 2010). Peirce
believed that the most preferred hypothesis would explain the facts in an economical way and be
able to be challenged through experimental testing (Svenevig, 1997). This preferred option was
referred to as the inference to the best explanation (IBE). In the IBE, the metric for evaluating
theory is not prediction via probabilities but explanatory power (Haig, 2005). A theory is the IBE
if it explains a phenomenon better than rival possible theories.
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Identifying the IBE may be accomplished best through the use of Thagard’s (1992)
theory of explanatory coherence (TEC). “According to TEC, inference to the best explanation is
centrally concerned with establishing relations of explanatory coherence. To infer that a theory is
the best explanation is to judge it as more explanatorily coherent than its rivals. TEC is not a
general theory of coherence that subsumes different forms of coherence such as logical and
probabilistic coherence. Rather, it is a theory of explanatory coherence in which the propositions
hold together because of their explanatory relations” (Haig, 2005, p. 381). TEC uses the level of
explanatory coherence as criterion for establishing IBE. Explanatory coherence is determined
through the use of three criteria and seven principles. The three criteria are consilience (offering
the most coherent explanation), simplicity (the theories with the fewest special assumptions are
better, which in effect pragmatically constrains consilience), and analogy (the best theory is the
one most relatable to other types of theories). The seven principles are symmetry, explanation,
analogy, data priority, contradiction, competition, and acceptability (Haig, 2005, Thagard, 1988).
Though these criteria and principles are not obvious and empirically measurable selection
standards, they do help one choose between abductively derived ideas and help prevent just any
random idea as from being even considered as the best explanation.
Research Design
Frequently, research efforts can be characterized as attempts to gain a greater
understanding of some phenomenon. A phenomenon is an occurrence, often of distinctive
importance, that is worthy of inquiry (Sandywell, 2011). When the relationship between some
cause and effect is unknown for a phenomenon, one cannot explain why the phenomenon occurs
in the way it does. The realization of this lack of understanding can cause surprise since one is
unexpectedly caught unaware and is left with some fascination about how the phenomenon
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functions. Situations like this are indicative of a lack of structured knowledge, conceptual grasp,
and command of the phenomenon. To remedy this, one can use abduction to regain control
through the creation of rules and pair future situations with these rules in order to make stronger
inferences (Reichertz, 2010; Svennevig, 1997).
The current state of understanding regarding the phenomenon of governance decision
making is believed to be representative of situations where the exact functions of a phenomenon
are rather unknown. In this case, abduction could be used to generate greater understanding of
the phenomenon’s rules for operation, its relationships between key factors, and the identity of
those key factors. Though abduction is far more conjectural in nature than induction and
deduction when it comes to pairing observed facts with rules (Timmons & Tavory, 2012), the
process can still be used to scientifically conduct a qualitative analysis. The start of this process
is through the application of abduction’s basic logical process.
The design of this research is the same as the design of abductive logic. Timmons and
Tavory (2012) succinctly presented the formulaic structure of abduction described by Peirce.
They stated, “abduction starts with consequences and then constructs reasons: The surprising
fact C is observed. But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. Hence, there is a reason to
suspect that A is true” (Timmons & Tavory, 2012, pg. 171). This work explores the phenomenon
of governance decision making, and, as a matter of research design where abduction is applied,
starts with an account of the surprising and puzzling evidence observed regarding governance
decision making.
There are several puzzling pieces of evidence related to governance decision making. For
instance, some of these pieces of surprising evidence might include observations such as: people
seem to make different governance choices even when presented with the same information;
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there appears to be a thematic element to the way people think about governance, almost as if it
was a personality type; it seems as if there are clues that indicate that certain principles
repeatedly guide people’s judgments and evaluations of governance matters; standard political
identities do not appear to suitably describe governance preference patterns; perceived
motivations for governance preferences appear to overlap or be contextually bound; the four
approaches that Kettl (2018) presented seem unnecessarily disconnected or incomplete; each of
the four common decision making approaches appear to require different mind sets and
assumptions, yet the same person could potentially use all of the approaches; people have the
ability to understand the reasons behind one another’s approach to governance even if they
disagree; people seem able to communicate different aspects of governance but also appear able
to talk past one another in terms of preferences.
This likely partial list of puzzling pieces of evidence regarding governance decisions
starts the process of an abductive inquiry. These are each the surprising observed “fact C”
mentioned before. The design of any research using abduction then moves on from the
recognition of surprising facts into some process of reasoning and explanation. This means
attempting to discover what is happening in the phenomenon that causes these surprising facts to
come about. Again referencing the formulaic logic presented by Timmons and Tavory (2012),
this is conceptualized as stating “If A were true, C would be a matter of course.” To explore the
main research question “How are governance decisions formulated?” is analogous to identifying
what “A” is in the abductive logic formula. What “A” would cause these observed surprising
facts of “C” to be a matter of course? This question is asking what rule of the phenomenon’s
operation would cause the puzzling evidence to not be so puzzling but simply outcomes that are
expected products of some process.
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The literature review presented in the previous chapter suggests the identity of the “A,”
which is the rule for the process of governance decision making that is bringing about the
existence of puzzling facts. It proposed in this work that this rule of “A” relates to the structure
and approach of that decision making process. The form of this process is then conceptualized as
a model. The literature review suggested that none of the four approaches presented by Kettl
(2018), and especially not rational choice theory, are likely able to satisfactorily and solely
describe how these governance decisions occur. Instead, the review suggested that these often
complex and interpersonally communicated decisions employ a nonrational approach. The
nonrational approach uses schematic lenses and heuristics that operate within a shared mental
model to guide an individual’s decision making.
If it can be found that the structure of such a nonrational model could explain the
presence of many of the puzzling facts associated with governance decision making, there would
be support for this model as being the rule “A.” This would mean that these otherwise puzzling
bits of evidence exist because the rule is causing them to happen. Said another way, the noticed
surprising facts are merely the byproduct of governance decisions being processed in a particular
nonrational manner. If a nonrational model could be presented that would account for these
puzzling facts, then it is likely to be an accurate depiction of the cognitive processes that are
happening because “if A were true, C would be a matter of course. Hence, there is a reason to
suspect that A is true.” The goal of this research then is to discover the form of this nonrational
model.
The design of this research is thus focused on completing the abductive process by truly
discovering “A,” the nonrational model that accounts for the puzzling facts associated with the
governance decision making process. By doing this, a more accurate and instrumental
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understanding could be achieved, and the research question of “How are governance decisions
formulated?” likely to be answered. The procedure for finding the form of this nonrational model
is then focused on first discovering the schematic lenses that are used and then discovering the
heuristics that are used. In doing this, as previously stated, the model should identify the
particular cognitive anchor points unique to this context of decision-making, yet it should also be
structured similarly to other models of decision-making in that complex groupings of
information are chunked together in order to expedite outcomes and preserve resources. This will
be achieved through the collection of various governance concepts, the grouping of these
concepts, the comparison of different features of evidence, the structuring of associations, the
mapping of a flow for decision making processes, the prediction of expected outcomes, and then,
finally, the presentation of a framework of schemas and heuristics modeling the governance
decision making process.
The sample of information used to assess various governance concepts will includes
elements such as frames for reference, ideological identities, political philosophies, societal
positions, and motivating interests. The selection of items deemed relevant to the nonrational
model will be based on the components that appear to be commonly referenced as well as able to
exert significant influence on governance decisions. Designing the framework of the model will
then include deriving categories, highlighting prominent parts, structuring relationships between
concepts, and identifying any stages of development that decisions go through. Analysis of the
model will include how well a decision path can flow through schematics and heuristics and then
account for puzzling evidence. Any analysis of the model should also include assessing its ability
to account for how people predisposed to one outlook on things may have difficulty with other
approaches to governance, yet the model should also be flexible enough to account for decision-
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making processes that are more blended or hybrid in nature. Tests of the model will come
through the principles of TEC, where explanatory coherence will guide identification of the
inference to the best explanation. The resulting model will strive to economically address
relevant facts, be structured in a manner that can be challenged scientifically, provide more
utility than existing possible approaches, and create conceptual linkages to other realms of
understanding.
The starting point for this abductive discovery is assumed to be related to concepts
associated with the study of conflict resolution and the assessment of disagreement. A key focus
of assessing and resolving disagreements is to examine the different interests and positions at
odds in a given situation. Governance decisions are a matter of choice, but those choices are
between different approaches to governance. The degree of difference between these governance
approaches conceptually represents the degree of disagreement and conflict. To make a selection
of some form of governance, to choose, is to resolve the conflict. It is for this reason that
exploring governance-related interests and positions will be the starting point of the abductive
analysis presented in the next chapter.

Summary and Applicability of the Methodological Approach
The following section is a summary of the methodological approach used for this study
and a description of how such an approach is the appropriate technique for addressing the study’s
research question. To start, the abductive approach will be compared with the other common
research approaches of deduction and induction. In order to compare the basic structures of the
three forms of logic, an example from van Andel & Bourcier (2002, pg 276) is presented. The
comparison highlights the fundamental differences between the three forms of logic despite each
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being comprised of the same general elements. The example also underscores the unique type of
inferential leap used by abduction, where the conclusion is reasoned conjecture. The comparison
is presented below:
Deduction:
1. The beans in the bag are white.
2. The beans come from this bag.
3. These beans are white.
Induction
1. These beans come from this bag.
2. These beans are white.
3. The beans in this bag are white.
Abduction
1. The beans in this bag are white.
2. These beans are white.
3. These beans come from this bag.

For the current research, a deductive, an inductive, or an abductive approach are possible
paths to take. In order to choose the correct approach, it must be determined which form of
logical argument is best suited for exploring the query initiated by the research question. The
choice of approach is a product of the domain of inquiry as it depends on the level of
informational certainty available and the structure of evidence to be used to assess the situation.
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Deduction has the logical form of “All A’s are B. C is an A. Therefore, C is a B.” In this
construction, the idea is a conclusion that exists already in the premises of the argument. With
valid and true premises, a conclusion can be guaranteed. This logic works well to test an existing
idea of some sample within a specific condition. The process requires a good amount of
situational and conceptual certainty in order to develop the logical premises, but if this level of
information is available, a general rule can be used to affirm a particular conclusion.
The certainty in conclusion that is associated with deductive logic can be desirable, but it
does not fit with the current research. As has been discussed, the use of deduction requires a high
level of conceptual certainty. If theoretically-grounded assumptions existed already for
governance decision making, then a hypothesis could be generated from them that could be
tested to see if the available observations and examples of governance decision making
supported it. In this, there would need to be an existing path to find support for. However, the
domain of understanding pertaining to governance decision making falls short of being able to
use deductive research methods because there is not yet a sufficient general rule that functions as
premise from which conclusions can be drawn. There is not yet a conceptualization of what the
process looks like to test if it occurs in that manner.
The next form of logical argument to consider is induction. Induction has the logical form
of “All observed A’s are C’s. Therefore, all A’s are C’s.” Induction attempts to generalize
existing ideas. Specific observations are projected into general conclusions that might be true.
The inductive process typically consists of some form of data collection and analysis where a
sample in some condition is evaluated to see if there is support for the ability to infer the
generalizability of some factor as articulated by some idea. In this process, some idea already
exists and the objective is to establish probabilistic grounds for this idea. Although convincing
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support for a conclusion can be generated, no amount of evidence can guarantee inductively
derived conclusions because additional or contradictory information can always be found.
The use of inductive methodologies is common in research, but inductive logic does not
suit the current study. Induction uses past examples and existing trends to assess a theory.
Induction would be applicable for the current research if there was a universal rule for
governance decision making that had theoretical foundations. This information could be used
then to determine if the results of some set of cases were influenced by some factor. The domain
of understanding pertaining to governance decision making falls short of being able to use
inductive research methods because the phenomenon lacks sufficient information to analyze.
This is because to know what factors make up a governance decision is to first know how such a
decision is made. Since it is rather unknown how such decisions are made, it would be
impossible to identify first the factors to analyze.
Therefore, both inductive and deductive approaches are incorrect for addressing the
research question for several reasons. Both approaches require an assumption of understanding
regarding the causal mechanisms of the phenomenon that does not currently exist. In fact, little is
known about the specific structure of governance decisions. Without the necessary theoretical
basis of understanding regarding the phenomenon in question, the required assumptions for
confidently creating the relationships between different types of data cannot be established. As a
result, the necessary data for deductive and inductive analyses that would address this study’s
research question do not exist. Furthermore, any collection of data (interview, assessment, or
archival repurposing) would be making assertions on a nonexistent theory.
Before any metric could be developed for a phenomenon, there must exist a belief that
the mechanisms of the phenomenon are understood to some sufficient level. To have a metric
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without such understanding would result in a researcher being unable to have meaningful
expectations about the meaning of that metric in relation to the phenomenon. Because it is
asserted here that there is not yet a workable conceptualization from which to develop the
necessary factor(s) to assess governance decision making, this research is not seeking a specific
metric but rather the conceptualization itself. Developing a phenomenon’s conceptualization
requires a methodology geared towards achieving such a goal. The methodology would also have
to match the level of structured knowledge available for the domain of knowledge. Such needs
point a researcher towards a methodology based on abduction when it comes to exploring
governance decision making.
Abduction has the logical form of “The puzzling evidence C is observed. If A were true,
C would be a matter of course. Therefore, there is a reason to believe that A is true.” An idea is
created from imaginative reasoning in order to explain the state of some sample in some
condition. A conceptual space is established in order to use imagination to take imperfect
observations and create some sort of conclusion about the state of affairs. The process of making
inferences is used to create the best explanation that can be thought of for some occurrence or
phenomenon.
What is it about the status of an inquiry into governance decision making that necessitates
the use of abduction? The primary reason is that no data set reports how governance decisions
are made across various situations. It is unknown exactly how those decisions are occurring, and
as a result, no data set can be created without injecting some heretofore nonexistent theoretical
presuppositions. Without such data, no deduction-based methodology could be employed to
confirm that occurrences of governance decision making are happening for a particular reason,
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and no induction-based methodology could be used to assess the influence that some variable has
had and could be expected to have in future situations.
In governance decision making, the outcomes are known, but what is unknown regarding
governance decisions are the conditions that bring about certain outcomes or results. In
deduction and induction, the outcome is that which is confirmed or extrapolated to given the
evidence presented. In abduction, the outcome is known or observed, and that outcome is, in and
of itself, the presented evidence. The quest to find a reason for why a particular outcome has
come about is the abductive process. The question of any abductive logic is to find why or how
that particular result might have come to be. This is done by making the connections necessary to
show that if something were true, then the observed evidence of some outcome would inevitably
happen. It would be a matter of course.
Not only is abduction the only one of the three approaches to use for analyzing
governance decision because of the previously mentioned reasons, it is also the right choice
because it that reveals what is believed to be the best explanation from why certain governance
decision outcomes came to be. Abduction can help provide an explanation when one is absent.
Since governance decision making is a domain of knowledge that is asserted as lacking sufficient
theoretical structure, that implies that an explanation for that phenomenon is absent. Abduction
can address a question concerning the formation of governance decision making by offering a
descriptive insight. This insight links outcomes to their origination roots.
In sum, it may be useful to conceptualize the three forms of logic as they apply to
research agendas in this simplistic way: Deduction is the confirmation of mechanisms, induction
is the extrapolation of effects, and abduction is the creation of explanation. Finding an
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explanation for how governance decisions are formulated is the focus of this work. This means
that abduction should be chosen as the methodological approach.
If abduction is to be chosen, how then is it used? Abductive research is looking to really
discover and articulate what would make some governance outcome “a matter of course.” To
start, some type of surprising evidence is perceived. If a particular thing happened to be true, the
observed surprising evidence would happen as a matter of course. There would then be reason to
believe that the particular thing is indeed true. The search for understanding seeks the best
possible explanation in terms of finding the best fits for the available evidence. Truth in this
situation comes in the form of a best guess, a guess that is aimed at being more than mere
conjecture because of the incorporation of available evidence and logical scrutiny. When applied
to understanding some phenomenon, this abductively derived explanation can be considered a
theoretical insight. Theoretical insights are important because they lay the foundation for the
theory that can describe a phenomenon’s mechanisms. Such a theory then needs development in
order to create the factors necessary for conducting induction type research. From that point,
conducting deduction type research could occur to confirm or disprove that something holds true
or not across other situations.
The purpose of the abductive insight is to “produce a rigorous chain of reasoning” (van
Andel & Bourcier, 2002). Maybe it is valuable to say that this chain of reasoning happens
“backwards” from normal, as a function of the different logical formula that is associated with
abduction. This happens because a very limited amount of utility could be gained by the
academic community if a researcher stopped at the presentation of the abductively derived
insight without giving it form or explanation.
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For example, if when the molecular formation of gases was abduced only the general,
categorical description of how that formation occurred was given, it would be of minimal
applicable use to other chemists and physicists. If, however, the researcher added information
about how the idea was formed by using some form of visualization to give tangible form to the
theory (like a model of the bonds between molecules), then much more could be done with that
abductive insight. With just a mere abductively derived theoretical insight there may be little a
researcher could do in terms of future research. All that has been offered so far in the current
study is the abductive determination that governance decision making likely occurs through the
process of a nonrational shared mental model. More description is needed to know how that
process is believed to operate, and more is needed in order to employ inductive and deductive
methodologies for assessing factors and their influences across situations.
In this search for describing that which makes an outcome a matter of course, there may
also be a question of how much description and articulation of such a thing is needed. It is likely
a good tenet that there be a construction of explanation beyond the insight proportional to the
existing level of conceptualization of the phenomenon. This means that the less that is known,
the more that is likely needed to be created, linked, and explained in order for the insight to have
utility to others.
Take for example a situation where a medical doctor has a patient that is very ill but with
steadily worsening symptoms. In this potentially all too common scenario, the exact reason the
patient is experiencing these conditions is unknown and an accurate diagnosis cannot be made.
Every known standard test has been run on the patient, but the cause of the ailment remains
unknown. The medical doctor then abductively searches for an explanation for why the patient is
having these symptoms. He then looks to the available evidence to seek out a new understanding
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that might be of use. Any possibly relevant pieces of evidence are included in the abductive
search in hopes of finding an explanation for why this patient is experiencing the symptoms that
they are. The medical doctor’s sources of evidence could be any of the foods, vitamin
supplements, and medicines ingested by the patient. The sources of evidence could also be any
of the places the patient has been to, the people they have met, or any animals they may have
interacted with. There could even be a search into the various diseases, unique infections, or
possible exposure to dangerous chemicals as possible culprits in the situation. In the search
process, the medical doctor also includes a search into the potential compounding effects of
several factors happening all at once. In a search for an explanation of the patient’s symptoms,
the medical doctor seeks what situation would cause a reality where these symptoms are a matter
of course. The data collection would be any puzzling pieces of evidence that seem to be relevant
and jump out at him.
As a result of this abductive search, it might be determined, for example, that the
patient’s conditions came as the result of the unique combination of certain factors. Say for
example that in this hypothetical situation the patient ate a strange tropical fruit that happened to
have a negative interaction with a regularly taken prescription medicine. What was additionally
challenging was that the fruit-medicine interaction happened at the same time that the patient
was also experiencing a separate issue related to a recent dangerous chemical exposure from his
work environment. The medical specialist in this hypothetical scenario would only be able to
unpack such a convoluted situation by using abductive logic. Only through abduction would he
be able to determine that the particular tropical fruit/prescription medicine/chemical combination
would produce the exact symptoms the patient was exhibiting. Therefore, if the patient is taking
that particular medicine, ate that particular fruit, and was exposed to that particular chemical,
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then his current condition would be a matter of course. His parameters for guiding the
construction of the explanation would fall in line with the theory of explanatory coherence (TEC)
principles for an inference to the best explanation (IBE). From there a comparison to other
options and tests of that conclusion could be conducted.
For this explanation to have meaning, be understood by others, be evaluated, and be used
for assessing future situations, the medical doctor must elaborate and give specifics concerning
what factors were interacting and in what way. For him to only provide the general abductive
insight of “the patient is having a bad interaction of several factors” would be of little use to his
coworkers. In order for there to be significant benefit of the diagnosis (the abductive insight),
greater explanation would need to be provided. Only the offering of explicit detail about how the
abductive insight is implicitly constructed can offer what is needed, which in this case would be
the details of a treatment plan for this patient.
To complete the abductively derived contribution and show why the outcome is a matter
of course, there must be sufficient description of the explanation. To do this, the medical doctor
must then present his best guess of what specific components are interacting and causing these
symptoms. In doing this, the articulation phases necessarily follow the presentation of the
abductive insight. The same principles and approach of this hypothetical medical diagnosis
example would apply to an abductive exploration into governance decision making. Also, as
with the medical diagnosis example, any information within the domain of governance could be
of use as a source of evidence for the formation of a nonrational decision making model.
Although not a formal representation of applied abduction thought, it may be helpful to
think of the abductive process as having two stages: explanation and articulation. The first stage
gets one to an explanation, a reason for why the puzzling evidence has come about. The second
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stage is about clarifying that explanation with details in order to flesh out the explanation’s
ability to be evaluated in terms of assessment of predictive ability and/or be compared to other
potential explanations.
For stage one of the current study where the insight is presented, it is abduced that the
explanation for the puzzling evidence is that an otherwise difficult to identify nonrational shared
mental model exists and occurs in people’s minds. For the second stage of articulation, which
enables the assessment and evaluation of that explanation, the potential form of that nonrational
model is explored. To complete and make meaningful the abductive process, one should create
an adequate explanation. This means giving form to the proposed nonrational shared mental
model that is presented as being the cause of the observed puzzling evidence regarding how
governance decisions are formed.
It is important to note that the abductive insight that is at the core of the contribution has
already been presented. The abductive insight anchoring this research into governance decision
making is that the mind uses a nonrational approach. It is the conclusion that governance
decisions do not happen in rational ways but rather as nonrational approaches that are part of a
societal shared mental model. Since this abductive insight has been presented, the remaining
sections of this work are geared towards the instrumental development of this insight. Said
another way, the forthcoming information in the next chapters will be about meaningfully
explaining, giving structure to, providing visualizations for, and applying that abductive insight.
The articulation of an abductively derived insight that pertains to decision making should
focus on the construction of the decision making process. If the insight of a nonrational approach
being employed in governance decisions is established, then the procedure for discovering the
structure of it, in order for it to become a useful and testable insight, would start with identifying
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how the nonrational thought process operates. The starting point for decision making is asserted
here as being the filtering of information from which a decision is made. Schemas are the first
filters of incoming information and are used at the start of the nonrational decision making
process. These filters will be shown to exist in the field as strong, culturally enduring content
filters critical to the societal level shared mental model. When the schematic filters are
established, the heuristic structures can be formed. If schematic lenses and heuristic mechanisms
are able to be organized in a complete nonrational model, the model can then be used for
conceptualizing the governance decision making process.
Only by developing the specific forms of the schematic lenses and heuristic structures
can one determine if the shared mental model of nonrational thought is likely to represent the
inference to the best explanation. If the structure of a mental model explains the surprising
evidence, then it creates support for the accuracy of the general abductive insight. The model can
be used to articulate the mental processes by allowing the user to trace different paths of choice.
The various possible paths that are likely taken to approach a decision regarding governance are
presented as relationships in a culturally-grounded nonrational shared mental model. From there,
one could trace a path from origin to outcome or from outcome to origin.
If decision processed goes through different stages and those stages are represented in a
mental model, then a path through each stage could be followed in order to reach each potential
outcome. Tracing different paths through the model would represent different choices within the
decision process and reveal different results. The use of a mental model to inquire how
governance decisions are formed could be expected to show how public governance choices
have consequences and cause real differences in outcomes. This concept of exploring an area of
inquiry through the construction of a mental model can be done with many different types of
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thought processes. For example, instead of asking “how are governance decisions formulated,”
one could ask “how are decisions about getting to work in the morning formulated.”
Imagine the mental process the average person goes through for getting to work each
morning. The person has to consider a number of potential options. First, he must know the
location he is at and the location he is going to. Then he must consider the resources (e.g., effort,
money, time, etc.) he desires to use in order to make this journey. With those choices acting as
filters, the person can now better determine if they wanted to take a bike, car, bus, train,
helicopter, or plane to work. Then once the method of transportation is selected, the person must
make a choice regarding the specific route they prefer given their identified mode of
transportation. Finally, they must repeat this process each time they are presented with a
challenge of how they want to get to work.
The process that this person goes through is a mental model . This model would be a map
of the choices that could be made and shows all of the possible ways a person could get to work.
Earlier stages of decision making create filters for how later stage decisions within the mental
model play out. For instance, once it was determined that the person would be taking a train to
work, they are only concerned with train lines and not at all concerned with, say, the available
bike paths for those choosing to bike to work.
Ultimately, if this mental model for getting to work was presented as a diagram of
options, one could trace the path on it that the person in the example decided to take. Mental
models can serve as a roadmap for describing decisions. The path a person takes can be traced,
and some forks in the decision making road can only be reached if specific selections were made
at prior forks in the road. This concept of tracing the path that a decision process goes through by
following the individual choices made by the decision maker along the way represents the
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function of a mental model. In this research, the objective is to answer the research question of
how governance decisions are formed by creating a decision making mental model.
It may be important to note that several assumptions exist for this research. It is assumed
(1) that abduction is a legitimate form of reasoning (with aspects explored in the past by
Aristotle, Bernard, Peirce, Merton, Kuhn, & Hanson), (2) that abduction is a worthy approach to
use for research since it has previously produced notable advances to understandings in science
and other forms of structured knowledge, (3) that abduction has an established form of logical
process for reaching conclusions, (4) that abduction does not use a data set to start from like
induction does but rather uses puzzling evidence, (5) that abduction has the potential to extend
existing theory and develop new theory, (6) that in order for abduction to have implications on
generalized theory the “theoretically sensitized observer” must often bring as much to the datum
as the datum presents by itself (MacCrimmon & Tillers, 2002), (7) that the goal of an abductive
insight is an idea that is innovative, probable, simple, and testable (MacCrimmon & Tillers,
2002), and (8) that for any abductively derived conclusion to have a proper place amongst other
research it should be thoroughly examined and explained.
To review the overall information presented in this section, abduction is the only choice
available in terms of methodological approach for this domain of knowledge referred to as
governance decision making. Abduction seeks out what factors best explain how the observed
outcome came to be. It uses any possibly relevant source of evidence to develop an insight. This
insight then needs articulation to be useful and testable. This fully articulated insight needs to
match the domain of inquiry, so for decision making, the objective is to determine which factors
would cause the identified mental process outcomes be a matter of course.
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The articulation of an abductively derived insight that pertains to decision making would
focus on the formation of a decision making process. Finding how information is filtered into
this process would be the start of conceptualizing the process. Incorporating heuristic
relationships between the pieces of information within the decision making process would then
come next. With schemas and heuristics together, the relationships between the components can
be structured. For a mental process like decision making, modeling the process is useful because
it serves as a roadmap for how the decisions are formed. With a model established, each decision
could be traced from its origins to its outcomes. One could then “read” the model by creating
process paths until they reach outcomes.
What is it about the abductive process gives the structure to answer the research question
of “How are governance decisions formulated?” The answer is that the abductive process helps
one find what would create “a matter of course” for some outcome, and in this situation the
outcomes are governance decisions. To identify that which would cause an outcome to be a
matter of course in this situation would be to identify the cognitive process of choice selection
that results in some particular governance outcome. By identifying what decision processes are
believed to be the best explanations for why certain outcomes occur, one could be believed to
have the best chance at understanding how governance decisions are formulated. If the
abductive process was completed for this research, one would be able to make an inference to the
best guess for these decisions are formulated. This would be possible because a theoretical road
map linking the beginning stages of perception that occur within governance decisions to the
outcomes of those decisions could be conceptualized. If those associations could be structured in
a meaningful way, then one might have a scientifically testable solution to the question of how
governance decisions are formulated. This would show that if there was a nonrational process of
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a particular structure, the surprising evidence would be a matter of course. That search is the
purpose of this research.
The current research abduces an explanation that addresses a set of puzzling facts
regarding governance decision making. The analysis and results sections of the research will
communicate how the idea is specifically formed and explain the meaning, implications, and
consequences of that idea in the form of a model. The next three chapters of the dissertation is
about articulating, giving structure to, providing visualizations for, and applying that abductive
insight regarding governance decision making occurring through a nonrational shared mental
model.
Abductive Methodology for Schematic Structuring
The following information presents the five steps that are to be taken in the analysis
section of this research. In these steps, the abductive methodology is used to identify the
schematic lenses necessary for constructing a nonrational decision making model for governance
decision making. They are as follows:
Step 1: Vector Articulation – For a useful schema to be identified, it must specifically
address the domain of understanding it will be applied to. In the current research, this will be
content that would be used in a nonrational shared mental model of governance decision making.
In order to focus on this specific subject, conceptual boundaries must be established that any
content evaluated must be of potential usefulness in a governance decision making process. Then
from within that range of content, a deeper search for applicable content can be conducted.
Step 2: Clue Identification – This study’s approach makes several assumptions. It is
assumed that the governance decision process uses a shared mental model in order to make

91
decisions, and schemas are considered part of that mental model. This would then imply that if a
person is using a mental model related to governance, the cognitive process the person goes
through includes some type of schema utilization. The utilization of schema is assumed to cause
some type of indication that such a process is happening, and this would be to reveal some kind
of clue related to the use of schemas. Since this research presumes that examples and indicators
of those schemas are present in some form for governance decision processes, it is assumed that
to identify the clues indicative of schematic expression is to ascertain the lenses that form the
foundation of a governance decision making mental model. It is further assumed that the
identification accuracy of those schematic clues can only be evaluated through reason, judgment,
and logical argument.
Seel (2012) states that “A schema represents the generic and abstract knowledge a person
has acquired in the course of numerous individual experiences with objects, people, situations,
and events.” With this broad scope of potential inputs, clues related to governance decision
making schemas will be searched for in a variety of areas. Clues will be sought within
governance perspectives, values, societal anchors, motivations, and outcome goals. They will
also be searched for in ideological identities, political philosophies, and common societal
perspectives.
Step 3: Evidence Structuring – When potentially relevant clues are identified, they will
need to be assembled in a manner that emphasizes the schematic frames. In doing this, it will be
important to identify the different facets of each clue area and construct content in a manner that
demonstrates the diversity of governance views within that domain of information. The
abductive logic principle of theoretical coherence should be ever-present in these formulations.
This principle helps one identify the best explanation by directing attention to the evaluative
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criteria of consilience, simplicity, analogy, symmetry, explanation, analogy, data priority,
contradiction, competition, and acceptability.
Step 4: Linkages Through Reconceptualizations – After different areas of potential
schematic expression are identified, structured, and deemed conceptually distinct within the
logical argument, it becomes necessary to assess if there is conceptual coherence across the
different categories of information. If these different components are part of the same schematic
lenses, then there will logically be relationships between the components as they will be existing
as different versions of the same schema. With an overarching schematic framework acting as a
scaffolding, each component can then be reconceptualized in order for conceptual bridges to be
constructed that link the associated schematic components. The resulting structure can then be
expected to show how the same schematic lenses are expressed differently across various areas
of governance decision making. The schematic lenses would then be expected to represent
different families of thought regarding the approaches one could take towards governance
decisions.
Step 5: Application of Schematic Lenses – With schematic lenses partially established,
they can be applied to different areas of thought within a larger mental model. Conceptual
relationships can be extended into other areas related to governance decision making. With a
more complete picture of the schematic lenses established, the schemas can be better evaluated
for how well they represent the abductive inference to the best explanation regarding a response
to how governance decisions are formulated. Again, the principles of theoretical coherence will
guide this judgment. Through a process of comparing these schemas to one another, the results
of these schematic structures can then be interpreted in terms of their relationships to any
heuristics that may exist within an overall governance decision making shared mental model.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS
In this research, abduction is used to address a set of puzzling pieces of evidence
regarding governance decision making. These puzzling aspects are believed to necessarily exist
because they are the byproduct of governance decisions being processed in a specific nonrational
manner. This conclusion is the abductive insight presented by this research. The purpose of the
abductive insight is to “produce a rigorous chain of reasoning” (van Andel & Bourcier, 2002). A
very limited amount of utility could be gained if research stopped at the presentation of an
abductively derived insight without giving it form or explanation. A goal of this research then is
to discover the structure of the abductive insight, and the analysis section of this research
develops and communicates how the idea is specifically formed. The procedure for finding the
form of this abductively derived model starts with structuring the schematic lenses that are used
at the core of the nonrational decision making process. This will be achieved through the
collection of various governance concepts, the grouping of these concepts, the comparison of
different features of evidence, and the structuring of associations. The result of these efforts will
be the presentation of a framework of the schemas used for governance decision making.
In order to develop the schematic lenses used for governance decision making, this
analysis will use the five methodological steps articulated in the previous chapter: vector
articulation, clue identification, evidence structuring, linkages through reconceptualizations, and
application of schematic lenses In using these steps to identify and structure the potential clues of
nonrational cognitive processing, it is assumed that these lenses can express themselves in
various ways. This means that for this analysis the conceptual clues indicating the different
applications of schema use will be compiled and organized. This analysis will start with
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otherwise disparate clues that potentially indicate the use of schematic lenses for governance
decisions and then work to connecting them into a cohesive structure

Vector Articulation
The first methodological step of this schematic-focused analysis is vector articulation.
Vector articulation is an explicit statement about the direction of the research. It communicates
the domain and boundaries for which the area of thought being analyzed. In this research, the
vector of schematic processing being assessed is only that which would apply to a nonrational
shared mental model of governance decision making. This is asserted as encompassing the
different stances, beliefs, terms, concepts, and identities that form the schematic lenses through
which governance decisions are filtered and communicated. It is the goal of the remaining
sections of this analysis to identify the formation of these schematic lenses that create the
foundation on which a nonrational shared mental model derives governance decisions.
Construction of such a model that can be then used like a roadmap to trace the governance
decision making process.

Clue Identification
The second methodological step of this schematic-focused analysis is clue identification.
This step of the analysis is significantly more substantial than the first step. In this stage, the
research seeks out indicators that schemas are being used by decision makers. The schemas
sought here are generic and abstract knowledge that people acquire and use for decision making.
Given that understanding, this is the search for categorical generalizations and short cuts that are
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believed to be indicative of the nonrational process. It is assumed that these aspects of decision
making are readily present in the governance process and able to be identified.
The point of this section then is to establish that the identification of clues that would
indicate the use of schematic lenses in the decision making process is likely to be accomplished
through the recognition of competing components that represent fundamentally different
perspectives on governance matters and are ultimately prioritized through governance decisions.
This means that to communicate the logic that, for clues of schematic filter use are to be found,
on needs to identify the particular relationships expected to contain such clues. These
relationships are assumed to be where a few different schematic filters occur simultaneously and
collectively offer different paths and conclusions that the decision maker could utilize. The
different potential views that these filters offer to and urge a decision maker to adopt represent
the competition that is resolved through a decision. That decision represents a prioritization of
potential perspectives. The resulting rankings of perspectives represents the possible
combinations of these individual perspective components. Combining the same few perspective
components in different orders to create different end results is similar to the way biological
DNA works. This is because different combinations of governance schematic filters result in
different governance decisions being made. In sum, to identify the clues of governance
indicating the use of schematic filters is akin to identifying the DNA of governance decision
making.
In order to identify the schemas used for governance decisions, one should start with
exploring how schematic lenses are assumed to operate. As previously discussed, schemas are
the starting point for any such nonrational shared mental model. Different schematic lenses form
different perspectives that the decision maker can adopt. Differing perspectives are assumed to
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imply that there are multiple drives that compete for a final decision. Schematic lenses for
governance matters would then influence how a people filter and assess information about a
governance situation.
If (1) there are schematic filters for governance and if (2) the use of these schematic
filters provides different conclusions about various aspects of governance choices, then (3)
decision making for governance can be conceptualized as the process of reconciling the different
streams of information provided by these schematic filters, and (4) the reconciliation process
between the different streams of information in this process that results in a choice, represents
some type of conflict or competition between alternatives that is resolved by a decision being
made.
If such a conceptualization is accurate, then the result of a decision where the conclusions
obtained through one or more schematic lenses are given a form of preference or primacy over
one or more other schematic lenses is in effect the expression of priority or significance between
schematic lenses. If a nonrational governance decision making process is the functional
expression of schematic lens preferences (or at least the conclusions derived from such lenses),
then it could be assumed that the expression of these preferences must necessarily happen in
different ways for there to be variation in governance decisions. Furthermore, it is assumed here
that the mechanisms and communication requirements of a shared mental model would
necessitate that (1) there be different possible combinations for these expressions of preferences,
and (2) there be unique identities to these various combinations of preference expression.
The consequence of these assumptions and the subsequent conceptualization they create
is that the core cognitive nonrational process of governance decision making can be thought of as
various combinations of distinct elements that are ordered in particular ways. Using this logic,
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“various combinations” represents the potential for different mixes of information to be included
in the different decisions, “distinct elements” represents the conclusions about information
relevant to assessing matters of governance that are derived from schematic lenses, and “ordered
in particular ways” represents the preference prioritizations of the decision made.
The use of various combinations of schematic lenses raises the question of how many
schematic lenses would be expected to be present in a nonrational shared mental model of
decision making for governance. The amount of possible combinations could vary greatly
depending on if there is an endless or finite number of significant perspectives to account for.
Judgment and Decision Making (JDM) research from the field of Psychology provides some
guidance. A review of JDM literature by Connolly and Ordonez (2005) suggested that in
situations where preference and purposive choice, decision analysts believe that people only
have a “few, basic values and must derive or construct preference…[for]…unfamiliar choices”
(p. 499). It is assumed here that a good example of a situation where preference and purposive
choice exist would be where there is a decision to be made regarding some matter of governance.
These conclusions from Connolly and Ordonez would then suggest that only a limited number of
perspectives would be used by people in a nonrational decision making shared mental model for
governance. If only a limited number of perspectives were used, then there would be a finite
number of possible combinations and configurations of those perspectives.
A good analogy for conceptualizing how governance decision making would consist of
“various combinations of distinct elements that are ordered in particular ways” might be to think
of these distinct, schematically derived elements like components of DNA for governance like
there is DNA for organisms. Thus, the goal of this analysis is to identify these foundational
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components that form the foundation from which governance decisions flow from. These
schematically derived perceptions might be thought of as core drivers for governance decisions.

Identifying components. If there are a few, distinct, and foundational components that
represent the perspectives that combine in unique ways to create governance decisions, what then
are these components? It is assumed here that the combinations of these components are not
purely random concoctions but rather occur with a sense of intentionality since they are people’s
willful decisions for governance. A solution for identifying these components, these clues that
indicate the use of schematic lenses, may become evident by exploring the mechanisms of how
they work together in people’s decisions. If a decision is the result of a choice between possible
alternatives, then a governance decision could be identified as the outcome of a clash between
different schematically-driven perspectives. If some form of struggle between components is
occurring, then the social science literature of "conflict resolution" would be relevant as it
specializes in analyzing such competitions.
This research assumes that there is a conceptual relationship between conflict negotiation
situations and the struggle between different governance viewpoints. It is for this reason that the
methodological step of clue identification may then be best accomplished by using the
conceptual structures provided by this body of literature. Some key notions of conflict resolution
that may be of particular use to this research are concepts of “interests” and “positions.” A very
basic understanding of each is that positions are the identifying desires of competing parties, and
interests are the motivating reasons for why those positions are sought. Positions are not
concerned with the underlying desires of others, but interests are and seek reconciliation.
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Many conflicts occur when there are competing parties, and both parties desire to hold
the same position, but the holding of such a position is perceived as mutually exclusive. Only
one party can win control of the position given the way it is conceptualized, and the conflict
represents the struggle to win that control. This type of situation could mean that, to some
degree, the competing parties essentially hold the same identity, designated by having a
particular perspective regarding some objective.
Accordingly, conflict resolution efforts often try to separate interests from positions. This
is done in order see if each party can focus on ways to satisfy their underlying interests instead of
focusing on trying to win control of some common position. In doing this, it may be found that
although positional control might be mutually exclusive, each party’s interests are not. Conflicts
can then be resolved when both parties satisfy their interests in a way that minimizes or makes
irrelevant the original position that was in dispute (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011).
In spite of such approaches, conflicts can get difficult to resolve. A main reason for this
difficulty is that, for the position held by each disputing party, an underlying interest emanated
from it, defined it, and caused the position to exist. This connection is what can make separating
interests and positions difficult. This conceptualization relates to the (pejorative) political saying
that “where you sit determines where you stand,” where the defining position of a disputant is
integrally connected to their interests. This relationship between interest and position could be
stated somewhat formulaically with “Disputant A is identified as holding position X because it
has interest Y, an interest that results in the desire for and creation of position X.” It is assumed
here that it is in is this way that interests and positions can be integrally related, even though the
two concepts are meant to represent necessarily different things in conflict resolution literature.
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If interests and positions cannot be separated in order for a constructive resolution to
reached, the only path for the conflict to be ended can be for one disputing party to “dominate”
the other disputing party in some way. Without the ability to separate the two components and
remove the mutually exclusive nature of the situation, conflict can appear inevitable for certain
situations. Therefore, where positions and interests cannot be differentiated, some form of
dominance between the disputing parties must develop in order for the situation to progress. It is
assumed here that this form of inability to differentiate positions and interests in a constructive
manner occurs at some core level of cognitive processing for nonrational governance decision
making.

Development of Interest/positions. When an interest drives an identifying position, this
means that the disputant has a particular perspective. Possessing a perspective that is emblematic
of some motivation is synonymous with the expression of some type of schematic lens. As
previously explored, a schematic lens is the cognitive tool for forming some frame of reference,
some filter for assessing what matters, or some vantage point for a particular frame of mind.
Therefore, a disputant could be conceptualized as having a particular perspective on what matters
as a result of the combination of their identifying position and motivating interest.
It is assumed here that the conflict of choice that is at the heart of any decision regarding
governance possesses all of the same qualities as any other mix of disputants. Given this
assumption, a governance decision is believed to consist of some mix of schematically derived
perspectives that bring with them their own positions and corresponding interests. If these
positions have corresponding interests, then the two represent a singular perspective. Together
they are occupying the same place in the decision making landscape. If that link is exclusive to
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the pairing, then collapsing the two components into one new, singular component would make
sense. This creates the concept of “interest/positions” that this work will use to identify each
schematically derived perspective that is to be identified. Given that differentiating the exact
functional association schematic lenses have to positions and interests is unknown and, to some
extent, outside the scope of this work, this hybrid designation of interest/position is used here to
represent a particular governance perspective.
A governance interest/position, as used here, would be where an interest and position are
aligned, unable to be meaningfully disaggregated, and not significantly influenced by other
perspectives. It would be a “pure” perspective and an unaccommodating expression of the
conclusions of a schematic lens. A governance interest/position could be expected to only be
able to filter and assess information in one predominant way. This would mean that preferences
would always be expressed as the governance options that offer the highest evaluation, given that
filtered assessment. The unique/identifying features of each schematically-driven
interest/position would then desire the highest evaluation possible for that category of
information.
A governance interest/position would be expected to have a distinct desire that is
integrally related to the evaluations and derived conclusions that come from that schematic lens’
perspective. The identification of governance interest/positions could then be expected to help
reveal the subsequent evaluations, conclusions, viewpoints, and preferences that are connected
with that particular perspective. The interest/positions would then be clues for identifying the
configuration of governance schematic lenses. As a result of these inferences, it is determined
that identifying the governance interest/positions that are representative of the governance
schematic lenses would partly satisfy the second step of the analysis.

102
These interest/positions are likely to have several identifying features. They are expected
to be distinct and differing frames of reference with representative motivations for their vantage
point on society. Given that these are governance interest/positions, the perspectives they adopt
are likely connected to a conceptualization about what type of action government should
typically take or what kind of role the government should play while taking certain actions.
These differing perspectives, to the extent that they desire different things, could also be
expected to utilize different evaluations for determining the success or failure of governance.
Furthermore, given the potential broad applicability that comes with being a core component of a
societal level shared mental model, these interest/positions are expected to be readily accessible
mindsets for the average person to be able to adopt.
With these assumptions about their identity, it might be helpful to conceptualize these
interest/positions as different types of “social institutions.” Social institutions are “mechanisms
of social order, which govern the behavior of a set of individuals within a given community”
(Miller, 2019). As applied in this work, interest/positions for governance, as a function of the
schematic lens through which information is filtered, may be social institutions that govern the
type of evaluations people of a certain mindset will use for assessing governance decisions. This
would imply that the continued use of a schematic lens would lead to decisions of a particular
type on a consistent basis, and, indeed, social institutions have stable, valued, recurring patterns
of behavior (Huntington, 1968).
In combining the aforementioned assumptions, a number of conclusions about the likely
identity of governance interest/positions could be determined. Interest/positions are expected to:
(1) consist of individual components, (2) relate to the world of governance, (3) advocate some
perspective of governance decisions, (4) be concerned about different things as a result of
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schematic filtering and assessment, (5) be limited in number, (6) be readily “knowable”
perspectives as part of societal-level shared mental model, (7) occupy distinct places in the world
of governance, (8) and, collectively, be comprehensive for addressing and representing the
major, core perspectives on governance. The following section will identify the interest/positions
for governance that fit these expectations.

Using vector articulation to achieve clue identification. The act of governance, for which
certain decisions are made, is assumed to be an action that includes some governing entity and
the people that are somehow related to this governance decision. Said another way, the process
of governance frequently exists through a people generally associated via some purview and a
governing entity that represents some type of formal or informal establishment of power over
that associated body of people. In these dynamics, any individual making a decision for or in the
perspective of the governing entity in some way would also, by default, be able to be considered
part of the people affected by that governance, if situational contexts allowed.
This means that the differences between the people involved in a governance decision are
assumed to be more cognitive than structural. It means that, more than any other identifying
characteristic of the individual, the schematic lens being used is the determinant of view in the
governance decision making process. This assumption would imply that the identity of
governance interest/positions, which are conceptualized here as form of a manifestations of the
schematic lenses used by the shared mental model, relates to at least some governing entity and
some designated set of people.
If governance relates to the actions of government, then the entity, regardless of its
formation, which acts as a governing body is likely to be an essential component of the
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governance process. It is important to note that what is referenced here is the schematic lens
representing or taking the perspective of such a governing entity rather than the governing entity
itself. This schematic lens then represents a thought process where the perspective of such a
governing body is adopted. The adoption of the governing entity perspective would not require
one to actually represent or be in such a governing body in some way. One would only need to
be assessing some governance matter from the decision making perspective of the governing
entity by using the schematic lens associated with that filtered view on a governance decision.

The State. Though the governing body could take on any form, it and its corresponding
governance schematic lens will be referred to here in this research as “the state.” To make a
choice regarding some governance matter in this view would then be to adopt the schematic lens
of the state. This means that this view would filter decision processes through the perspective
and preferences of the governing entity. A person using this decision making schematic lens for a
governance decision would then be essentially asking the question of “what is most important to
the state when it comes to this matter at hand?” That focus would guide such a person’s
governance decision making. As a result of these conclusions, “the state” is believed to be a core
interest/position that represents a key schematic lens in governance decision making.

Other than the state, the other aspect relevant to governance interest/positions would refer
to the body of people associated with this decision making process. It is assumed in this work
that “the body of people” is too broad of a categorization to have a meaningful distinction
regarding schematic lenses. This is because the dynamics of governance decisions are assumed
to be more than merely a binary schematic struggle of the state versus the people.

105
More options for combinations of potential decision making outcomes would likely be
needed in a true representation of the “DNA of governance,” and it is assumed here that a more
nuanced interpretation of the body of people associated with a governance decision would be
beneficial. If the body of people associated with a governance decision could be considered a
sort of social system, then techniques for assessing systems could be of some guidance. The
social sciences commonly analyze systems at three levels: the macro, meso, and micro.
These levels of analysis are likely to be helpful for meaningfully conceptualizing the
interest/positions related to “the body of people” associated with a governance decision. The
question arises then of what would be the macro, meso, and micro levels of such a system? A
European Identity Seminar from 2003 may have provided the answer for how to properly apply
these levels of analysis to this subject. This seminar was titled “European Identity: Individual,
Group, and Society.” This work explored interactions between these classifications of people,
and it is likely the correct way to divide “the body of people” into the macro, meso, and micro
levels of analysis.

The Everyone. The macro level of the body of people would be the largest number of
components within the system. This would imply that the macro level of the body of people
associated with a governance decision would be the largest population classification. Regarding
governance matters, this would be all of the people involved with that domain of governance. In
this work, this level of analysis will be referred to as the “everyone,” and it could be thought of
as an entire society of people. Everyone would be the macro level interest/position in a
governance decision making process. A person using this decision making schematic lens for a

106
governance decision would then be essentially asking the question of “what is best for society as
a whole when it comes to this governance matter at hand?”

The Individual. On the other end of the schematic spectrum would be the micro
interest/position, the viewpoint representing the smallest segment of a people associated with a
governance decision. This would be a single person or, possibly, a single family unit of some
form that would have a unitary view on governance matters. In this work, this level of analysis
will be referred to as the “individual.” The individual would be the micro level interest/position
in a governance decision making process. A person using this decision making schematic lens
for a governance decision would then be essentially asking the question of “what is best for me
and my family when it comes to this governance matter at hand?” Theoretically, this perspective,
through some theory of mind mechanism, could also be assumed to account for the question of
judging what one supposes another person or family similar to oneself might want. This could be
thought of as asking the question of “well, what would I decide if I was presented with that
choice?”

The Group. Finally, there would be the meso level of analysis. This is the level of
analysis that exists between the macro and the micro. It is something more than an individual but
less than everyone. This would be identified as some organization, community, or shared identity
that can account for some set of people. This set can be of any size as long as it is less than the
whole and more than one. Examples of such groups are those based on geographic regions, tribe,
race, ethnic group, religion, status, city, belief orientation, political party, trade, or other similar
possible segment or subsection of society. In this work, this level of analysis will be referred to
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as the “group.” The group would be the meso level interest/position in a governance decision
making process. A person using this decision making schematic lens for a governance decision
would then be essentially asking the question of “what is best for my group when it comes to this
governance matter at hand?”

Interest/positions as Schematic Lenses. These four interest/positions - the state, the
everyone, the group, and the individual - are asserted as being representative of the four core
schematic lenses for a governance decision making process. Governance-related information
entering into the mind of a person is filtered and assessed through one of these lenses. A person
adopts the perspective of the interest/position in this process, and uses it in a nonrational manner
in order to make a decision. In doing this, the decision maker functionally ignores what might be
offered by the other perspectives. This would imply that one having such a focus would be
taking a purist view on governance matters.
Since each perspective’s mindset would be assumed to be rather accessible to the
decision maker, it is assumed that personal preferences and contextual factors would dictate the
specific interest/position standpoint an individual decision maker would use. Moreover, although
the four are differentiated by scope and focus, there is no inherent reason to believe that any one
element offers a more relevant or valuable perspective than any other element. Each of the four
interest/positions are considered inherently equal and valid at face value in terms of the
comparative utility of the use of the differing schematic lenses.

Values as the Desired Outcomes of Interest/positions. As has been discussed,
interest/positions advocate for some perspective on governance decisions. As a result of their
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singular, schematically-driven conclusions regarding the evaluation of some governance option,
interest/positions desire a distinct, identifiable, consistent, and enduring type of governance
outcome to occur. To know if a vision of an outcome has been achieved, some type of criterionbased evaluation of the desired outcome is likely to be used. To desire and highly rate something
is to value it. The Merriam-Webster dictionary states that a value is commonly thought of as a
principle or quality that is intrinsically desirable through having a relative worth, utility, or
importance. Values are likely important and relevant to decisions of governance because they
express preferences and provide some type of criterion for success. This would suggest that
another important aspect of understanding and structuring governance schemas would be to
understand what are likely to be the core values of governance.
Though many values can come into play for complex decisions, it is assumed in this work
that, just like for interest/positions, there is likely to be a small number of core values that are
fundamental to governance decision making. These assumptions would also lend support to the
idea that the governance interest/positions exist as some form of societal institutions because
societal institutions have positions and values (Miller, 2019). This would indicate that certain
interest/positions and certain values would likely be related to one another. Therefore, to
complete step two of the analysis used in this research and fully identify the clues of the use of
schemas in governance decision making, the core values of governance should be abduced.
The question then arises of where to look to identify the core values of governance. It is
assumed here that the best approach would be to turn to governance practices to find hints for
determining what values might be considered important. Since public administrators use values
to make decisions (Kettl, 2018), the values emphasized by public administration might serve as a
close surrogate for the values of governance.
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Efficiency and Effectiveness. The original core value of public administration is likely
considered to be efficiency, a value highly emphasized by Simon (1947). Efficiency is concerned
with the proper utilization of resources as determined through a ratio of inputs to outputs (Perry,
2005). The second commonly referenced value for public administration is effectiveness.
Effectiveness is a concern for if governance is achieving what it set out to do (Norman-Major,
2012). The two values of efficiency and effectiveness are referenced countless times in public
administration literature and practical endeavors. Though there are times where the two goals can
be mutually exclusive to some extent, both are obvious core values of public administration.

Turning to the Pillars of Administration. Public administration then moved on from a
focus on efficiency and effectiveness to include other values, such as “economy.” Perry (2005)
wrote that the three E’s of efficiency, effectiveness, and economy have been principles that have
guided public administration and have been identified as the pillars of the field by National
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA). Economy is defined in this usage as the ability to
achieve organizational objectives while acquiring resources at the lowest cost (Perry, 2005).
These three principles have also been meaningful to evaluations of public performance
management (Otrusinova & Pastuszkova, 2012)
Though popular in some circles for administrative and evaluation purposes, this work
takes the stance that there is a conceptual problem with the use of economy as a component of a
governance decision making model. No argument will be presented here that will refute that
economy as a metric may have a place in various management strategies by assessing that
expenses are used wisely, but it is not believed to have an independent place in governance
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schemas. This disfavor with economy revolves around the definition and conceptualization of the
term, and, as a result of this perceived problem, economy is not believed to represent an
independent aspect of decision making.
To start the journey of understanding this perceived problem, this research starts with two
straight forward definitions of the term. The Merriam-Webster dictionary refers to economy as
frugality in expenditures through the efficient use of resources. In the world of administration,
economy is sometimes described in ways that essentially mean attempting to maximize results
through the best use of resources towards desired ends (Norman-Major, 2012). Given these two
definitions, the two components of the process that create an assessment of economy appear to
be little more than a blend of what is assessed independently by efficiency and effectiveness.
In reference to the efficiency side of an economy assessment, expenses are merely inputs
to any efficiency analysis where inputs are compared to outputs. “Expenses” here would be a
term that would apply to concepts like time, resources, or any other thing that could be
exchanged for some type of utility. This means that to speak of expenses is to simply reframe
discussion of inputs.
Furthermore, there is a relevant implication that arises if the focus in an assessment of
economy is on the input of financial resources in order to get the most governance output. The
implication is that such an understanding creates an assumption related to the direction of efforts.
It makes the implicit assumptions that resources are already directed correctly towards certain
desired services and that any desired deliverables are achievable. These implicit assumptions
mean that the output side of the efficiency assessment is held constant and that the only
measurement relevant to the concept of economy is how to achieve that desired objective with
the fewest inputs of financial resources. Said another way, the current understanding of economy
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presents itself as an efficiency assessment where the outputs are held constant at an optimum
standard and the focus for any critique is limited to the inputs used - the “best use of resources”
that gets the closest to an idealized process output. This means that, in some respects, economy
would represent little more than a modified evaluation of efficiency.
In reference to the effectiveness side of economy definition, the other half of the current
understanding of economy appears to represent merely an implied effectiveness assessment. If
effectiveness is the ability to achieve desired outcomes given stated intentions, then economy
represents a modified assessment of effectiveness because it carries with its conceptualization
various implied intentions. When any intention of governance is proposed, it means that some
governance action is to occur in some way. To take some governance action with the hope of
achieving some result is to hope for some effective effort.
This means that to “maximize results” is to hope that outcomes will match intentions in
an idealized manner. In such efforts though, it might be implied that it would also be hoped that
some particular course of action will not leave the governing entity bankrupt, worthy of being
overthrown, in a state of disarray, etc. Said another way, any assessment of economy is, in part,
just an effectiveness assessment that implicitly carries with it a number of outcome expectations
represented in the economy definition in some way as “maximized results.”
Taking these two positions together, the assessment of economy appears to boil down to
little more than an efficiency assessment with an implied effectiveness assessment. It may even
be characterized as the balanced optimization of both efficiency and economy, an administrative
pareto optimality of the two values for which an entity aims its efforts. Given these assumptions,
there is not believed to be an independent schematic lens for governance specifically concerned
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with economy, and all aspects of that concept are believed here to be parts of efficiency and
effectiveness.
The likely advantage in taking this position is related to limiting covariance. This means
that excluding economy as a variable of assessment - and thus an independent aspect of
schematically structured decision making - limits the potential conceptual and statistical overlap
that could occur if economy was retained alongside efficiency and effectiveness. As a result of
these assertions, this research takes the position that there is merit in retaining the values of
efficiency and effectiveness, but it also takes the position that there is no additional progress
gained towards the goal of identifying schematic lenses for governance by also retaining the
commonly cited pillar of public administration that is the value of economy. Structurally, there
are other core values of public administration that are often referenced, even as alternative pillars
of the field, that could serve as suitable alternatives for “economy” when suggesting the identity
of the schematic lenses used in governance decision making.

Equity. Another value espoused by public administration is that of equity. Equity has
been discussed in public administration as a core value of the field, but its place as a pillar of the
field in relation to other values has been a minor matter of dispute. Equity is understood in this
work as justice. This principle is considered to be a central issue in public administration (Perry,
2005). Some present the argument that equity should be considered a pillar of public
administration regardless of any other value considerations (e.g., Svara & Brunet, 2005). Some
are of the view that equity should essentially replace economy as a pillar of public administration
(e.g., Bishop, 2006). To others, equity and efficiency should be considered pillars of the field,
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but economy should be retained while the value of effectiveness is dropped (e.g., Frederickson,
1990).
Furthermore, some take the perspective that equity should simply be added to the
established values of efficiency, effectiveness, and economy as pillars of the field, such as when
“the National Academy of Public Administration’s (NAPA) Board of Directors recently adopted
social equity as the fourth pillar of public administration […] (National Academy of Public
Administration, 2005)” (Perry, 2005, p. 26). Norman-Major (2012) also discussed the NAPA
inclusion of equity as fourth pillar of public administration, stating “While not the only values in
local government decision making and service delivery, these four E’s are considered to be the
core values that support and drive the practice of public service implementation” (p. 13). Though
equity might be considered a core value of governance alongside other values like efficiency and
effectiveness, there has been debate and confusion about the proper meaning of the principle.

Social Equity. The dialogue about the place of the value of equity in public
administration also includes significant discussion about a particular interpretation of equity.
Perry (2005) noted that, to many, the fourth pillar represents not just equity but “social equity”
and that “Frederickson and other New Public Administration scholars have written in the area of
social equity since the 1970s” (p. 25). Perry cites the definition of social equity put forth by
Schafritz and Russell (1997) that describes it as the equal treatment by political systems and the
equal delivery of public services. Social equity is also concerned with the equitable distribution
of efforts that come directly or indirectly from some governing body, including the
administrative functions and processes (Svara & Brunet, 2004). Social equity is said to take on
three forms within public administration: (1) simple fairness and equal treatment, (2) the
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distribution of resources with the intent of reducing inequalities, and (3) the redistribution of
resources to increase the equality of opportunity (Norman-Major, 2011). It is a concern not just
for if a government program or policy is functioning properly, but also for whom the program or
policy is actually working (Frederickson, 1990).
Although these understandings of social equity seem rather straightforward, the common
public policy conceptualization of the term is actually confronted with many definitional
problems. Social equity essentially functions then as an extension of the normal equity definition
by reframing and recharacterizing the term to encapsulate principles of equality of outcome and
fairness. The framing of equity in this way has actually caused some difficulties for public
administration.
Since social equity can be thought of in a variety of ways, thinking of it as a synonym for
equality or fairness can present challenges in regard to one’s interpretation and application of the
concept. The usage of the term in public administration has been plagued with vague and
imprecise usage (Svara & Brunet, 2005). This is why there has been discussion that social equity
needs to be more clearly defined and operationalized (Norman-Major, 2011). Svara and Brunet
(2004) state that public administration has an urgent problem with understanding what is
specifically looked for when trying to assess social equity. The two researchers have worked to
propose a framework for identifying it, but they acknowledge that there is a great variety in how
different people think of social equity. The confusion regarding social equity exists because of
the governance implementation challenges that are associated with trying to use a concept that
has a sense of imprecision and inexactness.
The vague and varying understandings of what exactly social equity is, where it
references equality more than a more generalized and uncontextualized sense of equity, make it
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difficult for public administrators to understand the proper way to implement government
initiatives focused on it and to prioritize the value over other key values like efficiency and
effectiveness (Norman-Major, 2011). On the surface the term has substance, but it is rather
hollow when examined at a closer level (Svara & Brunet, 2004). This apparent lack of substance
regarding the practical application of social equity also causes problems for research related to
the topic. Even with the use of proper measurement methodologies of various policy initiatives,
there is difficulty in clearly defining what exactly should be measured in order to accurately
capture the real meaning of social equity (Norman-Major, 2011).
An unclear understanding for what exactly constitutes social equity makes achieving
pillar status for that interpretation of equity a difficult objective to accomplish (Norman-Major,
2011). The term also lacks some aspect of necessary objectivity when compared to other core
values. Efficiency and effectiveness have the potential to be far more objective concepts than
social equity due to its more normative interpretations. In practice, these normative
interpretations cause it to be more difficult to obtain an unbiased assessment (Norman-Major,
2011). Public administration actually disregards any sense of neutrality, a central aspect of the
impartiality that is essential to equity, when embracing social equity by pushing for this fairness
and equality-focused interpretation of prescriptive justice (Norman-Major, 2011).
Moreover, to present an inequity for a purpose cannot simultaneously also be considered
equity. This problem might be best represented by the challenge that conceptualizing equity as
equality and fairness removes the ability to delineate the meaning of justice. As Norman-Major
went on to say in 2012, “The stickiness comes in the question of what is ‘fair’ and ‘just.’ One
person’s fairness may be another’s injustice. Equity also has multiple forms that differ in
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complexity and run from simple fairness and equal treatment to reducing inequities and leveling
the playing field by providing equality of opportunity to disadvantaged groups” (p. 13).

Equity-Ethics Conflation. There is a way to solve these problems associated with the
conceptualization and practical application of social equity while simultaneously keeping equity
as a core value for governance matters. The solution is to eliminate confusion by simply
dropping the word “social.” Doing this would remove the additional weight of interpretation
challenges that come with functionally transforming the term equity into social equity. This
would mean moving the supplementary social equity considerations over to the domain of a
value more apt for addressing them: ethics. Taking this path would allow equity to maintain the
principles of justice where all individuals would receive the same treatment regardless of
secondary effects. Doing this would also move questions about purposely preferred inequalities
might actually be preferred to another value domain of consideration, one focused on conforming
to accepted standards and interpretations of morality.
This proposed solution to the problem of social equity lacking precision as a meaningful
term for public administration is based on the allegation that the term social equity unnecessarily
lumps together the principles of equity and ethics through the reconceptualization of equity as
equality and fairness. Evidence of this problematic link and reframing is subtle but important.
This alleged conflation of conceptual domain between the terms equity and ethics that is believed
to occur though the conduit of social equity driven equality might be best shown in the writings
of Norman-Major (2011) stating, “At the heart of debates over social equity are questions about
what is fair, just, and equitable. Ethics course easily lend themselves to discussions about these
issues. How do we determine what is fair, just, or equitable in a society? How do we define these
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terms? Who gets to define the terms? It is also important to consider for whom policies are fair,
just, and equitable. Other questions for consideration might include the following: What is the
proper role of government in correcting injustice, particularly if the injustice was caused by
public policies? Is it ethical to give some populations more in order to create equality of
opportunity? What if policies created to help one group become detrimental to another? What are
the ethics behind determining which groups deserve extra consideration or help through targeted
programs?” (Norman-Major, 2011, p. 248).
That quote looked at questions regarding how to be equitable but through a social equity
conceptualization. It helped show the real-world challenges that come up when questions of
defining equity are shifted through the social equity framework and become questions of fair
ways for governance to occur. Such a discussion, which is believed here to be an ethical
quandary as characterized by Norman-Major (2011), inevitably leads one to ponder the
comparative desirability of creating inequities in an area in order to create an outcome of
fairness.
The problem with such plans is that the entire notion of creating an inequity for some
other purpose, such as to establish some form of equality, is to suspend the value of equity. It is
to use some ethical determination for what is right other than a decision based on what is
equitable. It is to say what is “good” by creating a new conceptualization of “justice” that is only
able to be achieved through an inequality.
The first problem with this way of thinking is that if the concept of social equity could be
an ever changing and situationally adaptable value that can conform to any efforts to reframe a
situation. This would make it a value it that would have little functional worth other than as a
tool for helping with the rationalization of any action. A governance decision using this
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interpretation of equity would seemingly have little to no principled or metric anchored
foundation from which to evaluate the worthiness of some decision since there would be a
moving goalpost for which to aim. The relatively straightforward conceptualization of equity as
the manner in which a governance action is taken towards or for a people would be substituted
for a potentially endless reweighting of outcome equality. Since the process and effects of
governance are rather continuous and mutually dependent, the approach in question would create
a sort of “Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle” for governance matters. As such, a more
straightforward and less iterative interpretation of equity, opposed to a fairness and equality
focused social equity, is likely the most relevant to a nonrational decision making process.
The second problem with that way of thinking is that the logic used for a rationalized
sense of outcome equality could also be applied to matters of efficiency or effectiveness. It may
be the “right” thing to have some inefficiency in one matter of governance because it leads to
some desirable outcome either later or in some other domain. That desirable outcome may or
may not be related to some aspect of later efficiency. It may also be the “right” thing to be less
than ideally effective in some regard because it creates some advantageous or desirable
secondary effect, and, again, that desirable effect may or may not be related to some aspect of
effectiveness at a later time. These examples illustrate that the question of what is “right” is a
question separate from the values of efficiency or effectiveness, though there could indeed exist
a complex relationship given how the mechanisms of this situation play out.
Neither of these two possible perspectives given in the examples above on efficient or
effective governance decisions would necessarily have anything to do with equity, but they
would address the question of right or wrong that comes with an ethical decision. This implies
that the value of equity and a question about what is right or wrong should be thought of as
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different matters of concern in a governance decision. It also implies that the correct
interpretation of equity for governance decision making would not be as social equity but rather
as unqualified equity with concerns that come with the “social” aspect of social equity moved
over to the domain of ethical decision making.
An assertion of value conflation such as the one just discussed implies the exploration of
the subtle distinctions between a number of terms, and there would only be a place for such a
discussion if the distinctions were not obvious or commonplace. To disentangle equity and ethics
is to explore terms like equality, justice, rights, righteousness, liberty, and opportunity. Nuanced
terminological differences between such words may be negligible in real life practice but are
considered vital here to the accurate conceptualization of the distinct schematic lenses of a
nonrational governance shared mental model.
There are volumes upon volumes of writings on these topics with meaningful arguments
that are simply beyond the scope of this work. If Plato, Aristotle, and many other prominent
learned people have debated the proper meaning and operationalization of these concepts for
thousands of years, this work will be unable to fully encapsulate the intricacies of those
discussions. Further complicating matters is the reality that those many years of effort have
resulted in the creation of subcategories and competing classifications for many of those terms.
There are also contextual versions of the concepts, overlapping realms of practical meaning, and
synergistic effects that can occur between actions taken in the name of multiple concepts
simultaneously.

Conceptual Dichotomy. Given these challenges, this work aims to expedite such
complicated discussions via the explicit assertion of some conceptual distinctions. In proposing
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these conceptual distinctions for the development and understanding of schematic lenses, it is
important to note that despite any possible relationships that might exist between the terms, the
differentiation between presented terms is not meant to create any sort of spectrum between the
two areas of thought. The only objective here is to give form to two distinct views that are not
inherently referencing any other frame of thought in order to have meaning. The referencing of a
term does not mean that equity or ethics is more or less of anything, just different. That is to say
that the opposite of equity is not ethics, or vice versa. Also, these schematically-focused
descriptions do not mean to imply synonymous definitions between terms that fall within the
same categorization.
Equity is operationalized here as representing equality of opportunity, justice, negative
rights, liberty, an acceptance of results, a focus on the law, a treatment-oriented perspective,
integrity, honor, and an evaluation of the relative comparison of opportunity versus injustice.
Ethics is operationalized here as representing equality of outcome, fairness, positive rights, an
expression of control, morality, a focus on philosophy, a results-oriented perspective,
righteousness, virtue, and an evaluation of what is right versus wrong.
The most glaring challenge to the presented conceptual separation is likely related to the
division between the common usage of the terms justice and fairness. Though it is normal for
these terms to be used interchangeably, differentiating between their usage is not a new idea.
This is because, quite simply, what is just may not be fair, and what is fair may not be just. As
presented here, that is akin to saying that what is equitable might not be ethical, and what is
ethical might not be equitable. The difference between the two might be best understood through
their shared but divergent associations with the word equality. Fairness and ethics are assumed
here to be closely related to ideas concerned with the construction of some equality of outcome.
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Justice and equity are, conversely, related to ideas concerned with ensuring some equality of
opportunity. It is also argued here that even for the common subcategories of justice - procedural
justice, restorative justice, retributive justice, and part of distributive justice - are concerned with
equity and equality of opportunity.

Foot Race Analogy. It may be helpful to understand the difference between equity and
ethics through the analogy of a foot race between some large number of people. This
metaphorical foot race would have a universal starting time and a shared finish line. What could
possibly vary between the race participants is their starting position, their running speed, or even
the path that they have to take while running this race. These differences could cause significant
disparities in when each runner finishes the race, but changes made in the name of ethics or
equity could alleviate some aspects of these disparities. The two values would be concerned with
different features of the race experience and, if turned into actionable changes, influence
different components of the race experience.
An emphasis on the ethical nature of this race would be concerned with running a race
where everyone finishes at the same time or, at least, within an acceptable margin of difference.
The goal of ethics would be to contemplate what would help make every runner have a fair
chance at winning the race. It would be a focus on the result of the race and ensuring some
equality of outcome that is desirable. Possible scenarios that would fit this view would involve
making some runners wait until after the starting gun before they could leave their starting
position in order to minimize the marginal differences in starting positions, give some runners a
device that helps them run faster, require other runners to use devices that make them run faster,
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or find some way to transfer the energy the inherently fast runners have to the inherently slow
runners.
An emphasis on the equitable nature of this race would be concerned with runners
completing courses with the same structure regardless of the starting position or speed of each
runner. It would be expressing an interest in ensuring that there are no barriers to participation or
competition for each runner. Each runner would be able to finish as far ahead of or behind any
other runner, but each runner would be guaranteed to not have to run any hills, avoid any
obstacles, or run with any burden that every other runner would not also have to endure. Such a
concern for the equity of the race would allow runners to experience whatever successes or
failures their own races would present them with, but everyone would have an equal opportunity
to compete to the best of their ability without worry of some disparity being created by a
uniquely imposed obstacle. The paradigm of justice looks at only a snapshot of the race, as
opposed to the end results, because it creates a sense of duty for impartiality between runners.
This asserted distinction between the operationalization of the equity and ethics draws
attention to matters of potential importance regarding the common use and conversational nature
of those terms. The first noteworthy effect this distinction has on common usage relates to an
alleged misuse of the phrase “equality of opportunity.” The claim here is that governance
concerns that are commonly discussed as being expressions of a desire for equality of
opportunity are actually masked considerations for equality of outcome. Said another way,
equality of desired outcomes may masquerade as desires for equality of desired opportunities
merely because of an emphasis on pre-outcome factors. However, in order for there to be a
change in an outcome, effects must occur before that outcome, and this does not mean that those
factors are then, by default, related to aspects of opportunity.
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To reference the previously presented race metaphor, if equality of opportunity is focused
on helping bring advantages to an otherwise disadvantaged group, and it is perceived as
appropriate to create some disparity in treatment for that group, then the implicit goal of that
action is to have a more equal result for the race. Such an approach is connected to creating a
sense of equality of outcome. It is the desire to create that which is perceived as fair. “To be fair”
is a term that pushes towards a conceptualization of what is right or wrong as the metric for
determining what is fair. To determine an aspect of fairness is to express a moral preference and
thus an ethical aspect of a decision. In sum, to have a sense of preoccupation with a disadvantage
in starting position or running speed is to be oriented towards the outcome and thus the fairness,
morality, and ethical nature of potential adjustments that could be made to help induce a
desirable result for the race.
An accurate conceptualization of equality of opportunity cannot be concerned with the
comparative preexisting starting position of individuals or their inherent capacity for progress
because doing so would invariably imply a concern with the ending positions of those
individuals and the mutually exclusive desire for equality of outcome. The way to actually
achieve equality of opportunity in the race is to provide a sense of justice and equity in the
chances for action that individuals are provided. This would be an orientation towards the in-race
experience and preventing any racer from facing the imposition of new obstacles that are not also
presented to every other racer. To have a sense of preoccupation with the chances for individuals
to compete from their existing state and with their existing abilities is to be oriented towards
opportunity. This would prevent barriers for people’s engagement in the race.
The second noteworthy effect this distinction has on common usage relates to the
potential mischaracterization of distributive governance actions. A previously cited quote form

124
Norman-Major (2011) stated that two possible forms of social equity in public administration are
concerned with the distribution and redistribution of resources to reduce inequalities and increase
equality of opportunity. The position of this research is that, given the previously presented
dichotomy between equitable and ethical concerns, there is no functional difference between
distributive and redistributive efforts, and both are considered to refer to equality of outcome
instead of equality of opportunity.
The key to understanding this interpretation is connected to the difference between
negative and positive rights. The negative rights aspect of an equity-based decision has a
distinctly different governance effect on a person than the positive rights aspect of an ethicsbased decision. A negative rights influence would be the protection from interference or
obligation, but a positive rights influence would impose a duty on others to provide something.
As interpreted here, to redistribute is to directly transfer something from one to another,
but to distribute is to merely do it indirectly. Both acts occur through some type of force and
sense of control, but the acts occur through a desire to create a perception of a fair situation.
Force or control in this sense are not characterized as inherently malicious but rather aspects of
some form of societal participation, though the degree of agreement or willingness to participate
with such governance efforts may vary within a type of social contract.
If that interpretation has merit, then the two forms of social equity in public
administration presented by Norman-Major (2011) represent a false dichotomy of governance
action. The distribution of resources with some intent to alter an outcome is functionally the
same thing as a redistribution of resources with some intent. All resources come from the same
pool, so the distinction of the use of resources as distributive or redistributive is to some degree
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inconsequential. To use the race metaphor again, this would be similar to saying, if such a thing
was possible, to transfer units of speed from one racer to another.
To transfer via distribution or redistribution is an action imposed through positive rights,
opposed to the negative rights expectation of inaction where nothing would be taken from one
party to give to another. A governance decision to create an obligation to act, such as through an
obligation for a disbursement of resources, is a manifestation of a positive right. This means that
all distributive and redistributive efforts are related to ethical choices for what is right by way of
the imposition of the effects of positive rights. This means that any reference to distributive and
redistributive efforts would be more accurately characterized as a focus on equality of outcome,
not opportunity. It also means that these activities labeled as aspects of social equity are really
ethically-driven, and not equity-driven, actions.
The third noteworthy effect this distinction has on common usage relates to the
modification or qualified forms of these core values. The qualifier mentioned here refers to the
use of “social” in social equity or any other similar modifying or conditional terms applied to
governance values. The assertion presented here is that any modified or qualified version of
equity or justice is in reality likely just a perceived fairness achieved through an inequity. This
interpretation comes from the perspective that an equity-driven determination of justice can be
comfortable with the existence of inequality of outcome, but a qualified version of this value is
the explicit imposition of moral preference or interpretations. In asserting this alleged distortion,
this research does not intend to impart any judgment on the merit of actions taken from a
qualified perspective. The purpose of noting this distinction is only as part of an effort to achieve
the clarity and specificity necessary for operationalization of concepts used for identifying
schematic lenses of governance.
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The fourth and final noteworthy effect this distinction has on common usage relates to the
intersection of equity and ethics. This work wishes to make the assertion that even though there
is an alleged misuse or misapplication of otherwise distinct concepts (linked to governance
schematic lenses) through the usage of certain terms, that does not mean that the values of equity
and ethics do not have an important area of overlap. This is to say that just as how the balance or
simultaneous maximization of the values of efficiency and effectiveness through the concept of
“economy” can provide a potentially beneficial assessment tool for certain management
objectives, a similar interaction might occur between equity and ethics. Conceptually, this area of
overlap is assumed here to occur when there are dual objectives, such as balancing the equality
of opportunity and outcome, or balancing justice and fairness. The need for such a dual
consideration is believed to typically occur in matters of substantial judgment where the potential
impacts of a decision support whatever deliberation is necessary in order to achieve that which is
both just and fair. This area is assumed here to be that which can be identified as creating a sense
of “moral obligation.”
Moral obligation, which is sometimes referenced in the discussion of core judicial
concepts, is believed here to represent the intersection of equity and ethics. It is a challenge to
seek both the correct and right decision. This is the foundation of an ideal legal system that
works to seek that which a people identify as a righteous yet liberty-sustaining path. The
reference in this work to moral obligation and its potential place in the larger landscape of
governance decisions is not directly necessary for the construction of governance schematic
lenses. A mention of moral obligation is merited in this discussion, as it is considered an
important driving concept in real life and may guide the construction of societies. There is a
presumption here that this concept of moral obligation is universally idealized in governance
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matters and representative of the synergistic effect present when a decision is able to be made
through some optimum evaluation of equitable and ethical considerations.
In summary, this research takes the stance that to be concerned with the ethical nature of
a decision would be a distinct schematic approach and separate from any question of efficiency,
effectiveness, or equity. This means that ethics should be considered to be its own core value, its
own core schematic lens of governance, alongside the other E’s of efficiency, effectiveness, and
equity. This would allow it to properly receive its own, independent decision making attention
and help justify the place of public administration efforts concerned with corruption or otherwise
inappropriate behavior (e.g., Elcock, 2012). Taking this approach helps one avoid the
complexities of social equity, with its inability to be adequately defined or applied, and realize
that both aspects of that commonly proposed pillar are meaningful to the field, just in a different
form. This approach also allows governance decision making to retain the important principles of
equity while also acknowledging and adding the value of ethics as a core principle, which would
represent the arguments of what is right or wrong.

Ethics. At this point it should be apparent that the significance of ethics as not just a
likely pillar of public administration but as an important schematic lens for governance decision
making. Others, like Peter Shergold, have viewed ethics as a core value of public administration
alongside values like efficiency and effectiveness (Bishop, 2006; Shergold, 2014). Though its
place alongside the other core E’s of governance values might be a somewhat new
conceptualization, the importance of ethics in governance far from a new idea.
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle all viewed ethics as a necessary component of politics in
order for a people to achieve real happiness (Makrydemetres, 2002). Socrates is considered the
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founder of moral philosophy through his focus on ethics and the choice of the good (Rowe,
1976). Socrates believed that ethics was the process of rational deliberation that allowed one to
achieve morality and make choices for what is good and right (Makrydemetres, 2002).
Despite its potential for immense complexity, the metric for which ethics is evaluated
now is rather simple. Ethics is a functional understanding of that which is good in life (Vlastos,
1991). It is the social norms which guide public administrator conduct and decision making
(Makrydemetres, 2002). Given this common interpretation, it has also been stated that a
community has the right to have the highest standards of ethics maintained in governance efforts
while public administrators look to create efficient and effective programs (Cameron, 2004).

Four Core Values. This analysis suggests that four core values (efficiency, effectiveness,
equity, and ethics) are used for the formation of governance decisions. Discussions about core
values, what they mean, where they show up in practice, and how they are measured are likely to
be important components to studying public administration (Norman-Major, 2011). The
emphasis on the proper operationalization of such terms used in this work is supported in part by
the doctrine of New Public Management that has advocated for public administrators to make
explicit the standards and measures they would use for performance evaluations. The reasoning
behind this belief was that doing so would help the public understand if governance goals were
met or not (Hood, 1991). Seeking the proper operationalization of concepts is also important for
the construction of new ideas and the eventual statistical analysis of factors related to those
concepts.
It is likely important to know both what each value of governance decision making
represents as well as how it is expressed. This knowledge would also signify how a decision
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maker using a particular schematic lens would assess an act of governance. A decision maker
would need some form of criteria in order to know how much of their schematically-associated
value was being adhered to in the particular governance matter. Furthermore, they might also
need to be able to know what area of inquiry could provide more information about the details of
such a criterion when some type of conflict or uncertainty arises. For instance, if certain decision
makers were concerned with efficiency, they would assess a matter of governance by how
efficient it is or could be expected to be. To do this, they would need to have some criteria to use
as a principle-anchored metric for evaluating that level of efficiency, and they might also need to
use some professional or academic body of knowledge in order to explore how the details are
structured or applied. The following information attempts to provide this type of information
about each of the abduced core values of governance decision making.

Efficiency. Efficiency is assumed to be best thought of as a ratio of inputs to outputs.
Efficiency is asserted here as expressing how resources are transformed into some end product. It
is an evaluation that measures capability and production. The study of efficiency is rather
mathematical in nature, and, for governance, is most associated with the field of Economics.
Specifically, it is likely connected to more rational ways of thinking such as statistical modeling
or seeking a better resource usage ratio. It is not a value particularly concerned with the
appropriateness, worthiness, or justification of the action.

Effectiveness. The effectiveness of any decision of governance is assumed to be evaluated
by a ratio of intentions to outcomes. According to Cohen (1993), “The definition of effectiveness
will vary with different organizational environments, different organizational types, and different
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organizational goals” (p. 48). Overall though, effective decisions of governance are asserted here
as those that have an impact, make a meaningful change, and/or achieve some type of desired
results. The dominant area of inquiry for the study of effectiveness is likely, in its broadest sense,
organizational theory. An organization is a form of a group that is designed for a particular
purpose or goal. Having this group achieve some desired change in order to realize some
particular result is at the heart of organizational theory. Measures of effectiveness provide the
tools for assessing such outcomes. Although generally not discussed in quantitative terms,
numerical measures are sometimes created for issues of governance. For example, the World
Bank’s website discusses its “Government Effectiveness Index” which creates scores for
governance across a variety of dimensions.

Equity. Equity is presented as representing the ratio of opportunity to injustice. It
represents an individual’s interest in equality of opportunity and a perception of possessing the
liberty to act in a manner similar to others through the prevention of certain externally imposed
limitations. An emphasis on equity is expected to focus on the treatment people receive from
governance efforts, the perceived uniformity of governance process and access, or the
comparability of situations. Given its association with perceptions of justice, the dominant area
of inquiry for the investigation of equity is assumed to be the area of legal studies. Specifically
for public administrators, the study of administrative law is important to understanding
procedural equity (Norman-Major, 2011).

Ethics. For decisions of governance, ethics should be thought of as a ratio of right to
wrong. It is a concern for equality of outcome and ensuring the perception of fairness that can be
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produced through the application of positive rights. It is a governance path that seeks
righteousness and a focus on morality. The study of ethics is dialectical in nature and is best
explored through the humanities and philosophy. Sheeran (1993) notes that philosophy plays an
important part in our political system, and, although too often neglected in public administration,
“Ethics in public service has become a major topic in the United States over the past twenty
years” (p. 3). He goes on to say, “There are two main approaches to the teaching of ethics…the
objectivist, and the interpretivist or subjectivist…The interpretivist approach is often called
teleological theory. Subscribers to this theory offer no absolute standards for assessing right and
wrong. The individual’s judgment in particular, unique cases constitutes the only criterion for
what is right and what is wrong. In reality, this is “situation ethics,” whereby the situation
dictates what a person should or should not do and the result is the right or ethical decision. The
teleological approach considers only the consequences of human actions and makes judgment on
these consequences. There are no rules, laws, or regulations to help in judging the consequences”
(Sheeran, 1993, p.9).

Two Sets of Clues. The previous sections of this chapter identified two sets of clues for
governance schemas: interest/positions and core values. The initial abductive logic for
developing these schematic clues started implicitly with the surprising evidence that people
presented with the same general pieces of information regarding some governance matter could
come to different decisions. If different perspectives are presented for addressing governance
matters, the existence of these different paths of perspective would be a matter of course if
people were using different frames of reference for developing their decisions. This relationship
is believed to occur because of the assumption that the differing filtration and evaluation
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processes that come from different frames of reference would create diverging perspectives and
views about a governance decision.
If there are then different views within a person or between people that could compete for
dominance in a decision making process, then this competition represents a conflict that needs to
be resolved in some way in order for a decision to be reached. Given that conflict resolution
literature typically suggests finding a way to separate interests and positions in order to avoid
one of the disputing perspectives to obtain a dominant stance, it was postulated in this research
that the occurrence of dominance of some schematically derived frame of reference would
represent the collapsing of interests and positions into being a single viewpoint. This singular
perspective was labeled as an “interest/position” and represented a distinct frame of reference
used in a nonrational governance decision.
It was assumed that each interest/position would desire distinct, identifiable, consistent,
and enduring governance outcomes as result of being anchored by a schematically-driven
conclusion regarding the evaluation of some governance options. The universality of a societallevel shared mental model then suggested that these frames of reference become functionally
representative of the motivations for the vantage point of society that they embody for
governance decisions. In this identity, these interest/positions would be expected to denote the
type of action government should typically take or what kind of role the government should play
while taking certain actions.
Therefore, if interest/positions are (1) to represent different views that come from
schematically filtered information and evaluations, (2) to represent different desires for particular
outcomes to occur as envisioned by those views, (3) to represent the different approaches to
governance decisions in order to potentially achieves those desired outcomes, and (4) to be
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emblematic of common and occupiable societal stances, then interest/positions are assumed to be
a type of social institution relevant to governance. The identity of these interest/positions as
social institutions was assumed to then be derived from the governing entity as well as the
macro, meso, and micro levels of the people associated with that realm of governance. This
resulted in the assertion, presented below in Figure 1, that the four core interest/positions of
governance are the state, the everyone, the group, and the individual.

Figure 1. Four core interest/positions.

An important component of the idea of interest/positions representing some perspective
and corresponding desire for governance decisions is to know what those desires actually are. To
have such desires is to have a vision of an outcome and a way of assessing if that vision has
occurred. Such an assessment was assumed to require some type of criterion-based evaluation of
matters, to see if what is considered to have worth, utility, or importance has happened or is
expected to happen. These interpretations then imply the existence of a guiding value of
governance for each frame of reference, and this would be fitting as societal institutions are
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understood here as having values as a key aspect of their defining identity. This logic then
suggested that another important aspect of understanding and structuring governance schemas
beyond just that of interest/positions would be to understand what are likely to be the core values
of governance.
To then complete step two of the analysis used in this research and fully identify the clues
of the use of schemas in governance decision making, the core values of governance had to be
abduced. As occurred with interest/positions, it was assumed that there were likely to be a small
number of core values that are fundamental to governance decision making. The question that
this research then confronted was where to look to identify such core values of governance, and,
in order to answer that question, discussions and research concerning the values of public
administration were looked to as a guide. The result of this search yielded the conclusion that the
four core values of governance are efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and ethics. This search also
yielded the likely evaluative foci and dominant areas of inquiry for each of these core values,
presented below in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Core governance values, evaluative metrics, and dominant areas of inquiry.

Evidence Structuring
With these two sets of clues identified, the third and next step of the analysis is to
structure this evidence. Since it is assumed that each schematic lens in a nonrational governance
decision making shared mental model represents a purist view of a governance preference, the
evidence should be structured in a manner that emphasizes such schematic frames of reference.
These frames of reference are considered to be lenses that can be applied in a dynamic way, and
that implies that variability in the identity exists not just between the schematic lenses but also
within them. This means that the identified clues should be structured in a manner that
demonstrate the diversity and multifaceted nature of the core governance views that have been
identified.
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The difference between schematic lenses is straightforward and means that an appropriate
structuring of schematic lenses would have each lens represent only one interest/position or only
one core value. Variability within schematic lenses though connotes an ability of each schematic
lens to take on different forms while still maintaining its overall identity, purpose, and
uniqueness compared to other schematic lenses. This would imply that schematic lenses may be
able to be represented by not just interest/positions or core values but by either one as
appropriate.
In regards to this potential, this is indeed how schematic frames are believed to operate. It
is asserted here that schematic frames consist of both interest/positions and core values because it
is assumed that these two elements are intrinsically related to one another. Since
interest/positions are viewed here as a type of social institution that possesses values and are also
viewed as representative of different desires for particular outcomes to occur as envisioned by
those views, then the values are the mechanisms for articulating those desires. This connection
then implies that each interest/position is associated with a particular value, and, together, each
represent different facets of the same schematic lens. Because of these assumptions and
conclusions, interest/positions and values are believed to be evidence of the use of schemas
operating with a nonrational governance decision making shared mental model and are best
structured for comprehension as four distinct lenses. Each lens is presented as row in the column
below in Figure 3.
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Effectiveness

Individual

?
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Figure 3. Exploring the connection between interest/positions and values.

Linkages Through Reconceptualizations
With the abductively derived evidence structured, the next and fourth overall step of the
analysis is to link the different facets of the proposed schematic lenses. This is to be done by
reconceptualizing different aspects of each existing component of the schematic lenses, which in
this case are the interest/positions and core values, until a link between the components is
established. These efforts help the overall identification of each schematic lens make more sense,
maintain conceptual coherence, and reduce concerns for spurious associations.
If these different components are part of the same schematic lenses, then there will
logically be relationships between the components as they will be existing as different versions
of the same schema. With an overarching schematic framework acting as a scaffolding, each
component can be reconceptualized in order for conceptual bridges to be constructed that link the
schematic components of interest/positions and core values. Establishing these relationships will
be done by looking more deeply into what the interest/positions want and what would motivate
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someone looking through that schematic lens at the governance decision making world.
Specifically, this will be achieved through the analysis of interest/position identity associations
and then through identifying political philosophies which exemplify the schematic thought. The
resulting structure can then be expected to show how the same schematic lenses are expressed
differently across various areas of governance decision making. The schematic lenses would then
be expected to represent different families of thought regarding the approaches one could take
towards governance decisions.

Developing Identity Associations. Identity associations are presented here as the most
salient characteristic of an approach to governance that each interest/position could be expected
to exhibit. These are simple extensions of how each interest/position could be depicted in terms
of the most motivating interest or the most illustrative consideration. The identity association of
each interest/position is presented below and then shown together in Figure 4.

The State – Authority. In a decision of governance, an inherent identity that must be
recognized is that of the entity doing the governing. Identified as “the state” here, this
interest/position is concerned with exerting influence and power. This means that the identity
most associated with the governance preferences of the state is “authority.”

The Everyone - Societal. The totality of the people in a given realm of governance are
represented here through the interest/position of the everyone. This interest/position is concerned
most with the overall well-being of this maximumly inclusive category of people. A societal
focus is the identity association most representative of this interest/position.
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The Group - Affiliation. The interest/position of the group recognizes the middle ground
perspective between a societal-level consideration and an individual focus. Regardless of the size
of the cross-section of people from which this perspective is anchored, the core features of that
schematic filter are connected through a sense of association and membership. Therefore, a focus
on affiliation is the most representative of the group interest/position.

The Individual – Self Interest. The interest/position of the individual represents that of a
person and, for all intents and purposes, their immediate family unit/household. This schematic
lens is oriented towards personal agency and well-being. Self-interest is believed to be the
identity association most appropriate for describing this perspective.

Figure 4. Developing the identity associations of each interest/position.
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Interest/positions and their associated identities represent the core perspectives that
people can adopt for governance decisions. In terms of schematic lenses and frames of reference,
they inherently create a hierarchy of importance regarding the emphasis of some viewpoint. In a
related but different way, values also categorize governance decisions. Values, as well as their
corresponding mechanisms for evaluation, represent the core standards by which governance
decisions can be assessed. As Kettl (2018) stated, the complexity of political matters forces
necessary simplification that leads to the use of values as a tool for comprehension and
assessment. Figure 5 shown below depicts the connection being sought between the different
aspects of schematic frames.

Interest/

Identity

Position

Association

State

Authority

Everyone
Group

Value

Evaluative Focus

?

Efficiency

Inputs vs. Outputs

Societal

?

Ethics

Right vs. Wrong

Affiliation

?

Effectiveness Intentions vs. Outcomes

?

Equity

Individual Self-Interest

< Connection? >

Opportunity vs. Injustice

Figure 5. Connecting the different aspects of schematic frames.

Although both interest/positions and values serve as useful clues for how schematic
lenses are used within a nonrational shared mental model of governance decision making, there
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is a bit of conceptual gulf between the two. Interest/positions are families of standpoints for
articulating what matters for governance, but values are categories of criteria for assessing what
matters for governance. The two are both important groups of ways to frame matters within a
governance decision, but what connects them? It is asserted here that in order to offer a more
seamless presentation of the identity of the proposed schematic lenses for governance matters, a
conceptual connection between the two is necessary. This connection would need to represent a
sort of thematic element that bridges the minor conceptual gulf between interest/positions and
values. It is asserted here that political philosophies can serve this purpose.

Political Philosophies. Political philosophies are viewed here as philosophies that
represent a particular theoretical and normative approach to the inherently political questions
related to describing a person’s place in and relationship to social structures and governing
entities. Political philosophies are believed to be important and relevant to decisions of
governance because they orient a decision maker’s perspective for how they should develop the
connection between the current and future conceptualization of governance. For their use in this
work, it assumed that each schematic lens is believed to be representative of a pure form of some
political philosophy.
The use of political philosophies in this manner fits the abductive approach used for this
research. The formulaic structure of the logic of abduction can help show how this happens. This
is the surprising evidence observed, that there is an assumed linkage between governance
interest/positions and values within a schematic frame. If it were true that certain political
philosophies necessarily linked these two groups of perspective, then the connection between the
two categories would be a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to believe political
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philosophies serve appropriately as the link between interest/positions and values that exist
within the same schematic lens.
The question then arises of how to select the political philosophy that best fits the alleged
schematic relationship between one of the interest/positions and one of the values. Again, the use
of abductive logic provides guidance. Using the same approach, one is able to assess existing
political philosophies and establish that the use of one would, as a matter of course, lead to a
particular interest/position. The same process could be done for governance values. The
identification of four political philosophies that encompass both an interest/position and a value
then indicate that those political philosophies serve as linkages between their accompanying
interest/positions and values. Therefore, the objective of the next phase of the analysis is to
identify political philosophies that create the necessary bridge between one of the
interest/positions and one of the governance values.

Statism as the link between The State and Efficiency. The Cambridge and MerriamWebster dictionaries both characterize statism as a philosophy that espouses a governance
perspective where some governing entity has concentrated in it the ownership, control, and
planning of a people’s economic and industrial capacities. Statism is asserted here as
representing the link between the interest/position of the state and the value of efficiency. It is
worth noting that it is also asserted here that, in the reading of this section, statism is considered
to be functionally similar to an authoritarian philosophy in many ways. Both are anchored by the
control possessed and used by some governing entity, but the two do differ in that the
authoritarian conceptualization is more likely to seek control of private matters and have the
vision of state authority manifested in a particular political entity, as opposed to the government
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as an abstract and variable concept for statism. Given this minor distinction assumed here, the
use of statism was believed to have more potential in terms of the application of abstract
concepts discussed with schematic frames.
Statism is related to the interest/position of the state because the philosophy views the
state as being chiefly able and best suited to achieve acts of governance, and the interest/position
is associated with the identity and application of the authority a governing entity can wield. This
mindset is the belief that a certain governance vision can be best achieved by having a governing
entity harnessing the full potential of the resources it has power over. Furthermore, it is not just
necessarily the view that the governing entity would be most able to achieve some governance
goal but also the view that it should be the entity to carry out such efforts.
Statism is related to the value of efficiency because the philosophy is concerned with the
comparative advantage in outputs that can be gained by utilizing the governing entity’s full reach
and capacity, and the value is concerned with an evaluation of inputs compared to outputs
between choices in a decision. Efficiency expresses how resources are transformed into some
end product. It is an evaluation that measures capability and production. It is not a value
particularly concerned with the appropriateness, worthiness, or justification of the action.
An orientation for the most efficient action would focus attention on acquiring the
resources that direct the most activities and control the most contextual elements possible.
Harnessing the full power of all that is governable is the most logical option for achieving this
full capacity for getting the most outputs from a given level of inputs. The more a state entity is
empowered, the more ability it has to harness the full capacity of its resources. It has more
capability to get the most output from of a given aggregate social input than any other system.
Conversely, other systems could be focused on matters such as individuals all making their own
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choices, dominant groups jockeying for the helm of governance, or the community focusing on
seeking the right move.

Communitarianism as the link between The Everyone and Ethics. The Encyclopedia
Britannica characterizes communitarianism as representing political perspectives that emphasize
the social and community concerns that factor into and influence matters of governance.
Communitarianism is asserted here as referring to a philosophy which views the perceived needs
of the community as paramount. Communitarianism is related to the interest/position of the
everyone because both have a societal focus. A decision maker adopting a communitarian view
would be interested in the overarching effect an act of governance would have on everyone as a
whole and is chiefly concerned with the principled health of the society. The perceptual stance of
the interest/position of the everyone is believed to allow the greatest perspective and ethical
stance on the aggregate human condition.
Communitarianism is also asserted here as relating to the governance value of ethics
because the philosophy is concerned with the societal impact of a governance decision, and the
value is concerned with an assessment of what is right or wrong when it comes to what
governance decision is made. The inherent relationship between these two is that the questioning
of what is right or wrong happens against the backdrop of the influence of that evaluation on
society. It is the question of what is right or wrong in the eyes of a community and for a people
of a certain governance realm. When a society governs itself through the lens of
communitarianism, it is assumed to at some point become concerned with seeking virtue. This
view and pursuit also is assumed to operate with the assumption that since all the people
associated with a governing entity are connected in some way, the effects of decisions of
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governance are the concerns of all. This means that when an orientation towards the interests of
society becomes the central focus and communitarianism becomes the dominant political
philosophy, ethics plays an indispensable role in decision making.

Groupism as the link between The Group and Effectiveness. Groupism is characterized by
the Oxford and Merriam-Webster dictionaries as the desire to belong to, think like, and act like a
member of some group. In doing such things, a person would adopt the cultural pattern of such a
group. Groupism is then asserted here as a philosophy that stems from the drive to associate with
those that one can share an identity with and those that one is habituated to connect with. It is
when the dominant perspective in a decision maker’s mind is that of the group affiliation.
Individual identities become superseded by identities that differentiate one’s segment of people
from another segment. Groupism is the driving political philosophy for those most associating
with a sub-societal identity that is represented by the interest/position of the group.
Groupism is a philosophy that occurs in all cultures. It is particularly present in Western
culture (Storey, 2006). Groupism supports the affiliation of the citizenry to some group identity
because it assumes governance is enhanced when decision-making, at some level, is limited to
specific representatives. It is assumed here that this perspective believes that the competition and
cooperation that can occur between qualified and selected representatives of groups during
decisions of governance can produce outcomes that are more effective than the abstract
objectives of society as a whole, the potential mob rule of direct democracy, or the central
planning of state-led initiatives.
The core value associated with groupism is effectiveness. What is considered effective is
related to what voice was most able to articulate what an effective outcome looked like, which
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was tied to the goal and subsequent vision of a particular entity, a group of some sort. The
effectiveness of any decision of governance should be evaluated by a ratio of intentions to
outcomes. According to Cohen (1993), “The definition of effectiveness will vary with different
organizational environments, different organizational types, and different organizational goals”
(p. 48). Ultimately though, effective decisions of governance have an impact, make a meaningful
change, and achieve desired results.
A people concerned most with group orientation are focusing, to some degree, on the
characteristics that make their group unique from other groups. As a result, such individuals are
likely to be primed to be more aware of the subtleties that differentiate their group’s position on
matters from the positions of other groups. To prevent any cognitive dissonance, they are then
more likely to lean towards decisions that more closely resemble their group’s standpoint. These
leanings are the desired intentions of governance decisions, and perceptual evaluations of
governance outcomes are then assessed by their continuity with these prior intentions. In this
frame of mind, a focus on governance effectiveness is paramount.

Liberalism as the link between The Individual and Equity. Liberalism is characterized by
Oxford Research Encyclopedia as being representative of a political philosophy that advocates
for liberty, equal rights, and limited, nonauthoritarian influence by governing entities. This
philosophy is asserted here as being predominantly associated with the individual and the
concept of self-interest. Fundamentally, the most important concept to the rationale of
individuals seeking to pursue their self-interest is the ability to actually make such a choice. This
need for individual empowerment reinforces the role of liberty as a fundamental component of
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liberalism. Through it, everyone must have an equal opportunity to seek their goals or chance to
achieve their desires.
The value of governance that most meaningfully associates with the political philosophy
of liberalism is equity and its corresponding emphasis on equality of opportunity. In order for an
individual to have the ability to pursue particular interests, governance actions must be oriented
in a way that enables those pursuits to occur without undue and negative relative interference.
Supporting the individual in such a fashion might not mean accessing the full potential of all
people, having them engage in highly moral action, or using a strategy appropriate for acquiring
what they desire. Nevertheless, the individual would be empowered, and the fully empowered
individual is then on equal footing with all other individuals. This represents equity, and a
governance system focused on liberalism seeks to ensure that perceptions of injustice are
minimized while the perception of opportunity is maximized.

Multifaceted Lenses. The table presented below shows the four fully developed schematic
lenses of governance presented by this work. Each lens is represented by a different row in the
table. This means that each schematic lens can be identified by any of its components, such as
the interest/position, the identity association, the political philosophy, the core value, the
evaluative criteria, or, indirectly, the dominant area of inquiry. The ability to identify each
schematic lens by any of these components may raise the question “why are schematic lenses,
such as the ones presented here, multifaceted in nature?”
The answer to such an inquiry is that, simply, the schematic frames are multifaceted
because they represent complex concepts in the mind of a decision maker. A schema is a
cognitive tool that uses purposeful reduction in order to make an otherwise unwieldly problem
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manageable, and, in this context where such schematic tools exist as part of a shared mental
model, they are carefully curated mechanisms of interpersonal communication. Matters of
governance may be convoluted in nature and require the decision maker to be able to make a
nonrational assessment through whatever mechanism is the most advantageous for the scenario.
This means that the form of a lens that is used in a decision is a product of the type of decision
being made. In some situations, the lenses take on the form of competing metrics for evaluation,
in other situations they are best characterized as the manifestation of competing political
philosophies, and in other situations they might be best conceptualized as the representative ways
for different components of society to express governance preferences. What is important to
abstractly possess for the utilization of the idea of schematic lenses is that they represent unique
ways of thinking that can take on different forms while still representing the same essential
preference across different contexts. Said another way, the different components of schematic
lenses represent the same fundamental and comparative preference and assessment of that
preference, regardless of the form of the lens used in any particular situation. The different
aspects of schematic lenses are presented together below in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Complete schematic lenses used for governance decisions.
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Application of Schematic Lenses
The fifth and final step of the analysis is the application of the schematic lenses. The
function of this step is to further their description and conceptualization by applying them to
different areas of decision making. To do this, decisions will be articulated through the use of
examples constructed with only the application of individual schematic lenses.
The first area that these schematic lenses could be applied would be through a typical
statistical application of a multiple regression analysis formula. In such an equation, a prediction
line is created that specifies an intercept point, an error component, and slopes and coefficients
for each of the included predictor variables. If each schematic lens had a metric, then for any
decision one could include in a multiple regression information about each of those predictor
variables. One could, however, functionally remove the use of three out of the four potential
schematic lenses by setting three predictor variables to zero. This would mean that some
prediction outcome variable would be a function of only the intercept, the error, and the slope
and coefficient of that one variable. This would be an assessment of the impact of just that one
lens of analysis on an outcome. It is assumed here that such a situation would represent a “pure”
view of that governance preference, where no other governance schematic lens is relevant. Such
pure views, as a concept, are helpful for understanding the next example of the application of
governance schematic lenses.
The second example looks to show how the use of “pure” schematic lenses could be used
to describe, compare, and contrast the variability that could occur in a real governance situation
if different lenses were used. The governance example used in this example will be the digging
of ditches for a realm of governance. The example will demonstrate how different schematic
lenses would be expected to address this need. The different approaches will be anchored by
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each of the four political philosophies in order to show how each path would decide to have the
ditches dug.

The Statist Approach. If a statist perspective was taken, the government might establish
the “Ditch Digging Organization” and fill its ranks with its people. From there it could employ a
command and control approach to this organization of its people to ensure a highly efficient
digging of ditches. Resources would be allocated directly and costs to the community would be
minimized. This approach would maximize efficiency through state direction.

The Communitarianist Approach. If a communitarianist approach was adopted, a
committee would be formed to find the best ditch diggers from within the people and have those
folks direct their efforts towards the digging of the ditches. Presumably, the individuals selected
would be best for the job, and their efforts in that realm would be offset by the participation of
others in different areas. It would seem unethical for anyone other than the best ditch diggers to
be the ones helping the overall health of the community by digging the ditches, and as such a
highly ethical set of interactions would occur.

The Groupist Approach. If a groupist approach was taken, groups within the community
would compete for the opportunity to be the ones to dig the ditches. It would be advantageous in
some way for the group to earn this opportunity. High competition for this opportunity would
likely lead to innovation in ditch digging practices. All things equal, the group that could dig
ditches the best would win out over other competitors. Since the end result of this process could
logically be a supremely dug ditch, it could be viewed as a highly effective operation.

152

The Libertarian Approach. If a libertarian approach was adopted, the choice of how to go
about getting ditches dug would be left to the individuals with the most incentive to have the
ditch dug. In this scenario, the government would pass off this responsibility/opportunity to the
people. For those folks that were motivated enough to have the ditch dug, they could charter
some entity to do this for them or do it themselves. All things equal, every individual would have
as much opportunity as the next person to have a ditch dug in the manner they prefer or can
obtain. Those not interested in having a ditch dug would not have to devote resources towards
the process. With government stepping out of the picture for much of these transactions, private
entities would likely take on the most significant role.

Kettl Comparison. The third and final example used here to show how these schematic
lenses could be applied through “pure” views would be through the application of the lenses to
the four styles of decision making in government presented by Kettl (2018). This means that
Kettl’s typology could be reframed as different expressions of schematic lenses. This would
alleviate the concern expressed by Kettl that these approaches are disparate takes on decision
making in government and show that they are actually connected and all merely different
schematic takes on the same decision making process.

1. A statist governance push for efficiency matches up with Kettl’s fully rational
approach. This approach advocates for return on investment through the highest ratio
of inputs to outputs, seeks the “best bang for a buck,” and dismisses any deviations as
situationally-related error. An economic analysis would be the judge for assessing the

153
level of efficiency achieved as calculations of various tradeoffs would have to be
accounted for.

2. Kettl’s public choice approach strives for the outcome with the most individuallyperceived utility and self-interest. This would match up directly to the schematic
frame of liberalism. The value of equity is expressed by every individual being able
to follow the path that fits their own self-interest. A legal interpretation would be used
to see if decision makers were properly given the right to pursue their self-interests in
the same manner as others.

3. Kettl’s participative approach is like groupism in that the decisions are made by the
people that know the information and will be affected by it. Effectiveness is the value
that is sought, and the determination of what is considered the most effective is tied to
the judgment of those who would know best. Similarly, such folks would likely be
able to offer the best perspective on if the outcome of an action was the desired
outcome and matched their intentions, which would be their evaluation of
effectiveness.

4. Kettl’s bargaining approach is connected to the communitarianist philosophy/ethical
approach. It is considered by Kettl as the alternative to rational choice. This would
position the view, correctly, as being uninfluenced by what is the most cost-efficient
choice or what particular individuals want, but rather by what is considered,
collectively, as the “right” choice. The bargaining approach is anchored on political
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support where decisions are the products of bargains. Power structures (of morality,
ethical norms, cultural standards, capacity for influence, or sheer numbers of people
advocating some position) could have the greatest influence on those bargains. The
approach holds morality and evidence on an equal plane, unlike the rational approach.
“Who wins depends on who has the strongest hand and who bargains most
effectively” (Kettl, 2018, p. 25).
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS
In this research, abduction has been used to address the pieces of puzzling evidence that
exist regarding governance decision making. These puzzling aspects are believed to necessarily
exist because they are the byproduct of governance decisions being processed in a particular
nonrational manner. This conclusion is the abductive insight presented by this research. The
purpose of the abductive insight is to “produce a rigorous chain of reasoning” (van Andel &
Bourcier, 2002), but a very limited amount of utility could be gained if research stopped at the
presentation of an abductively derived insight without giving it form or explanation.
The analysis section offered a structure to this abductive insight by developing and
communicating the foundation of how the idea is formed. The procedure for finding the form of
this abductively derived model started with identifying and structuring the schematic lenses that
are used at the core of the nonrational governance decision making process. This was achieved
through the collection of various governance concepts, the grouping of these concepts, the
comparison of different features of evidence, and the structuring of associations. The result of
these efforts was the presentation of a framework of the schemas used for decisions related to
governance. Four core schematic lenses were identified, and how each could be used regarding a
“pure” assessment of a governance decision was explored.
Given this schematic framework’s contribution to this analysis, this chapter will explore
what results flow from those analytic discoveries. This chapter will show how the derived
schematic lenses can be used together in a governance decision making process instead of
operating independently as “pure” views. Specifically, this chapter will show how the decision
process results in a choice being made among these schematic frames, and it will show how such
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a choice represents the use of heuristics within the proposed nonrational shared mental model of
governance decision making. Furthermore, this chapter will explore the assertion that the use of
such heuristics represents the functional expression of governance ideologies, and it will propose
what common ideologies might most accurately represent such patterns of governance decision
making.

The Operation of the Nonrational Model
Showing how the proposed schematic lenses can work together presents a picture of how
the nonrational shared mental model for governance decision making is believed to operate.
Describing the formation of this nonrational model may best start with an analogy linking the
components of schematic lenses to the components of DNA. This association is presented
because of the assertion that large governance concepts are merely structures consisting of
smaller, core components. Complex biological structures are the result of strings of DNA that
can be arranged in a near endless array of possible combinations. These repetitive and discrete
components act in a manner similar to how numbers form values in mathematics, letters form
words, or elements form compounds. For these instructions to propagate, the DNA of a human is
encoded in every cell of a person, and it has clear influences on the human body’s structures and
functions.
In a similar sense, the DNA of governance may be encoded in people’s interpersonal
mindsets as a result of evolutionary developments, the influence of social psychological factors,
and the theory of mind. Just like biological DNA, the DNA of governance may have clear
influences on the way we approach our construction of civilization, right down to the structures,
procedures, and component organizations. The core schematic lenses presented in the previous
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chapter are believed to function for the governance decision making process just like the key
anchoring elements of DNA do for organisms. The within and between persons combinations of
the expressions of these schematic lenses would then be the vehicle through which the
governance variation occurs.
It is asserted here that the variation in governance decisions comes from the prioritization
of schematic lenses, and this prioritization represents the heuristic stage of governance decision
making’s nonrational shared mental model. In order for some type of prioritization of schematic
lenses to occur, multiple schematic lenses must be available for the decision maker to choose
from and utilize. Accordingly, it is assumed in this work that any particular person can view any
particular governance decision making situation through any of the four presented schematic
lenses. It is also assumed that a person may do this explicitly or implicitly, and a person may do
this knowingly or unknowingly.
This means that a person has the power and ability to not only assess any governance
situation through any of the four lenses, but it also means that a person has some capacity to
choose which lens to use. This may mean that a person can choose to ignore one or more
schematic lenses while in the processes of making a decision, or it may mean that a person may
deliberately choose to prioritize the perspective of one particular schematic lens. When any such
action occurs and a schematic lens is prioritized, it implies that all aspects of that lens can be
utilized, such as embracing the lens’ interest/position, identity association, political philosophy,
core value, or evaluative criteria.
It is also assumed here that when any such prioritization occurs, it is the expression of
preference and a statement about what type of assessment matters most to that person. A
prioritization of this nature is considered to be a statement of preference because when a person
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subjectively says one thing is more important than another but both things are relatively equal in
nature to each other, such as with the proposed schematic lenses, then the choice that person
winds up making is little more than an expression of personal preference. A prioritization of this
nature is also considered to be a statement about what type of assessment matters most to the
person because the use of a schematic lens necessarily includes the type of assessment that
occurs through that lens. This means that if a particular lens matters most to a person, then that
also means that the core value that comes along with that lens is what matters most to a
governance choice. In order to know if a particular value is achieved or not, the associated
evaluative criteria for that core value becomes the primary assessment used by the person. As an
example, if a person prefers efficiency over effectiveness, then they are far more concerned with
achieving the highest ratio of inputs to outputs than any possible concern for achieving intended
outcomes.
Beyond the prioritization of schematic lenses being an expression of preference or a
statement about what type of assessment matters most, prioritization is also a form of conflict. It
is a conflict because there is a winner (the prioritized schematic lens) and a loser (the schematic
lens that has been considered to be a secondary concern or even no concern at all). It is asserted
here that there are likely two reasons for why this prioritization conflict occurs. The first reason
that such conflict occurs is that a person, while engaged in a nonrational decision making
process, searches for a decision that is fast and frugal in regard to the expenditure of cognitive
resources. It is assumed to be both a faster and a more frugal approach to make a decision
through only one schematic lens instead of repeating the decision making process multiple times
through the use of multiple lenses. The nature of nonrational thought processes would seem to
support a streamlined and singular frame of analysis for making a decision.
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The second reason for why such conflict occurs with the prioritization of schematic
lenses relates to the need to prevent what might be thought of as cognitive gridlock. Such
cognitive gridlock is conceived here as the inability of decision makers to make a choice because
they are overwhelmed by the number of potential options and do not have a guide for
determining which options might be better than others. Such a scenario of cognitive overload
would be the worst of both the rational and nonrational worlds. There would be no nonrational
schematic lens in place as a guide for evaluating options and, as a result, every possible decision
that a rational analysis could conceive of would be considered as a viable option.
In order to avoid cognitive gridlock, the decision maker needs a sense of direction. The
decision maker needs the use of a schematic lens in order for the mind to be able to articulate a
vision for how a decision should look. The ability to use a single schematic lens offers the
decision maker a unitary metric of assessment through which there is the primacy of one value,
one criterion for evaluation, and one interest/position. For example, an embrace of the statebased schematic lens would help the decision maker by orienting them towards efficiency and all
other aspects of that particular lens. Moreover, though a more deliberate decision making process
might strive to optimize multiple lenses simultaneously (e.g., a focus on “economy” as it is
conceived here in its perceived dual maximization of efficiency and effectiveness), such a
deliberate process is believed to generally exceed the cognitive abilities of a single decision
maker trying to utilize a fast and frugal nonrational decision making process. The potential
calculations of the effects from different tradeoff combinations that could come with various
approaches within a particular decision in order to achieve some Pareto optimality are assumed
to be incongruent with a decision maker’s nonrational approach.
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This assumed perceived need for a sense of direction highlights the two different types of
trajectories a decision maker could select when confronting a decision. Both types of trajectories
are anchored by an urge to identify better versus worse decision outcomes. The first trajectory
that a nonrational decision maker could take would be to seek to identify the best expected
option that exists within the evaluative focus of a single schematic lens. For example, a decision
maker could look at the perceived efficiencies of all relevant and observable options and then
select the choice that is the most efficient. This would be the “best” path as determined by the
evaluative criterion of only one schematic lens. This would be the easier of the two possible
trajectories.
The second trajectory that a decision maker could take would be to try to identify which
schematic lens-derived path would be “best” when compared to any other lens. This is a far more
difficult course to take. This trajectory would result in a number of pairwise comparisons
between schemas. If each of the four schematic lenses is considered to be inherently equal and
there is no objective measure for which one is “best” for the decision at hand, then any choice
that is made between lenses is merely a matter of preference. This rather subjective expression of
preference would not then be the only or even most substantial struggle a decision maker in this
trajectory would be confronted with.
The real challenge would be that in order for a decision maker to have any sense of what
is the “best” choice, a decision maker would have to look at each potential choice and evaluate
how it performs in regards to the evaluative criteria of each schematic lens. This would
essentially result in four “scores” for each potential choice. Then the decision maker would have
to not only rank each choice by each of the four “scores” but then also compare the effect that
different potential rankings within each domain of evaluation have on the overall interpretation
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of some choice. If this approach was used, how would a decision maker be expected to interpret
a choice that is considered the best through one lens of evaluation, the worst through another,
and somewhere in between for the other two? Furthermore, how could any comparison between
such “score scales” be achieved? Such a situation would be akin to the proverbial comparison of
apples to oranges. Would a highly efficient but moderately effective choice be better than a
highly effective but moderately efficient choice? Such comparison challenges, challenges that
are evoked from the use of this direction of decision making, are believed to be how the state of
the previously mentioned cognitive gridlock occurs.
To summarize this subsection so far, the variation in governance decision is believed to
be the result of the use of heuristics that prioritize the use of governance schematic lenses. In
order for a person to be able to make such a prioritization, cognitive access is needed to multiple
schematic lenses and the person needs the capacity to choose among these lenses. This
prioritization then becomes a statement of subjective preference and of the subjective
comparative importance of the values inherent in each schematic lens. This prioritization is a
form of conflict since it is a struggle between potential paths. The reasons for the existence of
this conflict is that a singular schematic choice is needed in order for the decision making
process to be fast and frugal and to prevent cognitive gridlock. To not be fast and frugal would
be unfortunate to the nonrational decision maker, but to be stuck in cognitive gridlock would be
fatal to the process. The importance of preventing such gridlock creates a concern for how to
avoid it, and that is done by having a sense of direction and a unitary metric of assessment, and
both come from the use of a single schematic lens. This need for direction highlights an
awareness of the two decision making trajectories that the nonrational person is presented with.
The first trajectory is to only use one schematic lens and evaluate each choice through the

162
perception of that lens in order to find the best choice. The second and problematic trajectory is
to evaluate each choice through all available lenses simultaneously, be unsure of how to identify
the best choice, and face cognitive gridlock.
So, given these conclusions, a decision maker looks to prevent cognitive gridlock by not
having multiple evaluations of each choice and then trying to interpret the meaning of varied
comparative rankings. The decision maker instead looks to be fast and frugal by using only one
schematic lens. A decision maker then identifies some structure of schematic prioritization
through the use of pairwise comparisons of subjective preference in order to select a dominant
schematic lens. This expression of schematic dominance resolves the conflict by establishing a
comparative prioritization between any two schematic lenses that happen to come into potential
competition with one another within a governance decision making situation.
The choosing of one path over another, opposed to conducting a full analysis of all
possible paths, is the function of a heuristic within a nonrational decision making process. As has
been discussed, a heuristic serves as a tool or mechanism for problem solving. When a person
must make a choice between two schematic frames, such as to choose between an emphasis on
efficiency or an emphasis on effectiveness, a heuristic helps the person quickly make a
satisfactory choice. This means that the creation of schematic hierarchies of any sense comes
from the utilization of heuristics. Schematic lenses will filter and assess the information available
within a decision, but heuristics will determine which lens to use for a decision.
But governance is a unique domain of decision making. It is not a standard decision
making scenario where one decision maker makes a choice that affects just that isolated decision
maker. Governance decisions are actions that necessarily affect multiple people, and, more
accurately, likely affect in some way all people that exist within that particular realm of
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governance. This is in part why the communication of a governance approach is assumed to exist
as a societal level shared mental model.
There are then important implications to such a governance nonrational shared mental
model’s use of heuristics, heuristics that act as problem solvers when it comes to expressing the
dominance of some schematic lens. A heuristic is not merely saying “this is the metric to use to
pick the best choice.” The subjective decision is also then imposing the assertion that “this metric
is also better to use than a different metric that another perspective might bring to the decision
process.” This declaration is not the heuristic claiming that one schematic lens is the absolute
best schematic lens to use in order to solve the problem and reach a decision, but rather it is the
pairwise comparison that one schematic lens is comparatively better than another schematic lens.
In making such a claim, heuristics create systematic expressions of preference and
dominance between schematic lenses. Because the components of schematic frames necessarily
exist as a unitary lens to filter and assess decisions, the use of a heuristic is the expression that all
aspects of one schematic frame are more important than all aspects of another schematic frame.
This logic could be stated as “when it comes to some governance matter, the evaluative
preferences of [schematic lens 1] are better than the evaluative preferences of [schematic lens
2].” As an example, this would mean that a governance heuristic would be analogous to
expressing that the value of efficiency is more important to making a governance decision than
the value of effectiveness. In a related sense, since the same sort of relationship could exist
between other components of schematic lenses, such a heuristic example would also be
analogous to saying that the interest/position perspective of the state is more important to making
a governance decision than the interest/position perspective of the group.
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Since a governance decision necessarily involves multiple people who could have
multiple perspectives, any particular heuristic expression is the statement of preference for the
dominance of one of those perspectives over another one of the potential perspectives. To the
extent that some heuristic within the shared mental model achieves dominance (through
agreement, acceptance, force, or otherwise), what is consider good from one perspective
becomes also considered good for another perspective. This means that the views of one
perspective are imposed on those originally embracing the other competing perspective. For a
heuristic to act in such a way is to essentially state that what is good for one is good for another.
This is how the decision of governance is achieved. To use the prior example focusing on
interest/positions, this is to say that what is good for the state is good for the group. This is the
selection of a schematic lens against a competing lens and specifying the metrics of choice
evaluation. Thus, to adopt a heuristic in a nonrational shared mental model of governance
decision making is to say that a governance decision is achieved by coming to a conclusion
about which set of perspectives and values explicitly takes priority over another set of
perspectives and values. It is assumed in this work that the best characterization of such a
process and pattern of thought is a “political ideology.”

Exploring Ideologies
As discussed, it is assumed here that when heuristics occur for governance decisions,
they function as the explicit expression of preference of one schematic lens over another. There
may be many factors that influence whether a person uses a particular heuristic (an act that
effectively prioritizes one core value of governance over another) instead of a competing
heuristic (which may reverse the prioritization structure of those values). Identifying the factors
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that predict the use of any one heuristic are beyond the scope of this work. Where this work will
focus though is identifying the different forms of heuristics that can occur for governance
decisions. This would imply isolating the different pairwise comparisons that can occur between
schematic lenses and then giving each its own identity.
The identity given to each governance heuristic in this work will be a specific governance
ideology. It is asserted in this work that any heuristic used in a governance decision is a decision
pattern that is emblematic of a particular governance ideology. The term “ideology” is
considered to be “a word of fundamental importance within many areas of social science”
(Fagerholm, 2016, p. 138) and “can be understood as the basic unit of thinking” (Fagerholm,
2016, p. 139). Geertz (1964) described ideologies as “maps of problematic social reality and
matrices for the creation of collective conscience” (p. 43). Fagerholm (2016) expanded on
Geertz’s definition of an ideology because of a belief that ideologies are inherently connected to
political matters and, among other things, biased values. From these motives, Fagerholm
presented a new definition for an ideology as “an internally (and externally) coherent set of ideas
[…] consisting of […] biased thoughts related to the organization of power and status in a
society” (p. 144).
This work is aligned with that interpretation of ideologies and particularly with the
understanding of ideologies as expressions of biased values on a matter of governance.
Ideologies represent preferences between competing modes of thought, and, in doing so, they
resourcefully provide guidance for determining how the role of government should fulfill the
intentions of those it serves. Moreover, governance ideologies are concepts frequently used in
common discourse, and their use in this research has the added benefit of helping to connect
existing ideas to the underlying nonrational processes presented in this research. Ideologies are
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utilized and conceptualized in this work as known, meaningful, and useful terms for helping to
articulate the implications of various combinations of the preferences derived from the
prioritization of different schematically-linked political philosophies, interest/positions, and
values.

Spatial Representations of Governance Heuristics
As previously stated, ideologies in this model are the expression of a preference when
any two schematic frames come into conflict and one must become dominant over the other in
order for a governance decision to be made. The implication of this cognitive mechanism is that
a formulaic approach can be taken for describing ideologies, and otherwise complicated
governance decisions are able to be conceptualized as simply the expression of preference
between a few core concepts. Moreover, this process of expressing preference can occur in either
direction. This results in ideologies not only being able to exist as formulaic expressions of
preferences between two schematic lenses but also as bi-directional sets of outcomes. This means
that schematic lens A could be dominant over schematic lens B, or the reverse could happen and
schematic lens B could be dominant over schematic lens A. The manner in which such
relationships are communicated then become differing ways of discussing preferences. In this
work the articulation of these expressions of preferences are conceived as differing “domains of
discourse.” These domains of discourse would communicate both what schematic lenses are
considered relevant to that heuristic expression and which set of preferences takes a dominant
position for the governance decision.
Heuristics can be derived that compare each of the four schematic lenses to one another,
and each comparison can potentially occur in both directions of dominance. As will be shown
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below, this means that there are twelve potential expressions of preference between core
schematic frames or, said another way, twelve core governance ideologies. Each frame is
presented below by its corresponding interest/position and an arrow with a line that connects that
schematic frame to each other schematic frame. The numbers on the below in Figure 7 represent
each governance heuristic/ideology. Using a formulaic approach, each domain of discourse
articulating that heuristic’s expression of dominance between schematic lenses can be presented
through the base statement of “What is good for [one schematic frame, represented by
interest/position], is good for the [another schematic frame, represented by interest/position].”

Figure 7. Possible relationships between interest/positions.
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These twelve domains of discourse and expressions of dominance are the heuristic
conceptualizations representing the power relationships between schematic lenses. Although the
use of these schematic lenses can be described through any of their components,
interest/positions and their corresponding identity affiliations may be most helpful for
communicating how these relationships operate. Furthermore, since the descriptions of these
relationships explain power dynamics between the competing perspectives, it may be helpful to
visualize the competition between these inherently abstract perspectives as the struggle between
more concrete entities. For the purpose of better understanding these power dynamics, examples
of such actual entities can be generated. This can be achieved by identifying the entities that
could be assumed to best characterize how the manifestations of the different governance
perspectives would exist as real-life socio-political actors.
There are several entities, presented below in Figure 8, that could be considered
characteristic manifestations of each of the interest/position-based perspectives. The authority
focused interest/position of the state might be best characterized as a government, a ruler(s), or a
sovereign nation-state. The societally focused interest/position of the everyone might be able to
be portrayed as a population, a civilization, the public, or a community. The affiliation centered
interest/position of the group could be symbolized as federated states, political parties,
representatives, or tribes. Finally, the self-interested interest/position of the individual could be
thought of as being a citizen acting through their own sense of agency, a family unit, or an
individual entity of significant influence (e.g., a high capacity individual actor or an organization
which represents those singular intentions).
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Figure 8. Characteristic manifestations of each of interest/position-based perspective.

This work will now explore the twelve interactions between schematic frames that are
depicted by the above figure. These ideological positions are presented together at the end of this
section in Figure 9.

1. When what is good for the state is good for everyone, it represents totalitarianism.
The heuristic that establishes the preferences of the state over the preferences of the
everyone creates a domain of discourse between those two corresponding schematic lenses.
Governance decisions are contextualized as a discussion between these two sets of interests, and
decisions are achieved by suppressing the preferences derived from a societal focus and instead
using the state’s preferences for determining the best choice for some act of governance. This
implies that decisions are made through identifying the options that most defer to authority, are
efficient on an aggregate level, and support the philosophical perspective of statism.
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Furthermore, it makes these decisions by explicitly suppressing concerns that decisions be
ethical, support society’s desires, or acknowledge the philosophical perspective of
communitarianism. This heuristic is the adoption of a governance problem solving approach that
is concerned with using the perspective of the state’s interest/position to determine what is best
and explicitly supporting the notion that this perspective is more important than the perspectives
and preferences that come from the interest/position of the everyone. This heuristic is useful
because it resolves any potential conflict that could occur between trying to reconcile or balance
the preferences of authority with the preferences of society that could complicate decision
making and potentially cause cognitive gridlock. It is asserted here that such a heuristic would be
emblematic of a totalitarian governance ideology.
The Merriam-Webster dictionary describes totalitarianism as the “centralized control by
an autocratic authority,” and the Encyclopedia Britannica states that it is a system that “seeks to
subordinate all aspects of individual life to the authority of the state.” In a totalitarian system, the
government can control all components of citizenry behavior. The directive of the state is the
ultimate deciding factor in governance. Decisions are made through and for the state. The
ramifications of these decisions affect the entire citizenry. This citizenry is treated as a unitary
organism believed to serve as the able body that is controlled by the mind of the totalitarian
leadership. The influences of government are used for the betterment of the state. The individual
and group are only attended to indirectly. The individual and group perspectives are only of
concern to the extent that the collective mass remains productive and useful in accordance with
the preferences of the state. If the citizenry supports such a system, it likely does so because of
the positive perceptions of matters related to security, structure, unification, or a sense of
purpose. In keeping with an emphasis on efficiency, the state strongly rejects any action not in
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alignment with its overarching objectives. To the extent the leadership is perceived as benevolent
and oriented towards the betterment of the citizenry, the system is upheld.

2. When what is good for the state is good for the groups, it represents feudalism.
The heuristic that establishes the preferences of the state over the preferences of the
group creates a domain of discourse between those two corresponding schematic lenses.
Governance decisions are contextualized as a discussion between these two sets of interests and
decisions are achieved by suppressing the preferences derived from a group focus and instead
using the state’s preferences for determining the best choice for some act of governance. This
implies that decisions are made through identifying the options that most defer to authority, are
efficient on an aggregate level, and support the philosophical perspective of statism.
Furthermore, it makes these decisions by explicitly suppressing concerns that decisions be
effective, support a group’s desires, or acknowledge the philosophical perspective of groupism.
This heuristic is the adoption of a governance problem solving approach that is concerned with
using the perspective of the state’s interest/position to determine what is best and explicitly
supporting the notion that this perspective is more important than the perspectives and
preferences that come from the interest/position of the group. This heuristic is useful because it
resolves any potential conflict that could occur between trying to reconcile or balance the
preferences of authority with the preferences of affiliation that could complicate decision making
and potentially cause cognitive gridlock. It is asserted here that such a heuristic would be
emblematic of a feudalistic governance ideology.
The Merriam-Webster and Cambridge dictionaries characterize feudalism as a
governance system where groups of people serve highly ranked lords by fighting and working
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for them in exchange for state support and protection. In a feudalistic system, the government
directs all aspects of group behavior. Led by some form of unitary leadership from the state,
guidance is delivered directly to the citizenry though some form of group leadership. Such group
leadership can represent cross sections of people based on race, gender, religion, local
governments, geographic regions, or the like. The individual is not of concern as the group
representative serves as the conduit for all of direction and governance mandates. The everyone
is irrelevant as the group representatives provide all of the reach necessary for the state. The
influences of government are used for the betterment of the state. This system is apt to benefit
the citizenry through the state controlling economic, political, and social order. The
representatives gain by being rewarded for their level of management. The state welcomes the
ability to handle all affairs and directives through the societal subset of governed people. The
state disapproves of any independence which affects the perceived efficiency of the system or
creates perceptions which challenge its stability.

3. When what is good for the state is good for the individual, it represents fascism.
The heuristic that establishes the preferences of the state over the preferences of the
individual creates a domain of discourse between those two corresponding schematic lenses.
Governance decisions are contextualized as a discussion between these two sets of interests, and
decisions are achieved by suppressing the preferences derived from an individual focus and
instead using the state’s preferences for determining the best choice for some act of governance.
This implies that decisions are made through identifying the options that most defer to authority,
are efficient on an aggregate level, and support the philosophical perspective of statism.
Furthermore, it makes these decisions by explicitly suppressing concerns for the self-interested
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aspects of decisions, desires for equity, or the philosophical perspective of liberalism. This
heuristic is the adoption of a governance problem solving approach that is concerned with using
the perspective of the state’s interest/position to determine what is best and explicitly supporting
the notion that this perspective is more important than the perspectives and preferences that come
from the interest/position of the individual This heuristic is useful because it resolves any
potential conflict that could occur between trying to reconcile or balance the preferences of
authority with the preferences of self-interest that could complicate decision making and
potentially cause cognitive gridlock. It is asserted here that such a heuristic would be emblematic
of a fascist governance ideology.
The Merriam-Webster dictionary characterizes fascism as a form of governance that puts
the state and its leadership above the individual and has a particular willingness to assert such a
system through the “forcible suppression of opposition” as necessary. The Library of Economics
and Liberty describes fascism as “an economic system, fascism is socialism with a capitalist
veneer.” Benito Mussolini, the commonly acknowledged founder of Italian fascism, famously
stated that governance via fascism could be thought of “All within the state, nothing outside the
state, nothing against the state.” This comment represented the supremacy of the governing
entity and the necessity of individual adherence to state directives.
In a fascist system, the government directs all aspects of individual behavior. The system
believes in a need for strong solitary leadership of both personal and societal operation. The state
believes that it operates best when it governs a people possessing a culture directly oriented
towards the state’s perceived best interest. The state believes culture is a collective phenomenon
rooted in the hearts and minds of all individuals, and, as such, the state is directly concerned with
the views, values, perspectives, and patriotism of its people. It focuses not on the overarching
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cultural consciousness of a people but rather believes in maintaining a strategic advantage from
addressing the individual directly. The state attempts to foster a strong sense of loyalty in the
individual for the state objectives. The system believes that, when operating optimally, all is
possible because all individuals accept the state’s goals as truth to the extent that they are willing
to make virtually any sacrifice. With such collective devotion and motivation, the state is
confident in its capacity. Reciprocally, the individual finds solace in taking such perspectives
because, in a game theory-type sense, as long as all other individuals believe in the purpose of
the state, that individual wins. This perspective gives incentive for the individual to rationalize
the necessity of the eradication of all views in opposition to the state, be they foreign or
domestic.

4. When what is good for everyone is good for state, it represents communism.
The heuristic that establishes the preferences of the everyone over the preferences of the
state creates a domain of discourse between those two corresponding schematic lenses.
Governance decisions are contextualized as a discussion between these two sets of interests, and
decisions are achieved by suppressing the preferences derived from a state focus and instead
using the everyone’s preferences for determining the best choice for some act of governance.
This implies that decisions are made through identifying the options that most defer to societal
concerns, are ethical on an aggregate level, and support the philosophical perspective of
communitarianism. Furthermore, it makes these decisions by explicitly suppressing concerns that
decisions be efficient, support the state’s desires, or acknowledge the philosophical perspective
of statism. This heuristic is the adoption of a governance problem solving approach that is
concerned with using the perspective of the everyone interest/position to determine what is best
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and explicitly supporting the notion that this perspective is more important than the perspectives
and preferences that come from the interest/position of the state. This heuristic is useful because
it resolves any potential conflict that could occur between trying to reconcile or balance the
preferences of society with the preferences of authority that could complicate decision making
and potentially cause cognitive gridlock. It is asserted here that such a heuristic would be
emblematic of a communist governance ideology.
The Merriam-Webster and Cambridge dictionaries characterize communism as a
governance system where the public owns all property and controls all methods of production
and, in doing that, eliminates private property, eliminates profits, and allows society to achieve
the final stage of Marxist theory where the state has functionally withered away to nothing.
Commonly considered an approach opposite to capitalism, communism advocates communal
control instead of control by a particular ruling individual, a group such as a ruling class, or a
strong nation-state government. In communism, the end goal is an extremely weak state entity.
Societal pressures work to ensure that no individual or group takes advantage of the
righteousness of the collective community.
In the communist system, actions of governance by the state are the product of, and
perceived as for the benefit of, the entire citizenry. Since the citizenry views itself as the sole
entity responsible for the direction and betterment of the state, it does not place a particular
importance on the individual nor the group. In such a view, individual liberties, property, or
wealth are irrelevant, and there is similarly no place for divisive group identifications. With
everyone directing the state, all are believed to be collective participants in the direction of the
state. Individual or group competition is substituted for organizational directives from the state
aimed at the improving the communal good. The citizenry embraces this view as it is believed to
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bring everyone up together by offering security and the needs of life without intergroup strife.
Low production is considered an acceptable byproduct of a society that is optimally ethical. In
communism, the state is a tool for maintaining this communal perspective, and as such it is
granted the authority to combat individuals or groups which challenge the communal orientation.

5. When what is good for everyone is good for the group, it represents socialism.
The heuristic that establishes the preferences of the everyone over the preferences of the
group creates a domain of discourse between those two corresponding schematic lenses.
Governance decisions are contextualized as a discussion between these two sets of interests, and
decisions are achieved by suppressing the preferences derived from a group focus and instead
using the everyone’s preferences for determining the best choice for some act of governance.
This implies that decisions are made through identifying the options that most defer to societal
concerns, are ethical on an aggregate level, and support the philosophical perspective of
communitarianism. Furthermore, it makes these decisions by explicitly suppressing concerns that
decisions be effective, support a group’s desires, or acknowledge the philosophical perspective
of groupism. This heuristic is the adoption of a governance problem solving approach that is
concerned with using the perspective of the everyone interest/position to determine what is best
and explicitly supporting the notion that this perspective is more important than the perspectives
and preferences that come from the interest/position of the group. This heuristic is useful because
it resolves any potential conflict that could occur between trying to reconcile or balance the
preferences of society with the preferences of group affiliation that could complicate decision
making and potentially cause cognitive gridlock. It is asserted here that such a heuristic would be
emblematic of a socialist governance ideology.
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The Merriam-Webster and Cambridge dictionaries characterize socialism as the
transitional stage between capitalism and communism where there is some level of societal
control of the important means of production, societal ownership of certain property, and societal
influence over the distribution of goods. This ideology views governance as a tool for ensuring
that citizens have what they need in order to produce and survive without succumbing to the
negative influences of any particularly advantaged or empowered group. The perceived
desirability of this approach relates to the assumed outcomes that have all members of society
free from the constraints of their often class-derived group and free from the competition
between groups that creates gradients in rewards.
In the socialist system, actions of governance should control and constrain the influences
of the group for the betterment of the overall citizenry. Again, the most salient group is social
class, but all previously stated social groups apply. The socialist system aims to highlight and
emphasize where such groupings occur, even if they are otherwise intangible to the individual or
in the eyes of the state. The focus of this system stems from a belief that imbalances across
groups occur, and the occurrence of such an imbalance is detrimental to everyone. The perceived
benefits of the system include a balanced distribution of resources and a heightened societal
sense of ethics. In doing so, perspectives geared towards the advancement of the state or the
advancement of the individual are disregarded.

6. When what is good for everyone is good for the individual, it represents collectivism.
The heuristic that establishes the preferences of the everyone over the preferences of the
individual creates a domain of discourse between those two corresponding schematic lenses.
Governance decisions are contextualized as a discussion between these two sets of interests, and
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decisions are achieved by suppressing the preferences derived from an individualistic focus and
instead using the everyone’s preferences for determining the best choice for some act of
governance. This implies that decisions are made through identifying the options that most defer
to societal concerns, are ethical on an aggregate level, and support the philosophical perspective
of communitarianism. Furthermore, it makes these decisions by explicitly suppressing concerns
that decisions be equitable, support individual desires, or acknowledge the philosophical
perspective of (classical) liberalism. This heuristic is the adoption of a governance problem
solving approach that is concerned with using the perspective of the everyone interest/position to
determine what is best and explicitly supporting the notion that this perspective is more
important than the perspectives and preferences that come from the interest/position of the
individual. This heuristic is useful because it resolves any potential conflict that could occur
between trying to reconcile or balance the preferences of society with the preferences of selfinterest that could complicate decision making and potentially cause cognitive gridlock. It is
asserted here that such a heuristic would be emblematic of a collectivist governance ideology.
The Encyclopedia Britannica describes collectivism as a governance system where “the
individual is seen as being subordinate to a social collectivity.” The Merriam-Webster states that
it is an “emphasis on collective rather than individual action or identity.” In the collectivist
system, actions of governance should control and constrain the individual in order to maintain
some greater communal good. Group affiliation receives significantly minimized importance,
and the state is disregarded as being merely a tool of operation and not indicative of the true
potential and purpose of a people. Individual liberties, property, or rights are valued only to
much as they are aligned with the objectives of the citizenry as a whole, regardless of how
articulated or formulated these objectives happen to be. The perceived benefit of such a system is
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a continued communal contribution to a greater societal good. In pursuing such a goal, the value
of group affiliations or state action are diminished.

7. When what is good for the group is good for the state, it represents republicanism.
The heuristic that establishes the preferences of the group over the preferences of the
state creates a domain of discourse between those two corresponding schematic lenses.
Governance decisions are contextualized as a discussion between these two sets of interests, and
decisions are achieved by suppressing the preferences derived from a state focus and instead
using the group’s preferences for determining the best choice for some act of governance. This
implies that decisions are made through identifying the options that most defer to affiliation, are
effective on an aggregate level, and support the philosophical perspective of groupism.
Furthermore, it makes these decisions by explicitly suppressing concerns that decisions be
efficient, support the state’s desires, or acknowledge the philosophical perspective of statism.
This heuristic is the adoption of a governance problem solving approach that is concerned with
using the perspective of the group’s interest/position to determine what is best and explicitly
supporting the notion that this perspective is more important than the perspectives and
preferences that come from the interest/position of the state. This heuristic is useful because it
resolves any potential conflict that could occur between trying to reconcile or balance the
preferences of group affiliation with the preferences of state authority that could complicate
decision making and potentially cause cognitive gridlock. It is asserted here that such a heuristic
would be emblematic of the governance ideology of republicanism.
The Cambridge dictionary characterizes republicanism as governance through
representatives. These representatives are presumably leaders or delegates from some group,
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such as a geographic region. The Encyclopedia Britannica states that republicanism features a
balance of freedom and participation. This approach seemingly allows groups to work together to
direct governance through representatives while also maintaining some desired level of
separation between groups outside of those collaborative duties. These features contribute to the
adoption of a governance structure known as a republic.
In a republic, the governance actions of the state are determined by the decisions of group
representatives. The preoccupation with representatives overshadows a focus on the concerns of
the citizenry as a whole, and it also overshadows the voice of the individual by having their
participation occur through the conduit that is their representative. The representative may be
chosen by or for the individual. The state acts when a sufficient influence from group
representatives occurs. The perceived benefits of such a system are related to a perception of
effectiveness of governance, a sense of comfort attributed to an assumedly representative group
affiliation, and a belief that decisions of governance are made by more qualified, willing, and
able individuals than the general public. In applying such a system, an individual may experience
a sense of helplessness from not perceiving the state as being accountable specifically to them.
The society as a whole may become frustrated by the lack of cohesion across the republic and the
lack of progress that results from it.

8. When what is good for the group is good for everyone, it represents federalism.
The heuristic that establishes the preferences of the group over the preferences of the
everyone creates a domain of discourse between those two corresponding schematic lenses.
Governance decisions are contextualized as a discussion between these two sets of interests, and
decisions are achieved by suppressing the preferences derived from a societal focus and instead
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using the group’s preferences for determining the best choice for some act of governance. This
implies that decisions are made through identifying the options that most defer to group
affiliation, are effective on an aggregate level, and support the philosophical perspective of
groupism. Furthermore, it makes these decisions by explicitly suppressing concerns that
decisions be ethical, support societal desires, or acknowledge the philosophical perspective of
communitarianism. This heuristic is the adoption of a governance problem solving approach that
is concerned with using the perspective of the group interest/position to determine what is best
and explicitly supporting the notion that this perspective is more important than the perspectives
and preferences that come from the interest/position of the everyone. This heuristic is useful
because it resolves any potential conflict that could occur between trying to reconcile or balance
the preferences of group affiliation with the preferences of society that could complicate decision
making and potentially cause cognitive gridlock. It is asserted here that such a heuristic would be
emblematic of a federalist governance ideology.
The Merriam-Webster and Cambridge dictionaries characterize federalism as the sharing
of governance power between a centralized authority and affiliated yet distinct subdomains, such
as provinces, states, territories, or regions. The Encyclopedia Britannica describes this
governance system as maintaining overarching stability by creating required policies for all but
allowing for variation in the implementation of those policies. Such a process allows group
representatives to determine governance matters for everyone while also exhibiting a sense of
deference to the groups by allowing for autonomy of implementation.
In a federation, groups are self-governing for the administration of governance aimed at
enhancing the lives of everyone associated with the union. Group affiliations may be multiple
entities coming together across geographic locations, ethnicities, cultures, or the like. A strong
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state presence is substituted for a group centered collective, and the individual is relevant only to
the extent they influence their group. The rights of the individual are uniform across groups if
group representatives deem it beneficial. The perceived benefit of such a system is a balance of
limiting overarching state entity affiliation, maintaining the valued group identity, and enhancing
the outcomes of the collaborative society. In such a system, the individual is potentially
subjected to the preferences of other unaffiliated groups.

9. When what is good for the group is good for the individual, it represents tribalism.
The heuristic that establishes the preferences of the group over the preferences of the
individual creates a domain of discourse between those two corresponding schematic lenses.
Governance decisions are contextualized as a discussion between these two sets of interests, and
decisions are achieved by suppressing the preferences derived from an individualistic focus and
instead using the group’s preferences for determining the best choice for some act of governance.
This implies that decisions are made through identifying the options that most defer to group
affiliation, are effective on an aggregate level, and support the philosophical perspective of
groupism. Furthermore, it makes these decisions by explicitly suppressing concerns that
decisions be equitable, support individual desires, or acknowledge the philosophical perspective
of liberalism. This heuristic is the adoption of a governance problem solving approach that is
concerned with using the perspective of the group’s interest/position to determine what is best
and explicitly supporting the notion that this perspective is more important than the perspectives
and preferences that come from the interest/position of the individual. This heuristic is useful
because it resolves any potential conflict that could occur between trying to reconcile or balance
the preferences of group affiliation with the preferences of self-interest that could complicate
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decision making and potentially cause cognitive gridlock. It is asserted here that such a heuristic
would be emblematic of a tribalistic governance ideology.
The Merriam-Webster and Cambridge dictionaries characterizes tribalism as the tendency
for strong in-group loyalty by individuals where the group affiliation is prized above other
identities. In tribalism, group needs are put ahead of individual desires, and this means that the
group affiliation governs the actions of the individual. Little to no affiliation is identified by the
individual to a larger state or community. Individuals have influence to the extent that they
become group leaders. The perceived benefits of such systems are related to an inclination for
localized preferences as well as a sense of intimacy with and within the group during various
pursuits of progress and happiness. In such a system, the inherently restricted group size creates
limited abilities for internal and external actions of governance. Power is diminished due to an
extreme lack of focus on the existence and capability of the state, and larger social goals are
unable to be efficiently pursued.

10. When what is good for the individual is good for the state, it represents democracy.
The heuristic that establishes the preferences of the individual over the preferences of the
state creates a domain of discourse between those two corresponding schematic lenses.
Governance decisions are contextualized as a discussion between these two sets of interests, and
decisions are achieved by suppressing the preferences derived from a state focus and instead
using the individual’s preferences for determining the best choice for some act of governance.
This implies that decisions are made through identifying the options that most defer to selfinterest, are equitable on an aggregate level, and support the philosophical perspective of
liberalism. Furthermore, it makes these decisions by explicitly suppressing concerns that
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decisions be efficient, support state’s desires, or acknowledge the philosophical perspective of
statism. This heuristic is the adoption of a governance problem solving approach that is
concerned with using the perspective of the individual interest/position to determine what is best
and explicitly supporting the notion that this perspective is more important than the perspectives
and preferences that come from the interest/position of the state. This heuristic is useful because
it resolves any potential conflict that could occur between trying to reconcile or balance the
preferences of self-interest with the preferences of authority that could complicate decision
making and potentially cause cognitive gridlock. It is asserted here that such a heuristic would be
emblematic of a directly democratic governance ideology.
The Merriam-Webster and Cambridge dictionaries characterize democracy as a
governance system where power is vested in the common people and majority rule determines
state action. There is a strong sense of equity between all people regardless of their position in
society or group affiliation. In a sense similar to communism, full realization of democracy can
create a weakened state, and this can happen with democracy since authority is subjected to the
will of the majority of individuals. In this sense, the will of the majority differs from a societal
focus since it is the expression of power that comes from one side of an issue simply having
greater numbers, opposed to a societal focus on the selection of the most ethical choice for
addressing the issue at hand. Also, since this majority can consist of various cross sections of
group identities and since members of the same group could be on different sides of an issue, a
democratic majority is not considered a group as it is understood in other contexts.
The ideological reference to democracy here is meant to represent full, direct democracy,
where, for example, a government is directly controlled by choices selected through the votes of
its citizens. Democratic processes happening (in any form of governance) don’t necessarily mean
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full, direct democracy is occurring. Democratic practices can include the collection of the votes
of certain individuals, but the meaning, impact, and implications of those voting structures can
vary. This potential variance suggests that democratic practices can be utilized in many, and
potentially all, governance ideologies presented in this work. Conversely, direct democracy is the
process of having individual votes count directly towards some governance decision outcome
without the imposition of any filtering mechanism (e.g., representatives, electoral regions, etc.)
and majority rule generally wins the day.
In a governance system lead by a democratic ideology, the majority determines the state’s
acts of governance. Attention to group affiliations or the overall society as a whole may be of
relevance in some contexts, but the attention of the system is focused on direct participation of
the individual. Group representatives are viewed as inhibiting effective governance, and societal
concerns are not necessarily the focus of consideration since the will of the majority is believed
to be an adequate and efficient proxy for that which represents some otherwise abstract and
elusive goal of the society as a whole. The perceived benefit of such a system is the sense of an
adequate possession of rights and preferred options through the assumed ability to participate
directly in state affairs. In such a system, mob rule can run rampant without the safeguards of
group representative decision making, and the overarching societal objectives may never reach
their necessary prominence if their impact is too conceptually distant from an individual’s focus.

11. When what is good for the individual is good for everyone, it represents anarchy.
The heuristic that establishes the preferences of the individual over the preferences of the
everyone creates a domain of discourse between those two corresponding schematic lenses.
Governance decisions are contextualized as a discussion between these two sets of interests, and
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decisions are achieved by suppressing the preferences derived from a societal focus and instead
using the individual’s preferences for determining the best choice for some act of governance.
This implies that decisions are made through identifying the options that most defer to selfinterest, are equitable on an aggregate level, and support the philosophical perspective of
liberalism. Furthermore, it makes these decisions by explicitly suppressing concerns that
decisions be ethical, support society’s desires, or acknowledge the philosophical perspective of
communitarianism. This heuristic is the adoption of a governance problem solving approach that
is concerned with using the perspective of the individual interest/position to determine what is
best and explicitly supporting the notion that this perspective is more important than the
perspectives and preferences that come from the interest/position of the everyone. This heuristic
is useful because it resolves any potential conflict that could occur between trying to reconcile or
balance the preferences of self-interest with the preferences of society that could complicate
decision making and potentially cause cognitive gridlock. It is asserted here that such a heuristic
would be emblematic of an anarchist governance ideology.
The Merriam-Webster and Cambridge dictionaries characterize anarchy as a sense of
lawlessness and the universal lack of societal controls. Society is not governed by group
representatives or state authority but individualized and voluntary actions. Hirshleifer (1995)
defined anarchy as where the actions of individuals are unregulated but, unlike commonly
conceived, society is not plagued by chaos but instead exists through phases of spontaneous
order. In anarchy, each individual is (figuratively) on an island, and it is believed that individuals
should pursue whatever means they see fit. The assumption accompanying such a system is that
the culmination of individual intrinsic and extrinsic motivations will be more beneficial than
some state, societal, or group coordinated initiative. Since the influences of social organization
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are perceived as inhibiting progress, group affiliations or contributions to the state are
minimized. This ideological orientation, lacking the structure of other systems, can allow for
great gains or losses to occur. With the role of the group and state diminished and a pervasive
sense of comfort with risk, anarchy can enable a sense of lawlessness, unbridled risk, or
uninhibited action.

12. When what is good for the individual is good for the group, it represents capitalism.
The heuristic that establishes the preferences of the individual over the preferences of the
group creates a domain of discourse between those two corresponding schematic lenses.
Governance decisions are contextualized as a discussion between these two sets of interests, and
decisions are achieved by suppressing the preferences derived from a group focus and instead
using the individual’s preferences for determining the best choice for some act of governance.
This implies that decisions are made through identifying the options that most defer to selfinterest, are equitable on an aggregate level, and support the philosophical perspective of
liberalism. Furthermore, it makes these decisions by explicitly suppressing concerns that
decisions be effective, support a group’s desires, or acknowledge the philosophical perspective
of groupism. This heuristic is the adoption of a governance problem solving approach that is
concerned with using the perspective of the individual’s interest/position to determine what is
best and explicitly supporting the notion that this perspective is more important than the
perspectives and preferences that come from the interest/position of the group. This heuristic is
useful because it resolves any potential conflict that could occur between trying to reconcile or
balance the preferences of self-interest with the preferences of group affiliation that could
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complicate decision making and potentially cause cognitive gridlock. It is asserted here that such
a heuristic would be emblematic of a capitalist governance ideology.
The Merriam-Webster and Cambridge dictionaries characterize capitalism as a system
where profit-driven and competitive markets are navigated by private and corporate actors that
own capital goods and the means of production. This ideology is the antithesis of governance
systems where the state or society own or control production and wealth. It is governance
through the relative lack of such restrictions. The Encyclopedia Britannica states that the markets
that exist within capitalism are guided. This guidance likely exists as regulations of various types
since ensuring market competition may require, in some manner, regulation.
In a capitalist system, the group is uniquely identified by class, participation, ability, and
realm of interaction. Individuals receive the most benefit from actions of governance that
promote the utility gained from the interactions within and by their own group. Groups may be
best conceived of in this realm as market sectors, and the actions of various individuals
determine the overall growth or failure of that market sector. Individuals look to advance the
utility that can be gained from their group’s marketplace. The perceived benefits of capitalism
include rewards by merit and action, maximum progress though competition driven innovation,
and personal gain. In such a system, the state and society as a whole are considered to be entities
that will benefit from the individual preferred actions that benefit the growth of that individual’s
group. With a diminished emphasis on the state and society, as well as the necessary competition
between individuals and groups, capitalism may confront questions of ethics, an inability to
effectively promote the social good, and forces which prevent the efforts of the state to achieve
some non-marketplace affiliated objective.
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Summary
This chapter started by building off of the particular structuring of schematic lenses
provided by the analysis section. That structure offered four schematic lenses that represented
“pure” assessments of governance decision making. This chapter then explored what results
could be generated from those analytic discoveries when the nonrational decision making
process required those “pure” schematic views to interact with one another instead of operating
in isolation. This stage of the nonrational decision making process is where choices are made and
schematic lenses act like components of DNA for forming different governance outcomes.
Those choices represented the use of heuristics and helped present a picture of how a
nonrational shared mental of governance decision making is believed to actually function.
Furthermore, those various types of choices between the four schematic lenses produced twelve
domains of discourse and expressions of dominance. Those heuristic conceptualizations were
asserted as representing the different forms of power relationships between schematic lenses and
effectively performing as expressions of common governance ideologies. The complete
nonrational process of schemas and heuristics working together for governance decision making
is then able to be presented graphically in Figure 9. Given these abductively derived inferences,
the next chapter will explore the implications and applications of those developed concepts and
relationships.
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Figure 9. Core ideologies associated with governance decision making.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
This chapter will achieve three objectives. First, it will summarize the approach taken by
this research in response to the question of “How are governance decisions formulated?” Second,
this chapter will describe the theoretical implications of the model that was developed to answer
that research question. Third, this chapter will present various opportunities for the application of
the conceptualizations developed in this research.

Research Approach
The field of Public Policy and Administration is heavily influenced by the decisions that
individuals make regarding matters of governance, but up until this research there was no model
for sufficiently conceptualizing how these decisions might be made. Consequently, the goal of
this research was the creation a nonrational shared mental model for governance decision
making. The pursuit of this goal was accomplished with the intention of also achieving four
particular objectives. The first objective was to identify a more accurate representation of a
person’s thought process for governance than what a rational model could offer. The second
objective was to create a model that addressed the interpersonal nature of governance decisions.
The intent in doing this was to allow for decisions to be made in the mind of each individual but
also accommodate the necessary level of communication and conceptualizations needed for
multi-person processes to occur. The third objective was to develop a more dynamic set of
governance possibilities than can be offered by the more simplistic spectrum-based models of
purely politically-anchored governance models. The fourth and final objective was to foster a
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new avenue for analyzing governance desires as a result of the conceptualization derived from
the framework of and relationships among the ideas presented in this model.
This process achieved the aforementioned goal and objectives through three stages. The
first stage conducted an analysis that abductively derived the schematic lenses used in
governance decisions. The second stage interpreted the results of how those schematic lenses
would be utilized in real-life decision making processes through the use of heuristics. These
heuristics were believed to be best understood as the functional and formulaic representation of
how governance ideologies operate. The third stage was to accumulate the effects of the various
schemas and heuristics into one comprehensive and interconnected nonrational shared mental
model of governance decision making.

Theoretical Implications and Applications
There are a number of potential theoretical implications and applications of this research.
In this discussion, these implications and applications will be divided into four categories of
showing how they provide benefit. The first category explores how these concepts can help
Public Policy and Administration researchers by exposing new areas of cognitive mechanisms to
investigate. The second category explores how these concepts can help the average person
interact with governance more successfully. The third category explores how these concepts can
help public administrators understand and achieve various governance goals. The fourth and
final category explores how these concepts can help bring about forms of governance that are a
better perceived fit for those affected by a particular governance decision and potentially
fostering both subjective and objective interpretations of “good governance.”
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The first category of discussion regarding the theoretical implications and applications of
the ideas presented in this research explores how these concepts can help Public Policy and
Administration researchers by exposing new areas of cognitive mechanisms to investigate. This
section will address a few different subjects. It will cover how the concepts within this study
could be used for creating individual assessments, the possibility of moderating and mediating
variables, and the potential impact of this research on the structuring of the field of Public Policy
and Administration.
When it comes to understanding individuals and their role in governance, this study
opens an important line of research about the influence of one’s values and the use of mental
shortcuts as mechanisms for governance decisions. The primary manner of achieving this would
be through the creation of an assessment tool that evaluates an individual’s prioritization of
governance values. Assuming that such an assessment was conceptually valid and had merit, this
tool could reveal information about a person's level of intensity relative to each schematic lens
and then how they prioritize those schematic lenses. This would reveal information regarding all
aspects of each schematic lens, such as one’s sense of affinity to different interest/positions,
political philosophies, or values. Such information could reveal a person’s true ideological
leanings, their comparative governance preferences, and indicate what type of evaluative
measures would be more impactful to their decision processes. It would reason that there would
shortly thereafter be the development of research geared towards the identification of the factors
that influence the formation of an individual's particular profile of prioritizations.
Such an assessment tool would presumably be constructed and presented in a style
similar to how the Five Factor Model (McCrae & Costa b1997) of personality has typically be
administered and used. This is to say that governance preferences may also have tendencies that
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are persistent and stable over time, present themselves in a manner that creates different profiles
for people, and predict how people will react in future scenarios. This type of assessment tool
could also be expected to develop metrics for each schematic lens’ evaluative focus, and this
feature could be of particular usefulness. Not only could governance decisions apparently be
measured by each schematic lens (e.g., the level of intentions versus outcomes that occurred,
indicating effectiveness), but cross lens comparisons could be accomplished. This means that one
could theoretically, for example, evaluate a certain governance decision’s effectiveness “score”
along its efficiency, ethical, or equity “score.” This means a type of “apples to oranges”
comparison of scores for governance evaluative domains could be attained. Having such
information available to decision makers could drastically expand the scope of discussions and
debates about which particular governance approach should be taken for scenarios where
multiple options are available. With such information, not only could cross comparisons of
schematic domains between governance choices be conducted, but different versions of
composite or weighted scores could be developed.
Beyond the potential availability of a useful assessment tool, this research offers other
possible benefits to researchers. Since the proposed framework is assumed to offer a more
instrumental understanding of people’s decision making processes, this research could open up a
variety of prediction models for Public Policy and Administration researchers. Such models
could answer questions like what governance approaches are believed to be best for specific
communities, what path certain governments could be expected to take within different
situations, how politicians could be expected to vote on certain issues, or how one set of events
could affect future events. There would also be research opportunities for exploring the potential
interactional and synergistic effects between different schematic or heuristic tendencies that
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occur because of moderating factors. Still other research could explore various mediating factors
that could help explain why certain ideological patterns exist.
Lastly, Public Policy and Administration researchers could potentially see benefits from
allowing this new conceptualization of governance to reframe certain aspects of the field. For
instance, the heuristic-based classifications of governance ideologies could offer new definitions
for certain ideas or new understandings for how certain terminology should be used. Such
terminological reframing could also potentially be useful for creating new forms of assessment
regarding the analysis of policy trends or cycles. Finally, the reconceptualization of governance
components presented in this research could suggest a potential paradigmatic restructuring of
how public policy and public administration matters are approached in academic settings. For
example, if the presented framework took hold, certain educational topics, coursework, or
research could be structured around the four schematic lenses of governance. This would mean
implementing deliberate attention to the impact of the dominant areas of inquiry associated with
each schematic lens (economics, ethics, organizational theory, and legal studies).
The second category of discussion explores how these concepts can help the average
person interact with governance more successfully. If the conclusions presented in this research
are valid, then the newly acquired and more accurate conceptualizations of governance could
affect what outcomes of government actions are sought and how outcomes of governance
approaches are evaluated. Also, with the new understandings presented by this research, people
may be more empowered to prevent the implementation of governance policies and practices
with which they are uncomfortable through a greater ability to analyze the motives of any
particular governance approach
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The third category of discussion explores how these concepts can help public
administrators understand and achieve various governance goals. This research may help public
administrators connect certain values and preferences to the development of particular policy or
government initiatives. With more tools and information available to them, public administrators
could be able to achieve the various and otherwise esoteric types of targets that they are aiming
for when trying to implement policies. This research may also help public administrators resolve
conflicts between different factions of people by being able to frame preferences in a more
advantageous way. This could allow them to more easily identify constructive resolutions to the
disagreement at hand. Being able to more accurately identify interests and develop governance
approaches that attend to those desires, public administrators could potentially achieve greater
buy-in from the public for governance initiatives.
The fourth category of discussion regarding the theoretical implications and applications
of the ideas presented in this research explores how these concepts can help bring about forms of
governance that are a better perceived fit for those affected by a particular governance decision.
Such better fits could help foster a potential sense of achieving both subjective and objective
interpretations of “good governance.” The first way this could happen is by applying some
aspect of the schematic structure of governance decisions to systems designed for identifying and
selecting representatives. If, for instance, some type of governance system was able to ensure
that a representative from each perspective of thought was represented, then there might be
greater potential to develop governance approaches that are more balanced and ideologically
inclusive.
There is, however, likely to be an aspect of real-life governance decision making that is
more impactful on outcomes than the representativeness of perspectives. It is assumed here that
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representativeness is actually a surrogate goal for another governance goal, that governance
choices match the preferences of the people they are designed for. The ideas presented in this
research might offer a new opportunity for trying to have that sense of “fit” occur. The proposed
nonrational shared mental model of governance decision making may help decision makers
better understand what types of governance actions should provide to them the highest potential
level of perceived satisfaction for a certain “target audience” as a function of preference fit. Put
simply, if one can tell what the preferences of a people are, then governance approaches can be
selected that match those preferences. Presumably, knowledge of how to find such fits could be
iteratively acquired by conducting case studies on the perceived success and satisfaction levels
different approaches offered to various community preference profiles. Information gained from
these efforts could then be compiled for public administrators into a type of best practices guide.
This dissertation will conclude by providing two applications of the model presented in
this work. These application sections are included in this work because they provide potentially
valuable dialogue about the potential impact of this research. The first application is an example
of how such proposed governance-community fits described in this chapter could occur. It does
this by proposing that the relative strength or weakness of the different schematic lenses a
community exhibits in their preference expressions could indicate which form of public-private
partnerships might deliver the highest sense of fit and satisfaction. The second application is a
collection of four thought experiments related to this research’s main contributions. These
experiments are meant to provide thought-provoking insights that could logically follow the
recognition of the nonrational shared mental model for governance decision making provided by
research. Together, these applications help explore the potential implications of how governance
decisions are made and how a model of the process could lead to meaningful developments.
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APPLICATION I
Applying the Model to the Selection of Public-Private Partnerships
As discussed, this section will show how the proposed nonrational shared mental model
of governance decision making could be used to determine which public-private partnership
arrangement might be most desirable by a particular community. This will be accomplished by
first examining the different entities commonly present in public-private partnership governance
dynamics. Then those components will be linked with the schematic frames and preferences with
which they are most aligned. This association allows one to identify which public-private
partnership features might be more or less preferred by different preference viewpoints. Then, if
various hypothetical communities could be characterized by the level of intensity for each
schematic lens of preference they express, the type of public-private arrangement that best fits
each type of community could be determined. This example will culminate in the presentation of
a matrix of options that could serve as a guide for selecting which style of governance would be
the best choice.
It is also important to note that, out of the several different aspects of each schematic
frame that could be used for the development of this matrix, it will be the political philosophies
of each schematic lens that will be used. In comparison to interest/positions or core values, the
political philosophies of each lens are considered the most helpful in communicating perspective
differences. In this example, political philosophies will be used in a similar sense as they were
previously used during the Chapter 4 example of the government ditch digging project. The
forthcoming example starts by setting the stage with a brief overview of public-private
partnerships and then explores the potential impact of using the political philosophies of each
schematic lens to identify which form of privatization might best fit each preference
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environment. As will be shown, the level of complexity that can occur for public-private
partnerships arrangements is why it is good candidate for showing how the nonrational model
presented in this work can be helpful in confronting an otherwise difficult domain of governance
decision making.

The Structure of Privatization
The “public-private partnership (PPP) has become a defining characteristic of modern
governance” (Greve & Hodge, 2011, p. 265). The PPP is a byproduct of the push for
privatization in government. Privatization is a process that affects numerous spheres of people’s
private lives and is relevant in one way or another to almost every aspect of governance.
Although privatization is a concept that has been studied for several decades, it still possesses
some rather unclear boundaries and concepts. Furthermore, it still seems to be a matter of trial
and error when it comes to knowing what path one should take when approached with
privatization options.
Here, an attempt will be made to help align people’s prevailing perspectives on
governance and the privatization approach that is the most fitting for those views. Savas (1987)
stated that privatization efforts were strategic approaches towards more productive and costeffective governance, and the matrix presented here might help bring more strategy to these
decision making processes. To achieve this, a prescriptive stance will be adopted, analogous to
the approach taken by McNamara & Morris (2008). Here though, instead of using a two-axis
analysis of competition and accountability, Kolderie’s (1986) dimensions of governmental
provision and production will be used to orient privatization options.
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What is privatization?
Because of the somewhat contextual nature of the term, there is no universally agreed
upon definition of privatization, but all interpretations of it share similar features (Brudney,
Fernandez, Ryu, & Wright, 2004). In America, the term often describes the “government’s
contracting out of local public services to private providers” (Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 1997. P. 447). To Savas (1987, p. 3), it was the “act of reducing the role of government,
or increasing the role of the private sector, in an activity or in the ownership of assets.” It
involves seeking public goals through a greater presence of private markets and actors
(Feigenbaum & Henig, 1994), with government acting in a supervisory role (Kettl, 1993). It can
highlight cooperation and shared risk between public and private entities (Klijn, Edelnbos, Kort,
& van Twist, 2008). Ultimately, it is the shifting away from a bureaucratic entity towards some
other organizational option.
Given these broad definitions, it may come as no surprise that it can be difficult to tell
what exactly privatization looks like when it occurs. There are “differing views as to what
constitutes” a privatized relationship (Hughes, 2012), and privatization occurs in numerous
forms (Savas, 1987). To many, a privatized relationship is merely a type of contracting
relationship (Hughes, 2012), and, accordingly, survey research has shown that outsourcing is the
most common form for state and local governments (Brudney, Fernandez, Ryu, & Wright, 2004).
However, Brudney, Fernandez, Ryu, & Wright (2004) reviewed a number of sources and
concluded that the act of privatization includes a variety of things such as the sale of state assets,
grants and subsidies, contracting out, franchises, deregulation, private donations, service
shedding, volunteerism, vouchers, self-service, and user fees. Skelcher (2005) stated that the
PPP’s that develop from privatization include things such as the design of hybrid organizations,
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co-production between governments and private agents, the contracting out of services, and
business management of public utilities. Furthermore, Hodge, Greve, and Boardman (2010)
grouped the partnerships that develop through privatization into five categories: institutional cooperation for joint production and risk sharing, long-term infrastructure contracts (LTICs), public
policy networks, civil society and community development, and urban renewal and downtown
economic development. As one can easily see, privatization is related to an extensive array of
activities. Nevertheless, all forms of privatization can be analyzed as some shift of activity
between “the public” and “the private.”
What though is the difference between the public and the private? Unfortunately, a clear
distinction is “elusive” (Savas, 1987, p. 3). There is an “indistinct boundary between public and
private interests” (Skelcher, 2005, p. 348), and there is so much blurring of the domains that a
firm contrast would be little more than a somewhat arbitrary dichotomy (Moulton & Wise,
2010). Even the term “public” is often unclear, sometimes meaning to the common person some
interchangeable mix of “government ownership, widespread ownership, or widespread access”
(Savas, 1987, p. 4). Generally, public refers to something that is more government oriented in
nature, and private refers to something that is more related to an individual person, business, or
market.
The most meaningful understanding of public and private comes from Kolderie (1986).
His distinction is important because it does not try to strictly differentiate between the two
spheres but rather allows them to exist on a continuous spectrum. Additionally, what Kolderie
does is create a more useful conceptualization by viewing the differences through the lens of
actual governmental activities. He states that to properly understand any form of privatization
and to distinguish between the public and private nature of something, one must first more
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accurately grasp the two distinct activities that government does and analyze the publicness of a
situation along each dimension: provision and production.
To Kolderie, provision is any activity similar to policy making, deciding, buying,
requiring, franchising, financing, or subsidizing. Production is stated as being similar to
operating, delivering, running, doing, selling, or administering. Together, these two categories of
action look to cover the entire spectrum of governance-type activity, and these two sets of
activities performed by government are each then allowed to exist along a spectrum of
publicness (more private to more public).
These relationships, their meanings, and their corresponding examples are presented in
Figure 10. As can be seen by the figure, the combination of the two concepts creates a two by
two design of four types of privatization environments. The top left and bottom right quadrants
represent mixed provision and production scenarios, while the top right and bottom left
quadrants create, respectively, more public and more private situations. With these distinctions
for privatized scenarios, what becomes clearer what is the meaning , manner, and interpretation
of public or private circumstances.
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Figure 10. Kolderie’s spectrum of provision & production, differentiated by publicness.

Why do people want privatization?
The consensus reason for engaging in activities like contracting is that they have the
potential to save governments significant amounts of money and resources (Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). This can often be achieved because privatization “takes advantage of
the full array of ownership and operating relations to serve the public interest by satisfying
people’s wants and needs” (Savas, 1987, p. 4). Kettl (1993) states that the competition that
comes with privatizing yields many positive, self-correcting tendencies for production levels,
costs, and quality. Privatization also has the potential to fill citizen desires for greater choices for
service decisions and delivery (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).
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Because of these desirable qualities, privatization now occurs across a variety of
domains, including health policy, environmental policy, and support services (Kettl, 1993). In
truth, it is the flexibility and general “ambiguity” of the types of relationships that develop
through privatization that creates its appeal and power (Greve & Hodge, 2011, p. 265). The
ambiguity of its form allows for people with different motivations to come to the same
conclusion – that some form of privatization away from a typical government system would be
beneficial. Savas (1987) identified how these motivations coalesce into four categories of
overarching forces. These pressures for privatization are labeled as the pragmatic, the populist,
the commercial, and the ideological. They are described in detail below. Please note that the
phrases and wording used in the below four pressure descriptions are composites taken directly
from Savas’ work. These composites were used in place of quotes for the sake of brevity but
similar wording used to retain exact meanings.

(1) Pragmatic. The pragmatic view is associated with better government. Its proponents
believe in seeking out more cost-effective public service. They believe that increasing
productivity is likely to be politically attractive and that privatization can be turned into an
important tool for better public management as a key for creating a more cost-effective
government.

(2) Populist. The populist view is associated with a better society. It believes that people
should have more choices and focuses on the process of formulating common needs. Those with
this view are in favor of local institutions that empower the people as opposed to big government
or big, distant business deciding directly for them. It is the push for a better society while
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simultaneously reinforcing a local sense of community that draws the populists to what the
concepts of privatization have to offer.

(3) Commercial. The commercial view is associated with more business. Those that
espouse this view believe that government spending should be directed towards private firms. It
is believed that the private sector can do a better job than a direct government asset or stateowned enterprise of any nature. Government employees often perform routine commercial
activities that are not unique to government yet often continue to operate without competition. It
is thought that such governance environments create opportunities for mismanagement,
underutilization of assets, and the breeding of slothful practices.

(4) Ideological. The ideological view is associated with simply having less government.
Those with an ideological view believe that government is inherently too big, powerful, and
intrusive. They believe that the free market is fundamentally more trustworthy than the
government, which is rooted in political decision making and thus less economically maximized.
Moreover, it is believed that the overriding presence of government in decisions that could be
made privately threatens individual freedom and unnecessarily reduces personal autonomy.

Pressures as Philosophies
It is proposed here that these pressures are just the manifestations of political
philosophies. Political philosophies are, at their heart, psychoanalytic drives (to help us survive
or to prevent our destruction) applied as strategies for problem solving in the complex world of
governance. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, “The central problem of political
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philosophy is how to deploy or limit public power so as to maintain the survival and enhance the
quality of human life.” It also states that “Like all aspects of human experience, political
philosophy is conditioned by the environment.” The environment here is one where people see
privatization as a desirable tool for better governance and are seeking understanding on how to
do it in a way in which they are most comfortable. To help guide them in this effort and sort
through the decisions they face in these matters, it is assumed that people are likely to use their
core political philosophy (or some combination of philosophies) as their guiding principle(s).
Purposing how exactly people might do this and what it would look like in the real world is the
rationale for this example. Here, the four philosophies associated with the nonrational model
presented in this work are briefly discussed again and connected to various privatization
pressures.

(1) Statism. Statism refers to a philosophy which views the state as being chiefly able and
best suited to achieve acts of governance. If a decision maker is approaching a choice with the
interest of the state in mind, supporting decisions that espouse the authority of the state are then
very fitting. There is a belief that a vision of certain ends can be aptly achieved by using directed
effort to harness the means of the state. The state can take in resources and produce wanted
governance.
This view is related to the pragmatic pressure of better government. Statism supports the
targeted and concentrated power of the government towards a goal. Taking this approach is
likely to create a more cost-effective public service. This fits the pragmatic view of privatization
as a means for increasing the productivity and efficiency of government.
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(2) Communitarianism. Communitarianism refers to a philosophy which views the
perceived needs of the community as paramount. A decision maker adopting a communitarian
view is interested in the overarching effect of an act of governance on everyone as a whole and is
chiefly concerned with the principled health of the society. A core goal is how to allow the
greatest perspective and ethical stance on the aggregate human condition.
This view is related to the populist pressure of a better society. The needs of the
community are believed to supersede the political desires of the government, the profit desires of
the private sector, or the autonomy of the individual actor. The opportunity for a community to
address its common needs and thus help create a better overall society is likely a shared
perspective between the privatization populist and communitarianist.

(3) Groupism. Groupism is a philosophy that stems from the drive to affiliate with those
that you can identify with and those that you are habituated to associate with. It is when the
dominant perspective in a decision maker’s mind is that of one’s group affiliation. Individual
identities become superseded by identities that differentiate one’s segment of people from
another segment. Groupism is a philosophy that occurs in all cultures. Groupism supports the
affiliation of the citizenry to some group identity because it assumes governance is enhanced
when decision-making, at some level, is limited to specific representatives. This perspective
assumes that the competition and cooperation that can occur between qualified and selected
representatives during decisions of governance can produce outcomes that are more effective
than the abstract objectives of society as a whole, the potential mob rule of direct democracy, or
the central planning of state-led initiatives.
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This view is related to the commercial pressure of more business. The groupist view
likely supports cooperative action through competition and the use of selected representatives.
The commercial view supports privatized interests being competitively chosen as the agents
responsible for fulfilling the community’s need.

(4) Liberalism. Liberalism is a philosophy associated with rational self-interest. Rational
self-interest does not necessarily refer here to some economic model of utility analysis for
decision making, such as rational choice theory. In this context of a decision of governance, it is
the perspective of what is a preferred decision if taking the standpoint of the individual, a
rational egotism. Fundamentally, the most important concept to the rationale of the individual
seeking to pursue their self-interest is the ability to actually make such a choice. This need for
individual empowerment reinforces the role of liberty as a fundamental component of classical
liberalism; everyone must have an equal opportunity to seek their goals or chance to achieve
their desires.
This view is related to the ideological pressure of less government. Both perspectives
likely believe that self-interested individuals are the one who know best how their resources
should be spent or, at minimum, should have the right to live with the consequences of their own
decisions. They are confident in this decision because of belief in the advantages of the market
place and collective gain associated with the aggregate progress of individuals liberated from a
centrally controlling government.

It is assumed that these relationships between privatization pressures and underlying
philosophies exist and have an influence on the government’s approach to privatization.
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Furthermore, it is believed that these forces straightforwardly relate to the quadrants created by
the Kolderie’s work. It is presumed that the outcomes of these pressures result in the scenarios
Kolderie predicted. The associations between these four privatization conditions and these forces
is presented in Figure 11. Going clockwise and starting from the top left quadrant, a description
of each situation is presented below.

(1) Private Provision & Public Production. This quadrant matches best with the
pragmatic/statist view. This view believes in the use of focused government activity towards a
more productive delivery of public services, but it also supports a more privatized style of
approach towards the decision processes that go with those services. This would mean that
although the government is influencing the operating or selling parts of an activity, it would be a
private decision on how that is done or whether the good or service is paid for.

(2) Public Provision & Public Production. This quadrant matches best with the populist
/communitarianist view. It is believed that the communitarianist view can very much be in
support of bringing the perceived benefits of privatization to government. Furthermore, the
communitarianist view is arguably the most “public” of the four political philosophies presented
here. This doubly public quadrant receives a fundamental conceptual change here because of the
desire to emphasize the potential influence of privatization.
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Figure 11. Placing the forces in favor of privatization on the Kolderie framework.

Kolderie viewed the quadrant of public provision and public production as an exclusive
government scenario. However, the objective here is to propose what influence privatization
might have on that particular scenario. The original framing of Kolderie’s government activities
matrix did not allow for a privatizing effect on this mix of government actions. However, it is
believed that this can and does occur through the “softest” of privatization approaches, those
where the transitions are the closest in form and function to the typical governmental
mechanisms but require a slightly more localized element of private attention. This would fit the
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communitarian concern for the greatest perspective and ethical stance on the aggregate human
condition.

(3) Public Provision & Private Production. This quadrant matches best with the
commercial/groupist view. This view promotes the belief that government spending should be
directed towards the private sector in order to achieve better results. This would imply that
although the government is deciding to buy something, it is the private entities that sell to the
government and deliver to the public.

(4) Private Provision & Private Production. This quadrant matches best with the
ideological/liberalist view. This view promotes limited government and maximized individual
decision making. The liberalist view is the most “private” of the four political philosophies
presented here and best fits a domain where both provision and production are privatized.

As has been shown, the pressures articulated by Savas and their associated philosophies
merge well with the Kolderie framework. Although these links may be useful in and of
themselves, the intention here is to connect these forces to real world privatization approaches.
Doing so may offer a prescriptive solution for helping satisfy the particular mix of privatization
pressures that a government faces. In order to achieve this, the entities that play a part in
privatization processes, and their associations to these forces, must first be examined.
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Elements of Privatization
There are a number of entities that engage in public-private partnerships. Here, the
components of the privatization process are broken into two categories: the constants and the
variables. The three constants are the entities that are believed to be present in all large
governance situations. They are (A) the Public (population), (B) Government Officials, and (C)
Government Departments, Bureaus, or Agencies. The four variables are the entities that are
present only in certain circumstances. They are (1) State-Owned Entities, (2) Public Authorities
of the Government, (3) Contractors, and (4) Private Companies.
The three constants are believed to always be present because the backdrop of large
governance situations almost always includes the people who in some way chose a political body
of government officials, the government officials that run the government through administrative
bodies, and the administrative bodies that deliver government to the people. When any form of
privatization occurs, the four variable entities enter in to this otherwise non-privatized equation.
Private companies are independent businesses paid for by the public that select the company’s
goods or services. Government contractors are independent companies paid for by the
government. There is a wide variety of types of government contractors, but here they are
presented as the one type of entity because of their similar functional arrangements for the
privatization process.
In general, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are usually government-controlled businesses,
and public authorities are usually legally and financially independent decision making bodies
established by the government. Distinctions between SOEs and authorities are difficult for the
average person understand because the two entities are similar, are generally obscured from
typical life activities, and frequently occur in conjunction with one another. However, the two
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serve different purposes, have distinct roles for satisfying privatization urges, and possess key
differences related to the publicness of their provision.
Public authorities are legislatively created governing entities over some particular area.
They are initially formed for both political reasons as well as to have their administrative nature
be independent from typical bureaucratic structures. Usually, a board of directors heads a
commission that focuses on the administration of a particular function or service for society. The
authority is usually independent from the rest of government in terms of finances and controls,
and it is able to engage in contracts with private entities as it sees fit. They may be created to run
some protected service, such as utilities, or they may be created as a decision-making
compromise between two or more government entities. In a sense, they can act as outsourced
governance. Public authorities essentially take on a privatized business structure while
administering a function or service that would otherwise be left to a disconnected government
body. These attributes make authorities desirable substitutions for politicized initiatives,
government enterprises, or profit-motivated private ventures. (Gerwig, 1961, Leavitt & Morris,
2004, & Shestack, 1957).
SOEs are public enterprises and government-owned corporations that are partly or
completely owned by the state and compete directly with private companies operating in the
same market. Governments may not have direct control of daily operations, but they maintain
control of overall SOE operations through ownership influences. SOEs are dynamic because they
can be controlled directly through state ownership or through a public authority. This means that
SOEs can handle the business transactions and sell goods or services to the public in the same
manner that a public authority would determine to be best for the people of an area.
Governments may choose to create SOEs because of their increased productivity compared to
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bureaucratic operations, to deal with market failures, to control a monopoly, to engage in
economic planning, or protect a business sector that faces competition. In addition to utilities,
companies focused on oil, motor vehicles, tobacco, and alcohol have all been created through
SOE initiatives. SOEs are typically used as mechanisms for achieving state capacity, and,
although somewhat universal, they occur frequently in communist and less-developed countries
(Hughes, 2012, & Rees, 1984, Vernon, 1984, & Zengxian, 1997).
The goal for presenting the previous elements of privatization was to establish
environments based on these elements. Figure 12, shown below, summarizes those components
and indicates how they will be presented in future depictions. The next objective in this example
is to link these elements to the pressures of privatization in order to show how they might relate
to privatization preferences and the subsequent policy decisions and administrative processes
that come from those choices.

Figure 12. Entities in the privatization process.
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Relating Privatization Forces to Entities
It is proposed here that each of the four variable entities in the privatization process align
with the views of one of the four privatization forces. These associations help anchor each
privatization belief set to a real world embodiment of their preferences. Figure 13, shown below,
depicts how each variable privatization entity interconnects with the other proposed elements of
the Kolderie framework. The following is an explanation of each association:

(1) State-Owned Enterprises = Pragmatic Pressures/Statism. SEOs are business
organizations created by and directed through government to swiftly direct certain resources or
efforts towards some particular objective. This wielding of state power aligns with the pragmatic
views of a more productive and cost-effective approach of a more privatized operation than a
bureaucratic agency. They offer the government high control over a strategic marketparticipating entity. A statist approach is affiliated with pragmatic pressures and government
corporations/state owned entities.

(2) Public Authorities = Populist Pressures/Communitarianism. Public authorities are
community organizations designed to best serve the general welfare of society through
navigating, assigning, and describing responsibility and obligations in a manner that addresses
the needs of all parties involved. This orientation is aligned with the populist approach of more
localized decision making. A communitarianist approach is affiliated with populist pressures and
aligns with organizational decision making processes similar to those found in public authorities.
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(3) Government Contractors = Commercial Pressures/Groupism. Government
contractors are organizations that form from some subset group of those with particular
capabilities, skills, and abilities and for some purpose in response to some real or perceived need
of governance to effectively achieve some objective. Their presence aligns with the commercial
interests that pre public dollars to be redirected from public employees and to private specialists.
A groupist approach is affiliated with commercial pressures and the use of contractors.

(4) Private Companies = Ideological Pressures/ Liberalism. Private companies are
organizations of individual actors that independently, competitively, and somewhat fairly engage
other private actors in an exchange of utility through goods and services. This independent
nature aligns with the ideological approach towards a maximized privatization scheme. A
libertarian approach is affiliated with principles of ideological pressures and extensive use of the
private sector.
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Figure 13. Privatization entities in the Kolderie framework.

Privatization Structures
The previously discussed associations are valuable because they can be used to structure
idealized privatization scenarios. These proposed structures are believed to be close to the likely
preferred arrangement for each scenario, given the available privatization elements. Each
element is linked to one another by lines representing the flow of information, a controlling
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relationship, and/or a transfer of functions or services. Figure 14, shown below, depicts these
likely preferred privatization structures and relationships.
At each corner of this diagram, the four privatization forces create a structure that is
primarily focused on that direct influence. Between each of these “pure” examples is a blended
option that combines the influences of the two closest privatization forces. Finally, in the center,
is a structuring option that is believed to take a balanced approach across all four privatization
forces. Below this nine-block matrix of options, each option is briefly described individually.
If valid, this matrix fills the void in the research of describing how the pressures of
privatization lead to preferred provision and production combinations of functions and services.
For instance, if a particular community was assessed for its most prevailing privatization
pressures, the resulting data could be used to create a privatization structure that the people are
most likely to be satisfied with. In another scenario, if a community believes that a particular
view is underrepresented, and it seeks to rectify that short coming, this framework could offer a
prescriptive solution for helping those people achieve their goal. In a governmental setting, this
framework may help decision makers by giving them the information to develop and promote
better fitting privatization structures.
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Figure 14. Proposed idealized privatization structures for each condition.

Legend:
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1 Primarily Statist: This scenario represents a structure that would be ideal for those advocating
statist views. It features private provision with public
production. Where possible, government actions would
occur through the SOEs in order to most effectively direct
state abilities.

2 Communitarianist & Statist: This structure represents the blending of the statist and
communitarianist views. It has a balanced approach to
provision but a public-leaning approach to production. Both
public authorities and SOEs are used to bring functions and
services to people. Where a localized approach is preferred,
the authority steps in. Where more effective government is
desired, the SOEs are used.
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3 Primarily Communitarianist: This structure represents a dominant populist approach. Where
possible, it filters all government activity through public
authorities. Here, both provision and production are
addressed publicly.

4 Groupist & Communitarianist: This structure represents the blending of the populist and
commercial views. Provision elements are addressed
publicly, but production is mixed. Government agencies
can serve the public directly or work through public
authorities. Similarly, public authorities can work for the
public or operate through contractors.
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5 Primarily Groupist: This structure is fundamentally aligned with commercial privatization
pressures. By using contractors wherever possible, this
privatization design uses public provision and private
production. If a government service cannot be handled “in
house,” the government will contract with a private
company to complete that goal.

6 Groupist & Libertarian: This structure is a blending of the ideological and commercial
preferences. Similar to scenario #5, the government can
operate through contractors where necessary or preferred.
However, in this situation the public would also have the
ability to seek out other actors in the free market for goods
or services if so desired. This would be private production
with a mixed environment for provision.
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7 Primarily Libertarian: This structure supports a purely ideological view. Here, if a government
agency does not or will not provide a good or service, the
public seeks out what they need from the free market. They
may also, simply, use the market alternatives if they offer
more utility than the governmental options. This is a wholly
private situation for provision and production.

8 Libertarian & Statist: This structure represents the blending of the statist and ideological
perspectives. Private provision is combined with a mixed
approach to production. Government agencies can improve
their productivity by utilizing SOEs, but the public can also
use the free market to obtain what they desire. In this type
of relationship, given the presence of SOEs in the market,
some form of communication between the government and
private sector is likely.
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9 Balanced: This structure represents the blending of all views. It is believed to be the most
palatable option for a public as all options are available to
them. Although this structure likely exists today in many
places, the real question is if it exists across all goods and
services.
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APPLICATION II
Thought Experiments
The previous appendix explored in detail how the nonrational shared mental model
developed in this research could be used to guide the selection of a governance choice, even
within the otherwise complex governance decision making environments such as those that can
occur with questions of privatization. The remaining sections of this research’s discussion will
take a different tack. The discussion will move away from the potential applications of the
developed model and instead focus on a few previously unmentioned theoretical implications.
The following information focuses on more abstract theoretical implications that were
covered in this dissertation’s discussion section. In order to address the particular nature of these
potential implications, they will be examined as thought experiments. These mini thought
experiments will essentially ask conceptual questions and then attempt to answer them. Four of
these thought experiments will be presented.
The first thought experiment will ask if the ideological identities of the heuristics
presented reveal a progression of power for the dominance of each schematic lens. The second
thought experiment will ask what happens for combinations of three or four schematic lenses
instead of just the two at a time addressed with heuristics. The third thought experiment will ask
what it would look like to balance the influence of each schematic lens for developing
governance approaches. The fourth and final thought experiment will ask what a governance
environment might be like if the influence of one schematic lens, for some reason, was just
entirely absent.

226
Thought Experiment #1
The first thought experiment presented here explores if the ideological identities of the
heuristics presented reveal a progression of power for the dominance of each schematic lens. The
origin of this thought experiment revolves around a curiosity about how much influence a
particular schematic lens can have within a particular realm of governance, such as a nationstate. This is to wonder if the different types of governance environments that could exist are
indicative of the pervasiveness of a single family of heuristic approaches.
It is assumed in this work that most large governance environments include a mixture of
preferences favored by different decision makers. It would be plausible to think that every type
of schematic lens would be given primacy, or every type of heuristic would be expressed, by at
least one person in the population. The presence of a mixture of individual schematic or heuristic
perspectives is, however, expected to have far less influence on a governance environment than
the presence of a perspective that is particularly common or pervasive. If this pervasive
perspective was a schema, it could mean that, for some reason, one schematic lens is given
primacy by the vast majority of people. For example, the decision makers in one environment are
predominantly concerned with a statist perspective and always defer to ideological perspectives
that favor the state’s interest/position.
A pervasive perspective in such an environment could also come in the form of a
particular heuristic. This would mean that there was a pervasive ideology that was common for
that realm of governance. It could be so common that it is functionally representative of the
governance environment. Furthermore, there could be one overwhelmingly common heuristic
expressed while comparisons between the other two interest/positions are generally considered
nonissues and left generally unattended to. For example, a governance environment could exist
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where the overwhelming majority of governance decision makers adhere to a tribalistic ideology
but simply do not meaningfully address or have clear preferences for matters associated with
societal or state schematic standpoints. This would mean that there would be a strong sense of
groupism and a relevant but suppressed sense of individualism, but decision makers would lack
firm convictions for matters involving communitarianism or statism.
The previous two pervasiveness scenarios reveal that there could be an ideology that best
characterizes a certain realm of governance, and there could be varying levels to which a
particular schematic viewpoint is dominant within that realm of governance. Though the level
and type of pervasiveness may vary, both situations would be anchored by a schematic lens since
heuristic derived ideologies depend on schematic comparisons. The extent to which there could
be a pervasive perspective within some governance environment may be a function of the degree
of influence that a particular schematic lens exerts. The more influence a perspective exerts, the
more dominance it has over other perspectives.
The different perspectives presented by the nonrational model proposed in this work are
all considered inherently equivalent to one another as a matter of principle. Though that might be
a valid stance to take at the conceptual level, it may also be meaningful to suggest that there are
significant differences in these perspectives in terms of the real-life entities associated with each
perspective. The interest/positions of each perspective indicate that these real-life entities could
be an individual, a group, society as a whole, or a government. Though the decision making
process can allow a person to adopt the perspective of any of these interest/positions, the actual
manifestations of these perspectives as different entities involved in the governance process are
far more concrete and far less equivalent. This is to say there are substantial real-life differences
between an individual, a group, society as a whole, or the government. The most consequential
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difference between each of these entities is presumably the drastic differences in power that each
can yield. Though there may be exceptions, there are likely few situations where a government is
not more powerful than an individual. In a similar sense, an individual is usually less powerful
than a group, a group is usually less powerful than society, and society as a whole is probably
less powerful than a government. Though a whole society may be close in power to a
government or even exceed it in some cases, for the sake of the this thought experiment, it is
assumed here that factors such as military strength can keep the typical government as being
more powerful than society as a whole. In the end, it is likely safe to assume that the power
gradient goes from the individual, to the group, to the society, to the government.
Up to this point, the logic presented in this thought experiment creates an important
distinction. This distinction is that there is a difference between a perspective and an entity that is
typically affiliated with that perspective. Though somewhat obvious, this distinction has not yet
been acknowledged. This distinction implies that, for instance, though an individual might
approach governance situations by expressing a preference for the views of the state, that person
is not the same entity as the state itself. Likewise, a particular group may advocate for some
ethical perspective that is meant to speak for society as a whole, but that group is not
representative of society nor as powerful as it. Also, a society may support the perspective of a
king (a representative of a state entity), but that does not make the people of a realm on par with
the power of the king.
This separation of perspective and power then implies that a fascinating relationship
could exist between the pervasiveness of any particular perspective and the ideological system
that dominates a governance environment. If it is true that ideologies are the expression of
preference between different perspectives, and if it is true that real-life entities associated with
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the interest/positions of each perspective exist along a spectrum of power, then the pervasiveness
of any particular schematic lens’ perspective determines the ideological structure of a realm of
governance. This means that if a realm of governance has an ideology that is dominant to the
point of being representative, the type of ideology that is present is a statement about the
pervasiveness and strength of a schematic lens.
If this relationship is true, this could imply that certain ideologies exist as “families” of
thought through their dominant schematic lens, and the level of influence of that schematic lens
determines the ideological environment for a realm of governance. The more pervasive a
particular perspective becomes, the greater the power structures it affects. This means that, as
influence increases, dominance is expressed over ascending levels of powerful entities. A weak
level of influence only affects individuals, and the most dominant level of influence affects the
state. Each perspective has the opportunity to progress through the process of dominating the
other three perspectives that represent positions it does not occupy. This conclusion implies that
low, medium, and high levels of influence for each schematic lens develop. Since each of these
levels of influence would be the expression of preference, a progression through each stage
would signify the development of a new ideology. Put differently, as a schematic lens increases
in influence, the representative ideology for some realm of governance is transformed.
For example, as the schematic perspective of the individual gains influence it progresses
up the power scale. First the individual perspective dominates the group perspective, next it
dominates the societal perspective, and then it finally dominates the state perspective. What is
good for the individual also becomes good for the group, then good for society, and then good
for the government. At each level of influence, the ideology that corresponds to that schematic
dominance dynamic becomes representative of the environment.
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This pattern of progressive influence creates four families of ideologies, each connected
to a driving schematic frame and ranked by low, medium, and high levels of schematic
pervasiveness. This implies that here would be three ideologies in each of these four groups,
ordered by schematic influence. The pervasiveness of the schematic lens of the state causes a
progression from fascism to feudalism to totalitarianism. The pervasiveness of the schematic lens
of society causes a progression from collectivism to socialism to communism. The pervasiveness
of the schematic lens of the group causes a progression from tribalism to federalism to
republicanism. The pervasiveness of the schematic lens of the individual causes a progression
from capitalism to legal anarchy to full democracy. These progressions are presented in the
Figure 15 below.

Figure 15. Ideological transitions related to perspective pervasiveness.

These relationships indicate that as the perspective of each schematic lens takes hold
through ever greater levels of power, the resulting governance environments are fundamentally
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transformed. These relationships also indicate that there are inherent similarities between these
sets of ideologies. As perspectives get what could be described as “more of what they want,” the
governance environments are changed into climates ever more biased towards the desires of that
schematic lens. Conversely, the progression of power of each lens would also appear to indicate
that the influences of the other perspectives become ever less impactful.
The transitions presented could have some interesting characterizations. The schematic
lens of the state appears to transition from a social influence, to a structural influence, to a
complete take over. The progression of the societal influence transitions from a cultural
prioritization for society’s well-being, to a formal control of important sources of advantage, to a
weakened state commune. The schematic lens of the group moves the governance environment
from a stable, homogeneous body of people to having power shared through some type of
federation or confederation to a type of empire being established. The schematic lens of the
individual appears to transition a governance environment from focusing on individual motives,
to being like the American “wild west,” a land controlled by mob rule. This individualistic lens
could also be characterized as the progression of regulated individualism turning into an
environment of anarcho-capitalism (with an unregulated and voluntary society based on personal
discretion) and then turning into what would essentially be a compulsory and coercive version of
individualism.

Thought Experiment #2
The second thought experiment explores what happens when there are combinations of
three or four schematic lenses. Heuristics address what happens when any two schematic lenses
compete for dominance, but this research did not address how conflicts among more than two
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schematic lenses are expected to be resolved. This inquiry likely requires a far more complicated
and nuanced answer than what the core nonrational shared mental model presented in this work
can provide. Given this challenge, the specific explanations and descriptions needed to fully
address this inquiry are outside the scope of this research. Instead, what will be discussed here is
a preview of how complicated that inquiry is expected to be. This thought experiment will
investigate the possible myriad of discrete governance structures that could be derived from the
components of the nonrational model presented in this research.
To preface this preview, it is assumed in this work that real-life governance environments
necessarily include the constant competition of all four schematic lenses. This does not mean to
imply that there is no place for the ideologies identified in the previous chapter. The twelve
ideologies presented by this research’s nonrational model are believed to be necessary and
instrumental for understanding different governance priorities. The twelve ideologies may even
be able to stand alone as sufficient explanations of how certain governance environments operate
for situations where the two unaddressed schematic lenses are insignificant contributors to the
governance environment.
Despite the potential usefulness of those ideologies, it is assumed here that the majority
of governance environments operate through some sort of prioritization structure that accounts,
in some way, for all four perspectives. This is to say that the identity that best describes most
real-world governance environments (the pervasive structuring of views that can be
representative of that realm of governance) is likely to be more complex on some level than what
can be described by the presented twelve ideologies. In truth, some percentage of real
governance environments would likely be best characterized as some particular mixture of
ideologies. If true, this means that the proper identification of certain dynamic governance
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environments would require that one first exhaustively identify every possible combination of
preferences between schematic lenses that could occur when all lenses are accounted for
simultaneously. This thought experiment will not attempt to do that, but it will attempt to suggest
how many possible combinations this would be. Future research may then benefit from knowing
the potential range of preference combinations and then, with that knowledge, work to fully
articulate how each combination operates. From there, researchers could then use those
developed descriptions to properly classify cases of real-world governance environments that
possess internal dynamics too nuanced to summarize with standard core ideologies.
To identify the possible number of preference combinations, one must first identify how
those preferences are arranged. If, for instance, there is a sequential comparison between
schematic pairs, then this creates straight-line schematic lens relationship structures. This would
mean that the first schematic lens is considered the most dominant, and it is dominant over the
second most dominant lens. Then the second most dominant lens is then dominant over the third
most dominant lens. Finally, the third most dominant lens is dominant over the fourth and least
dominant lens. These relationships are presented in the Figure 16 below.

Figure 16. Straight line combinations.

A sequential set of comparisons like this would imply that, regardless of the dominance
positions of each schematic lens, governance environments of this nature would have the same
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general form for identifying them. In order of preference dominance, each one of these
combinations could be identified as schematic lens #1 over #2 over #3 over #4. This would be
the only structural option where there are heuristic comparisons all the way through the
dominance structure. This means that schematic lens #1 is more influential on decision making
than #’s 2, 3, or 4, that #2 is more influential than #’s 3 and 4, and that #3 is only more
influential than #4.
This structure would yield 24 possible combinations for the four lenses. These would be
24 possible classifications for governance environments where a more nuanced and complete
description of schematic lens interaction were needed for proper identification. This work
assumes that this set of 24 would be sufficient for identifying combinations of both three and
four schematic lenses. The reason that this set could address combinations for both is because it
is assumed that there is a negligible difference in stating that a particular schematic lens is ranked
fourth in a dominance struggle among four options or if that lens is essentially not present in the
ranking structure altogether. If, for example, in some governance environment the schematic lens
associated with groupism has no ability to influence decisions over other schematic lenses, there
may be no meaningful difference between that situation and another governance environment
where groupism is not even considered.
The structure of those 24 possible combinations all carry with them the implicit
assumption that schematic lenses must be unequal and a preference between schematic lenses
must be expressed. For that type of schematic structuring, there can be no sense of equivalency
between lenses. There may however be other types of combinations where the schematic
structuring includes the ability for two or more schematic lenses to have a sense of equivalency.
This means that, within the overall decision making structure, some schematic lenses would have
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a heuristic that establishes a prioritization dynamic, while other schematic lenses would lack any
type of prioritizing heuristic between them.
Such structures would still be nonrational in nature, but they would have a “blind spot” in
each area where a heuristic was not present to reconcile schematic lens conflict. For the
schematic dominance conflicts lacking a heuristic to resolve the matter in a fast and frugal
manner, those conflicts might be avoided, overlooked, resolved haphazardly, influenced by other
factors, modified, blended, addressed in a quasi-rational manner, or resolved through some yet
unknown means. Though it might be unspecified how equivalent and potentially competing
schematic lenses existing together within a nonrational decision making framework have their
conflict resolved, this thought experiment only aims to explore how such relationships would be
structured and not how they would function. One type of design representing how these
relationships could be structured would be that, after some dominant schematic lens leads the
way for governance decision making, there is a sense of ambivalence regarding the prioritization
of the other lenses. This could occur in two ways.
The first way this could occur is by one schematic lens being dominant over a second and
the second lens being equally dominant over two equivalent lenses. This would mean that #1 is
more influential than #2, #2 is more influential than either #3 or #4, but there is no relationship
or comparison of preference between the third and fourth lenses. This type of structuring creates
the potential for an additional 12 combinations of schematic lenses (governance style
classifications) to occur. The structure of this type of relationship is presented in Figure 17
below. In that diagram, like with the previous structural diagram, the number written inside each
box represents the overall rank of each lens. This labeling by tier or rank will also be used in
each forthcoming figure.
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Figure 17. End frame equivalency combinations.

The second way this could occur is for one schematic lens to be dominant over two
equivalent lenses, but one of those two second tier lenses is dominant over the remaining third
tier/fourth lens while no relationship existed between the other second tier lens and the remaining
third tier/fourth lens. This would mean that #1 is more influential than #2a and #2b, but #2a (and
only #2a) is dominant over lens #4. There is no relationship or comparison of preference that
occurs between schematic lens #2a and #4. This type of structuring creates the potential for an
additional 24 combinations of schematic lenses (governance style classifications) to occur. The
structure of this type of relationship is presented in Figure 18 below.

Figure 18. Third tier offshoot combinations.
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The previous two diagrams show how 36 additional combinations could occur if, after a
primary schematic lens is in place, two of the remaining three lenses are considered equivalent in
some way. This type of equivalency could only occur between two lenses and not three. Put
differently, when there is a primarily dominant schematic lens, two stages of prioritization must
occur for meaningful new combinations to be identified. What cannot occur is that there is a
primary lens of preference dominance and then three subsequent schematic lenses that are all
considered to be on equal footing or have no comparative relationship between each other. The
reason why these types of structural combinations are irrelevant is because they functionally
represent “pure” schematic views. If lens #1 is dominant over lenses #2, 3, and 4, and there is no
expressed preference between lenses #2, 3, and 4, then the only relevant piece of information this
structure offers is to say that schematic lens #1 is the only significant motivation exhibited within
governance decisions. It is assumed here that there no additional information is gained and no
benefit for classification efforts derived from considering this structural combination form.
Governance environments that could be best represented by this structure could simply be
accounted for as “pure” schematic views. The structure of this type of relationship is presented in
Figure 19 below.

2
1

2
2

Figure 19. Three second tier frames.
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So far in this thought experiment, 60 potential new governance environment
classifications were identified. All of those 60, however, shared the implicit construction
assumption that there was a primary dominant lens, a single #1. It is logical to presume, if it is
possible for different schematic lenses to be equivalent in some way, that there could exist
governance environments that function with more than one primary schematic lens. This
potential means that future research attempting to capture the nuances of real governance
environments may need to account for these types of classifications as well.

The first way this type of structure could occur is for two primary lenses to exist on the
same first tier, then both of those lenses could have dominance over a second tier/third lens, and
that second tier/third lens be dominant over a third tier/fourth lens. This means that there is no
relationship or preference expression between lenses #1a and #1b, but #1a and #1b are dominant
over #3, and #3 is dominant over #4. This type of structuring creates the potential for an
additional 12 combinations of schematic lenses (governance style classifications) to occur. The
structure of this type of relationship is presented in Figure 20 below.0

Figure 20. Equivalent first tier frame combinations.
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The second way this type of structure could occur is for two primary lenses to exist on
the same first tier, and both of those lenses have dominance over both remaining lenses, but
those remaining lenses are also on equal footing. In this structure there would be no relationship
or preference expression between lenses #1a and #1b, but there would also be relationship or
preference expression between lenses #2a and #2b. This type of structuring creates the potential
for an additional 6 combinations of schematic lenses (governance style classifications) to occur.
The structure of this type of relationship is presented in Figure 21 below.

Figure 21. Equivalent first and second tier frame combinations.

The third way this type of structure could occur is for there to actually be three primary
lenses that all exist separately yet equivalently on the first tier of preference, and all of those
primary lenses exert dominance over the remaining fourth lens. This would mean there would be
no relationship or preference expression between lenses #1a, #1b, and #1c, but each of them
would be dominant over schematic lens #4. These forms of governance would struggle to make
choices for governance decisions that put into conflict any of the views held by lenses #1a, #1b,
or #1c, but, at minimum, this type of governance environment could make decisions that express
preference against whatever schematic lens occupies the position of #4. This type of structuring
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creates the potential for an additional 4 combinations of schematic lenses (governance style
classifications) to occur. The structure of this type of relationship is presented in Figure 22
below.

Figure 22. Combinations with three equivalent first tier frames.

Tallying up all of the possible combinations of governance preference structures
presented in this thought experiment reveals that there are an additional 82 possible governance
style classifications for researchers to consider. All possible real-world governance environments
are assumed to be able to be identified through either the pure schematic views, the core
heuristic-derived ideologies, or any these 82 more nuanced and comprehensive combinations.
This assumption also implies that the proper classification of a governance environment should
be through an assessment of how the four proposed schematic lenses relate to one another for
governance decision making. However, if future research reveals that there is merit to including
some type of moderating variable(s) in any such governance environment classification system,
then the range of potential “proper” identities could increase substantially.
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Thought Experiment #3
The third thought experiment explores what it would look like to balance the influence of
each schematic lens for developing governance approaches. Given the discussion in thought
experiment #1, it is logical to say that there might be merit in trying to temper the influence that
any one schematic lens has on governance decisions and instead search for a more balanced
approach. A balanced approach would imply trying to avoid expressing preference among
schematic lenses and deliberately developing governance approaches that attempt to incorporate
each of the four perspectives equally.
The underlying assumption for such efforts would be that there could be both a
principally-based reason for pursuing such an approach as well as the potential to achieve that
which could be universally thought of as “good governance.” It is unknown here if the “good
governance” that a deliberately balanced governance approach could claim to achieve could also
be objectively labeled as the “best governance.” Such a question would require more information
and is outside the scope of this thought experiment. This thought experiment is limited to
exploring what this type of schematic approach would look like and what effect it might have on
governance decisions. This approach, a method where each schematic lens is intentionally given
an equal ability to influence a governance decision, is identified here as “holistic governance.”
It might be more helpful to envision how to achieve holistic governance not by thinking
about the constant reweighting of some four-part scale but by governance decision makers
actively seeking out how to maximize the potential positive influences that could come from
using each schematic lens. It is assumed here that each schematic lens inherently offers
something useful for identifying a more desired governance decision outcome, and it is also
assumed here that the shortcoming of every schematic lens is simply that each lens lacks what
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the other lenses offer. In order to cover the weaknesses of each lens and maximize the benefits of
all schematic lenses simultaneously, decision makers would want to try to enhance the presence
of the core governance values associated with each schematic lens.
This is a relatively straightforward concept, but it attempts to “break” the rules
established with the use of a nonrational framework. As has been discussed, nonrational
processes seek to avoid cognitive gridlock and reach a decision by not expending significant
resources seeking an optimization strategy between two competing schematically derived
perspectives. If trying to achieve a Pareto optimality for a governance matter that had to address
two variables was already difficult enough for decision makers, then trying to achieve such an
optimization with four variables could be particularly more difficult. A large part of that
potential difficulty is linked to the perceived computational problems that currently exist because
of a lack of metrics for evaluating core governance values and due to the inability to compare
metrics on a common scale. Though it is true that the nonrational model proposed by this work
suggests ways to potentially resolve both of those issues, even if such advances were achieved,
they may not be helpful enough to be used for predictive purposes.
For example, even if there were metrics for each of the core values and all four metrics
could be scaled in a similar way so as to transform a discussion that would otherwise be “apples
to oranges” into one that discusses “apples to apples,” those metrics might only be able to assess
how much of each value was present in a governance decision outcome that has already
occurred. Unfortunately, the need is not just for accurately assessing past efforts but for
developing confidence in how a future situation is likely to turn out. Decision makers
approaching a matter of governance are likely more concerned with predicting how different
choices are expected to exhibit the positive qualities of each schematic lens.
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With enough data, decision makers could eventually learn enough to account for many of
the potential confounding variables, interaction effects, and situational influences. Acquiring that
level of precision would allow for decision makers to far more accurately identify the
governance approach that would optimize all four influences simultaneously. Until that point is
reached, decision makers looking to strike a balance between schematic perspectives could
attempt a different approach. Functional holistic governance could be sought by trying to
deliberately maximize the political philosophy and core value of each schematic lens.
The maximization approach has subtle differences from the optimization approach, but it
might be a useful alternative for seeking holistic governance until the necessary information is
available. The difference between the two is that the optimization approach looks to increase
each schematic lens’ influence only to the point that there is a reduction in one of the other
influences, but the maximization approach merely attempts to develop and incorporate as much
of each schematic lens’ influence as possible for each situation. The maximization approach does
not artificially limit the potential incorporation of some perspective because of a predicted
concern that the influence of another perspective will be reduced. The maximization approach
would essentially use four separate efforts working in parallel (opposed to conditionally, in an
optimization approach) in order to identify a desirable, holistic governance solution. For the
maximization approach, a suboptimal outcome is fully expected because it is anticipated that
either (1) the desired increase in one influence will cause an undesired decrease in another
influence or (2) the unique interactive effect between the influences for that particular situation
mean that a pure maximization of influences never achieves the most desirable outcome.
Despite a suboptimal outcome, the maximization approach could be a worthy initial
substitute for seeking to achieve holistic governance because it has several potential benefits.
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The overt usage of the maximization approach would draw attention to each schematic influence
in areas where one or more perspectives might otherwise have been easily overlooked. The
approach could also be expected to promote the deliberate discourse of a shared goal and,
necessarily, better articulation of that goal. It would help prevent the nonrational decision maker
from having to confront the complex decision making processes that could cause cognitive
gridlock, and it could also prevent a focus on governance prediction by replacing it with a focus
on governance composition. The maximization approach likely allows decision makers to focus
on simple, “within domain” tradeoffs between options that deliver varying amounts of each
perspective’s values. There is also a high likelihood that a deliberate attempt to increase the
positive influences of each schematic lens will result in each perspective being significantly
incorporated into the governance choice that is eventually selected. Finally, it might be accurate
to say that the worst thing that could happen is a highly efficient, effective, ethical, and equitable
governance approach to be adopted.
The maximization approach can be visually represented and incorporated into the
nonrational shared mental model presented in this work by identifying the positive aspects of
each influence as if they were additional ideologies that could be selected. They are presented
below as ideologies numbered 13 through 16 and shown together in Figure 23. These influences
are presented in the first diagram as individual factors contributing to the attainment of holistic
governance. The second diagram, Figure 24, then presents holistic governance as its own
potential governance ideology to express preference for and sets it within the context of the other
core ideologies presented in this work.
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13. Enhancing the influence of statism through improvements in efficiency.
14. Enhancing the influence of the communitarian through improved ethics.
15. Enhancing the influence of the groupism though improved effectiveness.
16. Enhancing the influence of the liberalism though improved justice.

State

13
01
Individual

16
01

Holistic
Governance

14
01

Everyone

15
01

Group

Figure 23. The development of Holistic Governance.
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Figure 24. Holistic governance presented as an ideological option.
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Thought Experiment #4
The concept of holistic governance is assumed to be a rather desirable goal for most
governance decision makers. However, environments that are explicitly unlike the governance
situations that could be expected to occur from an emphasis on seeking holistic governance are
the focus of thought experiment #4. In terms of theoretical implications, this research has
explored so far (a) what happens when the competition between two schematic lenses is resolved
(ideology), (b) what might be happening in terms of the predominant ideology in a nation-state
when one schematic lens becomes more powerful, (c) how real-life government environments
may be more accurately represented by some form of prioritization structure among all four
potential schematic lenses, and (d) what it might look like for policymakers to strive for a
balanced approach to governance through a holistic approach. As a final experiment, this
research questions what a governance environment might look like if one of the four schematic
lenses were functionally absent from a particular governance environment.
If all of the proposed schematic lenses present values that are believed to be inherently
equivalent to one another and if each value is also believed to be cognitively accessible to the
typical decision maker, then it stands to reason that a normal governance environment would
exhibit some degree of influence from each schematic lens. There may, however, be governance
environments where, for some reason, one of these normally included schematic lenses was not
present. It is proposed here that if this occurred there could be a significant and distinguishable
impact on how people in that environment lived.
To refer back to thought experiment #2, three of the presented preference structure
diagrams implicitly called into question if there was any relevance or practical significance to
including a fourth schematic lens. It may be important to explore this possible feature of some
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governance environments. Saying that a schematic lens does not have a significant influence on
governance decisions may be the same as saying that that schematic lens is not functionally
present or at all relevant in the minds of decision makers. For some governance environments,
there may be a difference between a schematic lens having at least a 1% chance of having
influence and having a 0% chance of impacting governance decisions. For the situations labeled
conceptually as being at least 1% concerned with the perspectives derived from a particular
schematic lens, maybe there are factors that serve as moderating factors that could temporarily
flip the ranking of schematic preferences in some way.
This thought experiment, however, is about exploring governance environments where
even the potential effect of a schematic lens having an influence through a moderating factor is
not possible. In these environments, the entire set of concepts derived from one of the schematic
lenses is absent. This absence could theoretically occur because that lens’ concepts are
forbidden, selected out of existence, functionally unable to be used, or simply have not been
thought of yet because of the population’s stage of development or isolation. Such claims could
challenge the assumed universality of the governance schematic lenses proposed in this work,
but this thought experiment is not meant to directly challenge those assumptions as much as
explore alternate possible governance dynamics that could occur.
The governance environments presented in this last thought experiment might be able to
be characterized as “fundamentally flawed.” Each of the four fundamentally flawed governance
environments exhibits a complete lack of influence from one of the schematic lenses. The
political philosophy representative of each schematic lens is used here to identify each of these
environments. The environment that lacks liberalism is labeled with a “A,” the environment that
lacks groupism is labeled with a “B,” the environment that lacks communitarianism is labeled
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with a “C,” and the environment that lacks statism is labeled with a “D.” The diagram below
depicts these arrangements. Each of these four environments will be explored individually in the
following paragraphs. Figure 25 below depicts the components missing from each combination.

Figure 25. Environments lacking a core schematic frame.

The governance environment labeled with an “A” includes every schematic influence but
liberalism. This means that this environment would have little concern for the importance of
individual agency or family structures. This environment would have the influences of authority,
society, and group affiliations, but it would not have people concerned with a sense of self-
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interest and a desire for equity throughout the population. This sort of environment could be a
very unequal society, have great disparities between people, generally lack a sense of justice for
individuals, or have a constant sense of unrest that needs to be managed in some way. An
environment that has these features might look similar to a caste system.
The governance environment labeled with an “B” includes every schematic influence but
groupism. This means that the environment would have little concern for the importance of
smaller, subset communities. This environment would have the influences of authority, society,
and self-interest, but it would not have people particularly concerned with group affiliations.
This sort of environment could be very ineffective when it came to achieving any particular
governance initiative that looks to advance the development of a people. An environment lacking
the influence of groupism would have no suborganization below the nation as a whole, have few
intentional and coordinated efforts by different groups of people to achieve various desired goals,
be classless, and link individuals to society through strong ceremonial displays. This sort of
governance environment might see little need for different types of government services to be
produced and have little structure in place to deliver such services. An environment that has
these features might look similar to a remote island community.
The governance environment labeled with an “C” includes every schematic influence but
communitarianism. This means that the environment would have little concern for the
importance of collective will for a society. This environment would have the influences of
authority, group affiliations, and self-interest, but it would not have people particularly
concerned with the righteousness of society’s ways. This sort of environment would act in very
unethical ways. It could easily become corrupt and commit atrocities, but given the
characteristics it does have, it could however be agile and domineering. An example of a
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governance environment that best characterizes these sorts of tendencies might be Hitler’s Third
Reich in Nazi Germany.
The governance environment labeled with an “D” includes every schematic influence but
statism. This means that the environment would have little concern for the importance of topdown state control. This environment would have the influences of society, group affiliations,
and self-interest, but it would lack the influences associated with an overarching state authority.
This sort of governance environment would be highly inefficient in its attempts to achieve
nation-level socio-political endeavors. A population of people living in this type of environment
would be comparatively weak compared to other nation-states, have unsettled lands with
nomadic groups, and lack the ability to be strongly united through leadership towards some
cause. People that live in this sort of governance environment might be characterized as
“barbarians.”
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